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Abstract 
China is a huge country with a big territory and an even bigger population. The issue 
of how to deal with local government is one that has long vexed the central 
government of every Chinese epoch. Since the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China, China has experienced rounds of decentralization and 
centralization. The central-local relationship has experienced many changes as well. 
Thus, there is fierce debate over whether China is still a unitary country or whether it 
has transformed into a federalist nation. The central aim of this thesis is to provide an 
examination of the nature of the central-local relationship in Chinese governance, and 
to provide an understanding of how this central-local relationship affects healthcare 
social policies in China. 
Research was conducted cumulatively in three steps. First, it drew a lesson from the 
variety of literature on arrangement of central-local relations and policy process to 
build a theoretical context and foundation for this research. Secondly, the research 
examined whether the central-local relationship in China could be categorized as a 
federalist system or a unitary system, or whether neither label was suitable. This 
examination led to an understanding of “de facto federalism”, which provides an 
institutional description of the central-local relationship in Chinese governance. The 
examination was also conducted with reference to Paul Pierson’s three characteristics 
of federalism, namely: reservation of specific powers to constituent units; expression 
of interests to the centre; and the extent of commitment to fiscal equalization across 
the states. Thirdly, this research conducted a fieldwork study which included a 
document study and semi-structured interviews in three different Chinese provinces 
to examine and explore the nature of central-local relation in China and its impact on 
healthcare policy. 
It was observed that the de facto federalism partly captures the nature of central-local 
relationship from perspectives such as the extent of local autonomy and the 
reciprocity mechanism within central-local interactions. However, the central-local 
relationship in China does have many unique features. It is profoundly influenced by 
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the culture of unity, which seems to be the boundary of any reform in China. 
Meanwhile, China has a long history of non-institutionalized central-local power 
distribution, which is the result of a “dynamic” central-local relationship. The central 
government takes more initiatives to change the power distribution within such a 
dynamic central-local relationship. Indeed, de facto federalism has been constrained 
by these features. The rise of the “project mechanism” could be regarded as a sign of 
this dynamic relation and the central government seems to take more and more 
initiative when dealing with local governments. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Section 1.1 The central-local relationship in China 
1.1.1 Central-local relationship in history 
The long history of China is one where centralization has been continuously 
strengthened and local forces have been continuously weakened. Although China 
initially experienced three major secessions, it eventually moved towards three grand 
united dynasties (the Qin dynasty, Sui dynasty and Ming dynasty). Why were local 
separatist periods always short and why did each secession result in a centralized 
political regime? There are many reasons, but the major ones are perhaps the high 
regard for unity and the negative attitude towards secession which have existed in 
Chinese culture for a long time. The Chinese, as an ethnic group, have a strong sense 
of self-awareness and cultural superiority, which Fairbank (1986) termed “cultural 
nationalism”. Such awareness led to unity being the main idea for Chinese people. 
When Max Weber studied religion in China, he suggested that there was a stable 
factor that maintained the unity of China (Weber, 1977). The separatists that had 
appeared in China did not try to set up separate nation states. Their aim was not 
national independence or separatism, but to overthrow the current dynasty and 
establish a new one to unify China (Deng and Deng, 2004). Meanwhile, prevention 
against and containment of local forces were also priorities in China, especially for its 
rulers. When the Qin dynasty was established, the emperor drew lessons from the fall 
of the Shang and Zhou dynasties, which were both ruined by local forces; the feudal 
system was removed and replaced by the prefectures system. Since then, China’s 
central power has continuously been strengthened while local forces have been 
continuously weakened. Although there were periods of great division, such as at the 
end of the Han dynasty and the end of the Tang dynasty, historical lessons had caused 
Chinese rulers to be extra vigilant against local forces (Wang and Lin, 1985). In the 
Song dynasty, the first emperor Zhao Kuangyin highly centralized military, political, 
financial and judicial powers. Local administrative units were diminished and the 
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powers of local officials were dispersed. Such policies made the Chinese centralized 
system more mature (Zhao, 2004). In the Ming and Qing dynasties, central power (or 
imperial power) was greatly increased. Except for in the early stages of these 
dynasties, local separatist problems did not occur again for a long time (ibid.). As can 
be seen from this history, a regard for unity and a high degree of vigilance towards 
local forces have rooted themselves in the minds of Chinese rulers. Such a 
phenomenon has deeply affected the central-local relationship of present-day China. 
Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), China has 
experienced several cycles of centralization and decentralization in the central-local 
relationship. However, China has generally developed via the route of centralization. 
The leaders took decentralization into consideration and tried to maintain the 
enthusiasm of local government. But at the same time, the central government 
maintains a high degree of vigilance towards localism. After the founding of the PRC, 
the central government set up six large administrative districts in the northeast, north, 
northwest, east, south central and southwest of China. Both the Party Committee and 
the People’s Government were also set up within each district on behalf of the 
authorities of the Party Central Committee and the central government, to help the 
national economy recover and solidify the regime (Xie and He, 2010). In 1953, the 
first Five-Year Plan was implemented, and a large-scale economic construction 
commenced. This process helped form the national centralized management system. 
The planned economic system was formed and the power of the central government 
was also strengthened during the process. China then experienced decentralization in 
1956, which ended in 1961, and again at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution 
until 1975. However, these changes only focused on economic rights and the highly 
centralized planned economic system was not changed. These decentralizations did 
not bring political change either (Xie and He, 2010). Since the power of local 
governments during these periods was expanded and the power of central 
government was passively narrowed, the central government still maintained a 
dominating role over the local governments. 
16 
The long history before China’s reform and opening up is, in fact, a history of 
constantly strengthened centralization and constantly consolidated unity. It is also 
simultaneously a long history of vigilance against local separatists. Eliminating local 
forces and taking precautions against them had long been basic policies of the central 
government of each dynasty. During the long process of suppressing local forces and 
separatists, the centralized regime became accepted and the culture of unity 
permeated the minds of Chinese people. The dominant political force was not the 
only one who set maintaining unity as its highest goal. Oppositional and discrete 
political leaders also set establishing a new and reunified dynasty as their goal. Even 
normal people regard protecting the unity of the imperial power as just (Zhao, 2006). 
Such political culture ensured that China was reunified each time it split up. It also 
made local forces a lot more passive in relation to the central government as local 
governments held quite limited powers and could not even voice different opinions 
on central government decisions and policies. 
However, when China started to reform and open up in the 1980s, it unleashed new 
forces that had great influence on central-local relations. The economy developed 
alongside the growing local force because local governments were the main engine of 
economic development in the 1980s. The central government had to encourage the 
local governments to develop while staying vigilant against local authorities that may 
endanger central authority and national unity. Furthermore, the economic 
development from China opening up has produced inequality between different 
provinces. This issue has raised new concerns about how the country is governed. 
The central-local relationship and how the two forces interact with each other have 
experienced new changes as well. 
 
Section 1.2. Research problems 
While China has experienced significant changes in central-local relations, scholars 
have been slow to develop their views on this issue. This is because there is little in 
way of social policy research in China and the ability to engage in serious 
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evidence-based research is circumscribed by jealously guarded access to government 
organizations – the preserve of the privileged few. Little attempt has been made to 
either combine traditional Chinese scholarship with Western theories or develop 
authentic Chinese theories of central-local relations affecting specific policies such as 
healthcare. Moreover, very few research studies examine central-local relations 
based on current changes such as the rise of project mechanism. 
 
Section 1.3 Theory building 
This research aims to combine domestic Chinese scholarship with Western theories. 
It will be conducted cumulatively in three steps. Firstly, it draws on historical 
institutionalist theory. Since the central-local relationship has been regarded as a kind 
of institution, historical institutionalism helps to establish a theoretical foundation 
and analytical approach to explore the nature of the central-local relationship. 
Secondly, it reviews both Western and Eastern perspectives on the central-local 
relationship and how it affects social policy – specifically, Zheng’s (2007) “de facto 
federalism” and Pierson’s (1995) three institutional factors that affect social policy 
process. This examination will lead to an understanding of de facto federalism, which 
will provide an institutional description of the central-local relationship in Chinese 
governance from many perspectives such as interaction mechanism and interest 
expression. Thirdly, the research will apply this “de facto federalism” to a fieldwork 
study which will include a document study and semi-structured interviews conducted 
in three different Chinese provinces. The aim of this step is to find out whether it 
captures the nature of the central-local relationship in China. 
The decentralization and opening up of China that commenced in the 1980s has 
granted local authorities plenty of economic powers. As the local government 
gradually obtains a certain degree of autonomy on local policies and fiscal rights, the 
central-local relationship itself may evolve into a contract-based cooperation and 
bargaining relationship (Rodden, 2004). Thus, the role of the local government has 
changed from being an agent of the central government to being a stakeholder. The 
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central-local relationship in China, especially in terms of the economy, has presented 
more and more features similar to those of federalism. Among theories relating to the 
central-local relationship in China such as market-preserving federalism, “de facto 
federalism”, which was developed by Zheng, provides an institutional way to explore 
the changes and features of the central-local relationship based on the in-depth study 
of central-local government interaction in the different provinces of China during the 
opening-up and reform period. It also involves political features and traditions in 
exploring the whole picture of central-local relations. It seems to be a more 
reasonable theory that describes the central-local relationship in China compared to 
other theories. 
Pierson’s three dynamics, which was developed by Paul Pierson in 1995, has 
provided a specific way to explore how the institutional elements affect outcomes of 
social policy. Three institutional dynamics, namely reservation of specific powers to 
constituent units, interest expression to the centre of different tiers and the extent of 
commitment to fiscal equalization across the states, were emphasized to discuss how 
these institutional arrangements influence policy outcomes (Pierson, 1995, p. 463). 
These two theories are both institutional by nature but emphasize different 
perspectives of central-local relations, therefore Pierson’s three dynamics theory was 
chosen to complement de facto federalism to help explore how this institutional 
arrangement affects the outcomes of social policy in China. 
 
De facto federalism – a reasonable explanation of central-local relations in China? 
Zheng (2007) studied the formal and practical aspects of central-local relations over a 
long period and did in-depth case studies of three typical provinces in China. From 
the research, he suggests that de facto federalism in the central-local relationship in 
China is better explained from a behavioural perspective. Zheng defines de facto 
federalism as: 
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A relatively institutionalized pattern which involves an explicit or implicit 
bargain between the centre and the provinces, one element in the bargain being 
that the provinces receive certain institutionalized or ad hoc benefits in return for 
guarantees by provincial officials that they will behave in certain ways on behalf 
of the centre. (Zheng, 2007, p. 39) 
Moreover, according to Zheng, China’s central-local relationship could be described 
as de facto federalism because it satisfies the following conditions (Zheng, 2007, p. 
39–40):  
1. A hierarchical political structure in which both central government and 
provincial governments have some activities on which they make final 
decisions. 
2. Intergovernmental decentralization is institutionalized to such a degree that it is 
increasingly difficult for the central government to unilaterally impose its 
discretion on the provinces and alter the distribution of authority between 
governments. 
3. Provinces have primary responsibility over their economy and, to some extent, 
the politics within their jurisdictions.  
The intergovernmental decentralization which started after 1978 could be seen as the 
starting point of de facto federalism in China. During this decentralization, many 
political and economic policy-making powers for areas such as local public security 
and road construction were obtained by the local government. The local government 
became the economic planner and used these granted powers to develop an 
independent power base and increase local wealth. A large portion of economic 
decision-making authority was decentralized from the central government to 
individual enterprises as well. Such decentralization completed the reform which 
aimed to achieve a more laissez-faire economic model where the central government 
does not intervene in the economy (Zheng, 2007). The political transition during the 
decentralization is another big step for China in the reform period. Certain rights were 
given to protect both individuals and social groups from arbitrary acts by the state 
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while citizens were given more rights to raise issues and participate in institutions and 
elections. This liberalization and partial democratization included a broader portion 
of the society in the process of economic and political decision making. Therefore, 
this decentralization was not only a process which decentralized power from the 
central to local authorities, but also from government to the society. Local 
governments obtained institutional status and legitimacy to intervene in economic 
activities under their jurisdiction. Moreover, since local authorities became less 
dependent on the central government, the central-local relationship became a more 
interdependent one. It became necessary for the central government to seek the 
cooperation of the local government when it wanted to implement policies. At the 
same time, local officials also changed their strategies for dealing with the central 
government (Zheng, 2007). 
 
Pierson’s three dynamics – a perspective on how central-local relationship 
arrangements affect social policy 
Pierson (1995) analysed the relation between federalism and policy outcome in a 
more comprehensive way. His research suggests three characteristics of federalism 
which have great relevance to social policy outcomes, namely (Pierson, 1995, p. 
463): 
1. Reservation of specific powers to constituent units,  
2. Interest expression to the centre of different tiers, and  
3. The extent of commitment to fiscal equalization across the states.  
In other words, Pierson has offered a research strategy for studying the issue from the 
perspective of constituent units’ power, an interaction model between the central 
government and state government and the fiscal relationship between all constituent 
units. The first characteristic, reservation of constituent units’ power, has various 
effects on social policy outcomes in different countries mostly due to constitutional 
differences. This characteristic not only involves constituent units’ power but also 
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potentially restricts the policy intervention power of the central government. The way 
interests of different tiers are represented federally can also be considered in terms of 
the extent to which member states are able to influence the central government. The 
degree of fiscal equalization across the constituent units produces a great impact on 
the development of social policy. Fiscal capacity and approach really matters when it 
comes to state members’ attitudes towards social policy. States whose income mostly 
relies on revenue redistribution from the central government usually have more 
motivation to support expansive social policy innovation. Other constituent units 
who gain their income through local taxation tend to hold more conservative attitudes 
on social policy or even block welfare reform to protect the interest of local 
businesses which are their main source of fiscal income. 
 
Section 1.4 Selection of policy field 
Before the opening up of China, the central government had great power over social 
welfare and plenty of public services were uniformly provided by the central 
government. After decentralization started in the 1980s, the role of government in 
social security and welfare was weakened and the central government even 
relinquished certain fields. Market forces and local governments became increasingly 
important and took over within those fields. During the changing of the central-local 
relationship, healthcare appeared to be quite significantly affected by 
decentralization and centralization. During decentralization in the 1980s, local 
government and local market forces became the main source of the development of 
healthcare services. Thus, a big gap rapidly formed between different provinces on 
healthcare services. Medical service resources quickly transferred from towns to big 
cities or from undeveloped areas to developed areas. Large hospitals increasingly had 
better technology and equipment, while primary healthcare institutions such as rural 
township hospitals, health centres and other community medical institutions were 
gradually shrinking – many could not even survive. 
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When (selective) centralization was launched, healthcare reforms were accordingly 
activated. The trend of privatization of healthcare was strictly controlled by the 
central government and market forces were weakened. The bargaining and 
cooperation between the central and local governments subsequently made the 
healthcare system more and more complex and inefficient after reform. Therefore, as 
the healthcare system is obviously very sensitive to the changes of central-local 
relations, it would be a good policy field to explore the influence of central-local 
relations upon social policy. Moreover, from the perspective of data accessibility, 
healthcare records are a better choice than other policy fields such as housing in 
China because there is less sensitive information involved. 
 
Section 1.5 Research questions 
This thesis will focus on two questions:  
1. What best characterises the nature of the central-local relationship in China? 
2. How does the central-local relationship affect healthcare policies in China? 
 
Section 1.6 Methods 
The principle theoretical aim of this thesis is to combine de facto federalism with a 
broader understanding of the transformation of central-local relations rooted in a 
historical perspective and to provide a comprehensive analysis of the nature of 
central-local relations and their impact on healthcare policy. Fieldwork will be 
deployed as the principal approach for conducting this research, and the data for this 
thesis will be collected via the use of semi-structured interviews and documentary 
analysis. This thesis deploys a qualitatively oriented data collection. 
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Section 1.7 The structure of the thesis 
This thesis is organized into seven further chapters. Chapter 2 (‘Background of the 
political structure and the central-local relationship in China’) provides an in-depth 
review of the political structure of China, which includes the government system and 
the party system. A review of central-local relations is also provided in this chapter, 
which focuses on the transformation process and current problems. 
Chapter 3 consists of a literature review. The first section explores the theoretical 
context to study the central-local relationship and draw lessons from historical 
institutionalism. The second section is an in-depth discussion of central-local 
relations which emphasizes the typology and power distribution. The chapter also 
examines how institutions affect social policy by reviewing the relevant literatures. 
Here, Pierson’s (1995) theory of three characteristics of federalism that affect social 
policy is chosen to be explored within the context of China in later chapters. 
Chapter 4 (‘Central-local relations in China: unitary, federalism or neither?’) then 
discusses whether China should be categorized under federalism, the unitary system 
or neither. China has both federalist and unitary features in its political and economic 
situation, however, de facto federalism seems to be a more reasonable theory to 
provide an explanation for such a comprehensive situation. This is also selected to be 
explored within the context of China. 
Chapter 5 (‘The healthcare system in China’) discusses China’s healthcare system, 
which is the chosen policy field of this thesis. It provides a snapshot of social policy 
in China. Reasons are given as to why healthcare was the chosen area of study. At the 
end of this chapter, there is a review of the developing process of China’s healthcare 
system from 1951 to the present day in order to help understand how it works and 
grasp some specific features. 
Chapter 6 (‘Methodology’) sets out how the research was undertaken. It also 
chronicles how I, drawing on literature on research methods, considered appropriate 
methodologies and subsequently developed the study. A detailed explanation of the 
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research design is provided to show how and why the sample provinces were 
selected. 
Chapter 7 (‘Findings’) draws on a broad range of elite interviews with officials and 
academics in three sample provinces in China. The interview transcripts are reviewed 
according to Pierson’s three characteristics in order to explore whether these 
institutional factors operate in the context of China. 
Chapter 8 (‘Discussion’) provides an in-depth discussion based on the findings from 
interviews and the documentary study. This chapter tries to answer the research 
questions on the nature of central-local relations in China and how this affects 
healthcare policy in terms of power distribution, the interaction model and 
central-local fiscal relations. It also notes that recent changes such as the rise of 
project mechanism somehow limit the extent to which de facto federalism can be 
regarded as an accurate description of current central-local relations in China. 
Finally, this thesis concludes with a summary of the main theoretical, methodological 
and research findings. The research questions are comprehensively answered in this 
last chapter. When the research is considered within the Chinese context, de facto 
federalism can be regarded as a periodical description of central-local relations, but 
dynamism is discovered to be a fundamental feature of central-local relations based 
on the transformation process and special context. 
 
Section 1.8 Note on terminology 
In mentions of “government” in the following chapters, any references to local 
government on a specific level will be presented with clear indication such as 
“provincial government” or “county government”. Otherwise, “local government” 
refers to the general governing bodies which are below the central government. 
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Section 1.9 Contribution 
This research seeks to make three main contributions to the study of Chinese social 
policy. Firstly, it provides substantial in-depth interview data about central-local 
relations and their impact on healthcare social policy. Secondly, it combines Chinese 
scholarship with Western theories through an examination of de facto federalism and 
Pierson’s three characteristics within the Chinese context. Lastly, it provides a 
broader view of the nature of central-local relations and their impact on healthcare 
policy rather than just their periodical features and impact. 
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Chapter 2: The political system and the 
central-local relationship in China 
This research seeks to understand the role of central-local government relationships 
within a healthcare system. Since China is a huge country with a different culture and 
history from that of Western countries, and its unique institutional settings are full of 
complexities, realities there may be more complicated than in other places. This 
chapter will provide a brief overview the political structure and intergovernmental 
relations in China which provide important context for this research. Section 1 
discusses the political system from formal and informal perspectives, while Section 2 
discusses the central-local government relationships in China’s history and in recent 
years.  
Section 2.1: Political structure of China 
2.1.1 Review of state structure 
Due to its long historical development, China has gone through many changes in 
terms of state structure. Since the founding of the PRC in 1949, the structure has 
undergone several changes. China used to have five levels of local government. At 
present, according to the constitution, China utilizes a centralized structure where the 
entire administrative system is divided into four levels: provincial, municipal, county 
and town. The structure is illustrated by Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1: Government structure of China 
 
Source: Organic Law of PRC on Local NPC and Local Government (2004). 
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2.1.1.1. Central government 
In spite of the role of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) and the lack of 
competitive elections, the governmental structure of China is still a little similar to 
Western parliamentary systems, with both president and prime minister appointed by 
a parliament and a semi-independent judiciary. 
The PRC government is presided over by President Xi Jinping, who entered the office 
in 2013. He also chaired China’s Central Military Commission, which supervises 
China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Traditionally, the president 
always chairs the Central Military Commission. 
Much of the PRC governing structure falls under the charge of the State Council. The 
State Council is headed by China’s premier Li Keqiang, who also entered office in 
2013. There are vice premiers, ministries, bureaus, commissions and agencies under 
the Premier. They serve as the administrator and regulator, responsible for the daily 
operation of government.  
The State Council administers the offices of China’s executive bureaucracy, which 
include ministries, commissions and offices. There are 27 ministries and 
commissions, which are ranked the highest among PRC government offices. There 
are 30 “directly administered offices”, including most government offices not 
mentioned above, which report directly to the State Council. There are also 
differences between these directly administered offices. For example, there are 
directly administered government bureaus, such as the State Administration of 
Education, and directly administered professional organizations, such as the National 
School of Administration. Quite a few these offices are granted ministry-level status 
by the State Council.  
There are also 11 indirectly administered offices, such as the National Energy 
Administration, which are under the State Council but supervised by ministry-level 
offices. Moreover, there are a handful of “leading groups” which lead on specific 
policy concerns under the State Council. Such leading groups are typically headed by 
a senior-level leader (at the premier or vice premier level) and report to a relevant 
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central ministry. The Leading Group on Western Development, for example, is 
chaired by the Premier Li Keqiang and reports to the National Development and 
Reform Commission.  
 
Legislative organs 
China has two main bodies responsible for legislation – the National People’s 
Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC). The NPC is China’s highest legislative branch; it is responsible for all laws 
at the national level and approves the appointment of leaders at the national level. In 
practice, however, the NPC has long acted as a “rubber stamp” organisation which 
has little practical influence; only recently has it played a more independent role in 
daily politics. It meets in full once a year, while the Standing Committee meets 
bimonthly. The CPPCC is a parliamentary body which is formed by other political 
parties in China. The CPPCC serves as a forum for discussing big public issues and 
provides advice to State Council and the CPC. However, it holds no decision-making 
authority or power on these issues. 
 
Judicial organs 
The Chinese judicial organs consist of the People’s courts and the Procuratorate 
courts. The People’s Court is responsible for handling civil, criminal and 
administrative cases as well as appeals. In addition to the normal court, there are 
specialized military courts, maritime courts and railway courts which handle specific 
cases. Procuratorate courts supervise the application and enforcement of laws.  
 
2.1.1.2. Local government 
As shown in Figure 1, there are four types of provincial government in China: 
(general) provincial government, autonomous region government, municipal 
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government of centrally administered cities and government of special administrative 
regions (SARs). Due to the special nature of SARs, this thesis will not be concerned 
with them. 
 
Function of local government  
According to the Constitution (Article 107), the function of local government is to 
manage economic and other affairs within its jurisdiction. This specifically includes: 
1. Managing and developing the economy, education, science, culture, health, 
sports, and urban and rural construction within its jurisdiction,  
2. Administrating finance, civil affairs, public security, nationalities affairs, judicial 
administration, supervision and other administrative work within its jurisdiction, 
3. Appointing, removing, training, evaluating, rewarding and punishing 
administrative staffs within its jurisdiction (The PRC, 2004, amended by author). 
 
Since decentralization started in the 1980s, local governments have gained a large 
amount of power from the central government, and play an increasingly important 
role in economic development. For example, there were great socio-economic leaps 
in the Pearl River Delta. Between 1980 and 1993, the numer of local enterprises in the 
Delta increased from 30,850 to 403,898, and by 1993 the industrial output value by 
local industries consisted of 39.49% of the total industrial value (Yiu, 1996). 
Meanwhile during the decentralization in 1980s, many local governments took 
ownership of many enterprises. Hence, local governments directly intervened in the 
economy and played a leading role in local economic development.   
 
Formation of local governments  
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For local governments at the county level or higher, senior officers of local 
governments such as provincial governor, the chairmen of the autonomous regions, 
the mayors and heads of autonomous prefectures, counties and districts are elected by 
the corresponding People’s Congresses (Organic Law of PRC on Local NPC and 
Local Government, Article 8). It is notable that these local administrative officers are 
elected through an indirect election system, in which the local voters elect the 
representatives to the People’s Congresses who then have the right to elect the 
officers of local governments. The candidates for the positions of senior officer and 
vice officer should be nominated by the presidium of the people’s representatives or 
co-nominated by more than ten representatives (Organic Law of PRC on Local NPC 
and Local Government, Article 8). 
Structural relations of local governments  
Local governments in China operate within a hierarchical system of leadership at 
different levels, where the lower level is in principle subordinate to the higher levels 
(Yang, 2003). The provincial governments lead the municipal governments. City 
governments lead county governments and county governments lead town 
governments. Governments at the lower level are principally under the leadership, 
instruction, and supervision of governments at a higher level. This means that local 
governments on the one hand exercise their powers independently under the guidance 
of higher-level governments, but on the other hand may have to complete tasks 
required by government at a higher level (Yang, 2003). 
 
2.1.2 The de facto system in political structure and informal rules 
The political organs and mechanisms mentioned above make up the dominant 
political system of China. Such a dominant system refers to that which is expressly 
provided in the rules of formal specification. These formal rules mainly include 
relevant provisions of the constitution, the Party Constitution and other specific 
formal documents which relate to local power configuration and performance 
evaluation. At the same time, China also has a recessive system in its political 
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structure that contrasts with the dominant system. A de facto system is one that is not 
expressly provided for but in fact plays a role in the system and policymaking process. 
It may appear to deviate from the formal system; it may appear to be complementary 
and corrective to the formal system. This system provides important context to 
understand the political system in China. The main aspects and features of this system 
will be discussed in the following sections. 
 
2.1.2.1 Demand-led government behavioural preferences 
The demands of government at higher levels lead the governments at lower levels. 
This higher-government-demand-led system means that the preference structure of 
local government is compatible with the requirements of the higher levels of 
government. This is in contrast to the public-demand-led preference structure. Some 
scholars such as Jiang and Yang (2008) and Zhu (2008) have studied this system 
from the angle of fiscal expenditure and have concluded that local governments have 
more motivation to develop the economy and minimal motivation for affairs that 
service people’s well-being. Among the services for people’s well-being, education, 
health and social security receive attention from local governments, but only in terms 
of guaranteeing stability; outside of the stability concerns, the local governments 
have little enthusiasm for these services. 
This preference structure is a result of the policy guidance of central and higher levels 
of government. Over the years, central policies have revolved around economic 
development and stability overrides everything. Under the guidance of such a policy, 
local governments are active in economic development and social stability work, 
while for education, health and social security, services for people’s well-being, 
policies and fiscal input are insufficient (Lin, 2000). Despite the policies resulting 
from central and higher levels of government, specific performance appraisals have a 
direct impact on the behavioural preferences of local governments. We often see 
“image projects” – projects done to make one look good – implemented by local 
governments to cope with the higher-level assessment. In order to achieve 
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outstanding results in the assessment, local governments may be willing to commit 
fraud in the statistics (Lin, 2000). For identical infrastructure projects, those in urban 
areas will be quickly launched and built while projects in distant rural areas will be 
delayed. The reason such things happen are because appraisal cycles for local 
government are generally shorter and the assessment methods prefer the use of 
quantitative indicators (Jiang and Yang, 2008). In order to adapt to this assessment 
system, local governments are more interested in implementing policies that could be 
well expressed by quantitative statistics (Jiang and Yang, 2008). Therefore, the 
projects which are more valued by their superiors and more visible – projects 
displaying engineering feats with minimal effort – are favoured by local 
governments.  
In 2005, the central government proposed establishing a harmonious socialist society 
in order to correct the imbalance of economic and social development caused by the 
preceding period. Local governments’ policy behaviour in recent years has also 
adapted (Jiang and Yang, 2008), and they have been paying more attention to 
fulfilling the central guidance. Although some goals were achieved, the behavioural 
preferences of local governments in China are still in the 
higher-government-demand-led mode because the appraisal system has not changed 
very much. 
 
2.1.2.2 Preference of mandatory administrative tools 
Mandatory actions are the main administrative tool chosen by the Chinese 
government. There is a variety of governmental administrative tools. In order to solve 
practical problems, there cannot be just a single tool, but a portfolio of tools available 
to the government. According to their social attributes, administrative tools can be 
generally classified as mandatory, voluntary and mixed (Huang, 2010). Mandatory 
administrative tools of the government are public control and direct offers; voluntary 
tools of the government are the market, communities, families and voluntary 
organizations; mixed tools of the government always present themselves as subsidies, 
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taxes, user fees and property rights auctions. The mandatory administrative tools of 
the government are considered the highest level of government intervention in the 
tools category. The voluntary tools of the government are at the lowest level while the 
mixed government tools are in the middle of the category. 
Specific policy decisions will bring about different choices, and the government’s 
preference of which tools it uses will reflect the behavioural characteristics of the 
government. The Chinese governments, especially local governments, usually prefer 
mandatory administrative tools, followed by mixed governmental administrative 
tools (Huang, 2010). The voluntary administrative tools are rarely selected. This 
situation is due to many factors: the political system, the economic and social system, 
political culture, the level of political democracy, economic and social development, 
and the values, position and cognitive abilities of the decision makers (Huang, 2010). 
Since China’s reform and opening up, and with in-depth development of the market 
economy, the national social structure has improved significantly. The progress of 
political reform has continuously accelerated. Especially with the widespread 
dissemination of advanced concepts of government and governance, the proportion 
of non-mandatory administrative tools used has grown; significantly the use of 
economic tools has become more frequent, which is directly related to the process of 
market-oriented economic development (ibid.). However, the situation has not 
fundamentally changed the fact that mandatory administrative tools are still the first 
choice for the Chinese government. 
 
2.1.2.3 The dominating role of government at the higher level 
Governments at higher levels have a dominant position, while the governments at 
lower levels are often passive. Here “government” may include the People’s 
Congress, People’s Government, the courts and Procuratorates. In the dominant 
system, the relationship between government at higher levels and lower levels is very 
complex. The executive organ and the Procuratorate implement a dual-leadership 
system according to the relevant laws and rules. For example, Article 132 of the 
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constitution and Article 10 of the People’s Procuratorate Organization Act declare 
that the lower Procuratorate is under the lead of the higher Procuratorate, which is at 
the same level as the People’s Congress and hence the Procuratorate should be 
subject to their supervision. However, the reality is the executive organ and the 
Procuratorate are dominated by higher-level government and are formally led by the 
People’s Congress at the same level. Generally speaking, the overall condition of 
China’s vertical intergovernmental relations is that lower-level governments obey the 
wishes of higher-level governments. Governments at higher levels can manipulate 
lower-level governments, which can also be seen as passive obedience. Such a 
situation may be the result of the lack of democracy within the entire political system. 
It may also be the result of China’s personnel management and the distribution 
pattern of leaders in relevant organs and institutions. 
 
2.1.2.4 The personification of government power operations 
The dominant system is expressly provided for by the Code of Conduct; an open, 
well-known list of rules for procedures. However, the reality is that these explicit 
specifications have not been fully complied with and implemented – they are 
modified and distorted or even completely opposite to the rules (Yang, 2003). One 
important issue associated with the softening of the dominant system is the 
personification of government power operations. In other words, the personification 
of power is a key cause of incomplete implementation of dominant rules. Therefore, 
personified governmental power seems like an unspoken universal rule of the 
political system in China and impacts the system continuously. The reason 
personified power operation occurs is because the power is too concentrated and 
lacks effective supervision in some sectors. The major drawbacks of such a 
phenomenon are excessive concentration of power, patriarchal leadership, life-long 
tenure of leadership and various privileges. Much of the political power is 
inappropriately concentrated in the Party committees. The powers of the Party 
committees tend to be concentrated on a few secretaries, especially on the first 
secretary (Deng, 1994). The first secretary may finalize everything as a commander. 
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Thus, leadership of the party often becomes a personal leadership (Deng, 1994). In 
China, the phenomenon of personal autocracy not only occurs in the governmental 
sector, but also extends to state-owned enterprises and institutions and has gradually 
become part of the recessive system in daily political life. 
2.1.2.5. The impact of “guan xi” 
Informal relationships (“guan xi” in Chinese) are a significant factor which affects 
the governmental process. This invisible rule is closely related to the personification 
of government power operation. In other words, the personified power is the direct 
cause of the informal-relationship effect. When investing in China, foreign investors 
may observe that informal relationships play a significant role. One might profit if 
one does not understand such relationships. Native Chinese people are clear about the 
importance of so-called relationships. Some people make a living by relying on such 
relationships and there is a kind of “relationship economy”. Some intermediaries 
even claim that they can help others buy official positions using their contacts and 
strong relationships; these were reported in cases of cheating in Beijing (Guo, 2010). 
The informal relationships relevant here are a kind of personal relationship 
contributed by familial relations, marriage, geopolitical factors, learning geography 
(relationship with classmates), industry and other factors. Due to the personified 
characteristics of the operation of governmental power, these informal relationships 
penetrate political life and play a role that formal relationships cannot match (Yang, 
2003). 
The areas affected by informal relationships are all-encompassing, such as personnel 
arrangements, development planning, investment, urban renewal, assessment 
appraisal and so on. For example, in the daily operation of a government, discovering 
and setting up “guan xi” has become the preoccupation of people inside and outside 
the institutions, dominating their main daily discourse and behavioural strategies 
(Zhou, 2005). In terms of access to official positions, a subordinate member 
relationship with his superiors may be a screening criterion to judge whether he 
deserves a promotion. In terms of power execution, “opening back doors” (i.e. 
making benefits for someone who has an informal relationship with the powerful 
37 
officer) has become a tacit strategy among government officials and local people. As 
for getting resources from government at higher levels, “hunting for projects” that 
rely on informal relationships and bribing officials have become normal and expected 
behaviour in local governments (Yang, 2003). People who are skilled in such 
informal relationship strategies could be dubbed geniuses or capable workers by their 
employers, and even obtain a certain social status and informal power themselves 
(Zhou, 2005). Proliferation of such behaviour based on relationships in local 
government leads to many difficulties in government power operations. A strong 
Machiavellian culture, which is rooted in informal relationships, leads to internal 
friction within institutions and organizations, meanwhile reducing the overall 
efficiency of the operation of power (Zhang, 2010). The informal relationships also 
violate the fairness within institutions and organizations and leads to the formation of 
a resource-adhesion mechanism based on informal relationships (Zhang, 2010).  
The dominant and recessive systems described above affect each other and together 
contribute to the behavioural pattern of government. For example, a highly 
centralized political system determines the elite political characteristics of the 
governmental process and set mandatory tools as the go-to selection for a government 
to achieve its goals. Only by grasping the character of these two systems can we 
effectively understand how the governments (at the central and local level) operate 
and affect social policies. 
 
2.1.3 The role of the CPC 
The CPC, which was established in 1921, has ruled China for more than sixty years. 
After it defeated the army force of Chiang Kai-shek, the CPC built up a new regime 
named the People’s Republic of China. From then on, the CPC has played a dominant 
role in China’s politics and profoundly evolved China’s political institutions and 
political culture. The following sections will emphasize the role of the CPC in 
China’s political system in order to present a holistic image of the CPC. 
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2.1.3.1 The scale and structure of the CPC 
According to the Party Constitution, any Chinese citizen who is over 18 and willing 
to accept the Party’s constitution and policies, for example being an atheist, may 
apply for the membership of the CPC. However, the approval rate is somewhat low. 
For example, while there were 21 million applicants in 2010, only 15% of them were 
accepted, of which less than a quarter were female (Zhao, 2011). In light of the 
statistics released by the Organization Department of the Communist Party Central 
Committee in 2011, the CPC has 80 million members which constitute approximately 
6% of the total population in China (Zhao, 2011). 
In accordance with the provisions of the Party Constitution, all Party members, 
regardless of their rank, must belong to a branch or a specific unit to attend the regular 
Party activities. These branches and units cover almost all the organizations and 
institutions in China. Most of the branches and units are distributed among official 
and semi-official organizations and institutions, including state-owned enterprises 
and academic institutes. The CPC also tries to set up Party cells within private 
enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises. These Party cells hold a great deal of 
influence within enterprises. The only exception is within the wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises, where the Party holds very little power. An increasing number of young 
people in China are eager to join the CPC precisely because of the ubiquity of Party 
organizations and the great control on promotion it wields in the public sector. 
The whole structure of the CPC can be divided into the central, local and the 
grass-roots parts. The central part is the highest authority and decision-making 
organization of the whole Party. CPC local organizations exist in the public sector at 
the provincial, municipal and county levels. Grass-roots organizations are widely 
present in enterprises, rural areas, offices, schools, research institutes, communities, 
social organizations, the enterprises owned by PLA and other grass-roots units. 
Based on the CPC’s constitution, as long as there are three full Party members in such 
organizations and institutions, a formal grass-roots Party unit will be set up. 
39 
At the very top of the entire Party system stands the Politburo Standing Committee 
(PSC). It is the most powerful and highest decision-making unit. It is composed of 
nine members, who are regarded as the nine most powerful men in China and are 
always named “the Big Nine”. Under PSC, there is a board Politburo which is 
composed of 23 members. These 23 people lead the Central Committee, which is 
composed of nearly 370 official and alternate members. Of the nine men who 
compose the PSC, each of them is concurrently responsible for the leadership in one 
or a few specific political systems. The top-ranking PSC member, General Secretary 
Xi Jinping, for example, concurrently serves as the chairman of the Central Military 
Commission and as the president of the PRC, which means he is the head of the state 
and military force. Zhang Dejiang, who is the second highest ranking member in the 
PSC, serves as the head of the NPC. Li Keqiang, the third most powerful man in 
China, serves as the premier of the State Council. In the fourth place is Yu 
Zhengsheng, who is responsible for the leadership of the CPPCC and the supervision 
of the non-communist group’s relationship with the Party. Other members in the PSC 
include the senior bureaucrats in the propaganda system, in the management of Party 
bureaucracy, finance and economics, Party discipline and internal security system 
(Lawrence and Martin, 2013). 
The full Politburo is the decision-making body below the PSC. Besides the nine men 
in the PSC, these members include the heads of major departments of the Party 
bureaucracy, the two highest-ranking officers in the Military Force, the vice premier 
of the State Council, State Councillors and the heads of important provinces and 
cities. Due to the relatively large size and geographic diversity of the personnel, the 
full Politburo is not involved in the decision making of day-to-day work. Their work 
tends to focus on discussing important issues and preparing for the national 
conference (Lawrence and Martin, 2013).  
The power of the PSC and full Politburo comes from the Central Committee in the 
lower layer. Approximately 370 official and alternate members together elect the 
Party General Secretary Politburo Standing Committee and the full Politburo, and 
“decide” on the composition of the Party’s Central Military Commission. Members 
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of the Central Committee come from various parts of China’s political system 
including the provinces (41.5% of members), central ministries (22.6%), the military 
(17.5%), central Party organizations (5.9%), state-owned enterprises, educational 
institutions, “mass organizations” such as the Communist Youth League, and other 
constituencies (12.4%) (Li, 2008). 
According to the Party’s constitution, the Central Committee derives its power from 
the Party Congress. The congress is held every five years, during which over 2,000 
delegates elect the members of the Central Committee. Meanwhile, delegates of the 
congress review and approve the Party General Secretary and report to the NPC, 
revealing the Party’s position and entire plan for the next five years. In the time 
between two Party congresses, the Central Committee is required to meet at least 
once per year. Each meeting is called a plenum. The plenum generally discusses a 
specific aspect of the developing direction and makes important appointments and 
dismissals. For example, in October 2010, the fifth plenum of the 18th Party 
Congress discussed and approved the 12th five-year plan which covered 2011 to 
2015. The meeting also approved the appointment of Xi Jinping as the first vice 
chairman of the Central Military Commission. The action was widely considered to 
be in preparation for Xi to become the next supreme leader of the Party in 2012 
(Lawrence and Martin, 2013). When a plenum ends, the Party will issue a 
communique to announce the major decisions made during the meeting. 
 
2.1.3.2 The CPC’s ruling model and its changing process 
During the civil war against the Guomindang (Kuomintang Party), the CPC 
repeatedly announced that it would not rule the country as a one-party state (Chen, 
2008). However, due to domestic and international constraints after the victory of the 
civil war, the CPC eventually established a highly centralized political system that 
disregards differences between party and state. After the establishment of the PRC in 
1949, the CPC continued to follow the model of unified leadership that was used 
during the warring years in order to ensure the leading authority upon provinces and 
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complete monumental construction tasks (Chen, 2008). Consequently, the CPC 
achieved comprehensive leadership on national affairs. For example, the senior 
leader of the Party served as the leader of government, established the party 
committee and party group – which was directly led by the CPC Central Committee 
within the government system, and established the Party approval system to 
investigate political and legal cases (Chen, 2008). During the Cultural Revolution in 
1966, leading political organs at all levels were severely damaged and the personality 
cult of Mao Zedong grew greatly. This led to the gradual evolution of China’s 
governance into a personal dictatorship party-state model (Chen, 2008). 
After Deng Xiaoping came into power, the CPC started to strengthen and improve its 
leadership model. The CPC had to rely on legislation by the People’s Congress and 
other legislative means to achieve their leadership of state affairs. The CPC was no 
longer the direct leader of economic and social affairs, and so it turned to play the role 
of coordinator (Chen, 2008). The centralized unified leadership model on governance 
had changed into a political, ideological and organizational leadership. The party was 
no longer directly involved in governmental affairs but was still embedded through a 
variety of ways to maintain the government’s political leadership (Chen, 2008). 
Firstly, important development plans and decisions about the economy had to be 
approved by the Party Committee before implementation. Secondly, for the 
composition of government at all levels, the major leaders must be CPC members. 
This was more prominent especially at the province, district and county levels, where 
executive heads concurrently served as the local party’s deputy secretary. These 
leaders also exercised their executive powers with their identity as Party members. 
Lastly, the power to investigate and appoint administrative officials at all levels was 
held in the hands of the Party’s Organization Department, while the power to punish 
party members with corrupt behaviour was wielded by the Party’s Discipline 
Inspection Departments (Liu, 2011). 
Simultaneously, the duties of the Party and government in economic and social 
affairs were gradually standardized. The local party’s first secretary no longer served 
as the major leader of the government, and party committees no longer sent 
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one-to-one correspondence on work instructions to the relevant departments of 
government (Liu, 2011). Policy decisions made by the government were 
self-published by the government rather than released by the Party Committee as a 
party document. The chief executives became the real core in the government of all 
levels and held the highest decision-making authority and leadership (Xia and Gu, 
1999). More and more institutions and state-owned enterprises took the executive 
leading model rather than the party secretary leading model (Xia and Gu, 1999). 
Therefore, the boundary between Party and government became increasingly clear. 
As mentioned above, the current ruling model of the CPC could be summarized as 
selecting and recommending outstanding members to state organs in order to manage 
national, economic and social affairs on behalf of the Party. Meanwhile, the CPC sets 
up corresponding agencies like a government would. Each Party agency directly or 
indirectly leads, supervises or serves appropriate government agencies. Party 
organizations achieve their ruling power in the government through the Party group 
within the national legislation organ (NPC), the judiciary organ (courts, 
Procuratorates), democratic parties and social groups (Chen, 2000). Over decades of 
development, the CPC’s ruling model has experienced continuous improvement. The 
boundary between Party function and government function is basically clear and is 
realized in daily practice. 
However, functions overlap and problems still exist between the Party and 
government, which reduce the effectiveness and efficiency of daily state operations. 
Firstly, the Party Committee still holds some authority similar to the one held by 
government at the same level. During the reform and opening-up process, leaders 
developed a habit of solving problems via Party organizations rather than through 
judicial means. Such a phenomenon has formed a kind of path dependency (Chen, 
2000). For example, during the institutional reform in 1998, a big issue was how to 
manage state-owned assets. However, a relevant asset management department was 
not established within the State Council system. Instead a large Enterprise Work 
Committee was established within the Party system to manage the state assets and to 
coordinate the relevant powers of the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Personnel and 
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the State Economic and Trade Commission (Chen, 2000). This example indicates 
that leaders have become accustomed to solving problems via Party organization 
rather than via administrative and judicial means. Secondly, although the constitution 
notes that government and the judiciary organ are under the leadership of the 
People’s Congress, due to the unique position of the CPC in China’s political system, 
the power of the People’s Congress cannot be fully used. This is because the 
administrative organs are actually under the leadership of Party organization (Liu, 
2011). Thirdly, because of the embarrassing situation of the People’s Congress, some 
of the Party’s principles, policies or official documents often have priority over 
national laws. The increasing judicial corruption is partly because some Party leaders 
interfere with the results of judicial cases to meet their own interests. Lastly, there is 
internal friction between government leaders and Party leaders within the same 
department or institution. Research done by the Central Party School showed that in 
50–80% of local governments, the Party secretary would contradict the executive 
head (Chen, 2000). Such disunity is the result of unclear power distribution and 
overlapping organization between the Party and government. The Party Committee 
does have decision-making power on significant events according to the constitution 
and law, however, it is difficult to determine whether an event is significant or not. 
Such situations could bring about administrative power confusion and illegal 
intervention on policymaking and implementation. 
 
Section 2.2: The central-local relationship in China 
2.2.1 Historical review of central-local relations  
The concept of local autonomy was introduced to China in the late Qing Dynasty; 
local self-governance was implemented and soon formed the initial framework of 
both urban and rural self-governance (Hu, 2001). When the revolution broke out in 
1911, many provinces announced independence. Federalism was popular around 
China. When Shandong declared its independence, the Shandong Consultative 
Bureau made eight recommendations to the central government. Five of these 
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recommendations were: the constitution shall be marked as a federal system of 
government; the official system and local taxation customs should be decided by the 
province; the central government should not interfere; Articles of the Consultative 
Bureau make up the constitution of the province and the province is free to change the 
set; and the province should have the freedom to conduct military training to defend 
its autonomy (Research Council of the National Cultural and Historical in Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference, 1981). Other provinces such as Hubei, 
Zhejiang and Jiangsu also developed provincial constitutions, namely Ezhou Act of 
Republic China, Zhejiang Provincial Act of Republic China and Jiangsu Provincial 
Act of Republic China respectively (Chi, 1997). These Acts were in fact the 
provincial constitutions at the time. Federalism was widespread in China and led to 
the local autonomy movement. However, the limited power of local government and 
external and internal troubles of the central government led to the downfall of 
self-governance under the storm of revolution. After the establishment of the 
Republic of China (ROC), the government attempted to preserve and develop 
self-governance. The local autonomy movement was popular at that time (Hu, 2001). 
Sun Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen) supported local autonomy in the beginning, but he 
later found that the local autonomy movement was actually trying to strengthen 
provincial warlords and weaken the central government. Thus he turned against local 
autonomy and strived for unity (Cao, 2003). That directly led to the abandonment of 
the local autonomy movement. Even on the eve of the establishment of the PRC, the 
founders discussed whether to establish a federal system, but the final resolution 
decided on regulating central-local relationships with democratic centralism (Yu, 
2002). The only institution which still has autonomy is the regional ethnic autonomy 
in minority areas.  
The CPC took state structure into consideration in the very early stages. In the second 
national representative conference in 1922, the CPC made a proposal of a future state 
structure which asserted that Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet would have ethnic 
autonomy and federalism would be the choice to combine the central and the local, 
these ethnic parts and the rest of China (Lin, 1998). The main reason the early CPC 
considered federalism seriously is that, firstly, the existing example of the Soviet 
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Union showed that federalism is possible for a socialist country. Another important 
reason is that many initial members of the CPC had taken part in the local autonomy 
movement and saw local autonomy as an effective way to end incessant fighting 
between warlords and gain independence and unity. However, after 1937, the CPC 
realized that the multi-ethnic situation in China was different from that seen in the 
Soviet Union, and federalism based on ethnic autonomy could be easily used by 
enemy forces to annex parts of China (for example, the Japanese established 
“Manchukuo” in northeast China to use as a base to invade the whole of China). 
Therefore, the CPC abandoned this idea and advocated a unitary system with regional 
ethnic autonomy (Yang, 2003). 
Like many emperors in history, leaders of the PRC were vigilant towards the 
emergence of localism. Localist activities actually appeared in Guangdong province 
in 1952 and 1953. The localists in Guangdong refused to implement land reform in 
the manner that the provinces in north China had. Firstly, Guangdong could achieve 
reform without needing to “mobilize the masses”. Secondly, localists felt that 
co-operative agriculture production would reduce the farmers’ enthusiasm (Wang, 
1958). Localists in Guangdong also valued officials from the local over those from 
the centre. As Tao Zhu reported in the first session of the Party Congress in 
Guangdong, the most basic aim of the localists in Guangdong was to oppose leaders 
and officials from other parts of China. In other words, they sought exclusivity and to 
oppose the central government (Tao, 1957). In response, the central committee of the 
CPC started the Anti-Localism Movement in 1957. In 1959, the central government 
began to centralize and take back power from local government. During the central 
conference held on 27 January 1962 (also known as the “Seven Thousand People 
Conference”), Liu Shaoqi, the chairman of the PRC, reported that it was 
inappropriate to establish many complete industrial systems within the whole country. 
He noted that there was excessive decentralization and the tendency for dispersion 
had grown (Chen, 2008). From 1962 to 1965, there was a debate on whether trade 
flow should be organized based on the division of the administrative district or based 
on economic efficiency. Local governments advocated organizing trade flow based 
on district division (ibid.), but on 23 March 1963, People’s Daily, the official 
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newspaper of the central government, published an editorial which called such 
practice (that is, organizing trade flow based on district) a kind of “local 
protectionism” (Xie and He, 2010). 
It is apparent that in this period before the reform and opening up of China, localism 
actually reflected local governments’ requirements for local autonomy based on local 
conditions. It is completely different from both the local separatism in the history of 
China and national localism in the West. However, the central government was 
distrustful of it and eliminated localism by highly centralizing the powers. The 
central government curbed localism with political movements. The CPC’s 
organizational discipline and media propaganda were also used to warn and guide 
local governments not to confront the central government on this issue. 
 
2.2.2 New changes and features during the reform and opening-up period 
After the reform and opening up of China, the central government decentralized a 
series of economic and administrative powers to the local government, which 
enhanced local management functions on economic and social resources, in order to 
stimulate the economy and recover from the chaos brought about by the Cultural 
Revolution. 
Previous to the reform and opening up of China, decentralization did not involve 
enterprises. This is because enterprises in China used to be the appendages of the 
public administration, and lacked self-development abilities. However, 
decentralization had not only readjusted the relations between central and local 
governments but also the relations between government and enterprises. From the 
perspective of the central-local relationship, local governments were given more 
autonomy on economic and administrative affairs. Such an arrangement was a result 
of the mobilization of local government and easing the financial burden on the central 
government. From 1980, the central government implemented a new “financial 
contract system”; the financial system was divided into a central system and local 
system (Li, 1994). In 1985, the financial contract system was improved, and the roles 
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of the central and local governments became clearer with regard to economic 
activities and fiscal distribution (ibid.). Local government was also given several 
economic management rights such as capital construction plan approval rights, price 
management rights, foreign investment approval rights and foreign trade 
management rights. Plenty of enterprises that used to be under the jurisdiction of 
central ministries were delegated to local governments (Zhang, 2000). In addition, 
special economic zones, economic and technological development zones and central 
cities were granted a certain number of economic privileges by the central 
government (ibid.). 
Throughout the 1980s, China’s policy adjustment was not only a process of 
administrative decentralization, but also a change in economic management. Local 
governments obtained more space and concessions to develop the local economy, 
which promoted the national wealth. However, it also led to an irrational expansion 
of the interests of local governments, which in turn weakened the central 
government’s macro-control on the economy. Therefore, a new macro-management 
system in which tax sharing played a key role was established in order to overcome 
the negative consequences. From 1994, the central government began to implement a 
new tax-sharing system. The main features of this system include dividing 
governmental income at each level based on taxation, determining the expenditure 
standard based on the level of government and establishing an initial redistribution 
system (Zhang, 2000). Since then, taxes in China have been divided into three 
categories: central tax, local tax and share tax. At the beginning of 1994, a 
comprehensive reform which involved financial, investment, planning and foreign 
exchange commenced, which aimed to build a new framework for 
macro-management via decentralization and institutionalization. 
In the process of social transformation, as part of China’s reform and opening up, 
central-local relationships gained several new features, especially under the 
promotion of the establishment of a socialist market economy system. The relations 
now moved beyond a simple cycle and gradually entered a new phase of interaction.  
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2.2.2.1 Stepping out of the zero-sum game interaction 
Under the highly centralized party-ruled system before China’s reform and opening 
up, the relationship between the central and local governments was a negative game 
relationship. In terms of the division of power and interaction between central and 
local governments, the central government took the position of absolute initiative and 
the local government was extremely negative (Shen, 2001). In addition, since power 
centralization and decentralization were implemented based on an administrative 
subjection relationship, the power transfer between the central and the local 
governments was a zero-sum game; the power concentration of the central 
government meant power loss for local government and the more power local 
government obtained meant more power the central government had lost (Shen, 
2001). Such an obvious phenomenon increased the game awareness of both the 
central and local governments. Therefore, if local government was granted power by 
the central government, based on the expectation of power retaking, local 
government would likely overuse the power, which may result in local dispersion and 
disorder (in the view of central government). Meanwhile, based on the expectation of 
local dispersion and disorder, if the power held by local government declined, the 
central government would rush in to retake the power. This resulted in frequent 
power adjustments (Shen, 2001). This centralization and decentralization seemed 
dependent on the will of the central government, but in fact it was a result of the 
interaction and interest requirements of local government (ibid.). Although both the 
central and local governments wanted to achieve a balanced situation, under the 
influence of zero-sum game awareness, such an idea remained just an idea. The result, 
like Deng Xiaoping said, was that “concentration is not enough and dispersion is also 
not enough” (Li, 1994, p. 199). 
However, the economic reform which separated enterprises from government and the 
political reform which separated the Party and government provided an opportunity 
to change the zero-sum game situation. Enterprises obtained some economic 
management power not only from the central government but also from local 
governments. Such a power transfer did not lead to a power shift between the central 
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and the local governments. Since the Party separated from the government, local 
Party committees have played a positive role in encouraging and helping local 
governments to implement policies so that local governments can effectively 
implement central policies and also draw the central government’s attention to local 
interests and demands, which could be fully realized within the purview of local 
governments (Lin, 1998). Moreover, the tax-sharing system implemented in 1994 
makes a clear institutional division on power, rights and finances between the central 
and the local governments, offering institutional protection for central and local 
interests. Lin (1998) argues that these changes have caused central-local relations to 
enter a new stage of benign interaction. 
 
2.2.2.2 Bilateral growth of central and local authority 
After the establishment of the PRC, China gradually established a highly centralized 
planned economy system. The relationship between the central and local 
governments was also highly centralized. This centralization was necessary in order 
for such a huge country like China to be managed. However, local governments also 
required autonomy. In order to deal with the contradiction between centralization and 
local autonomy, there were several major adjustments which could be seen as 
decentralization and the regaining of power. After the reform and opening up, society 
and markets were introduced into the system. Power was no longer only transferred 
within the government system, it was also transferred among the Party, society and 
enterprises (Zhang, 2000a). Before this, there was no difference between Party and 
government and no difference between government and enterprise; the Party was the 
only dominant leader in China (Shen, 2001). Due to the lack of a buffer zone like 
enterprises or the society for power configuration, power transfer between 
governments easily caused conflicts and simple shifts of authority between the 
central and local governments (i.e. one fell as another rose). Under certain conditions, 
once there had been an extreme centralization of power, local government would 
seriously lack motivation for economic and social development. The central 
government thus started the decentralization within the government system. Since 
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there was no buffer provided by enterprises and society, the decentralization process 
was often too rapid. This resulted in the fall of the authority of the central government 
accompanied with a resurgence of local dispersion. This in turn directly led to the 
retraction of power and a new process of centralization. These processes had formed 
a strange cycle: centralization, low local motivation, decentralization, local 
dispersion and back to centralization (Shen, 2001). 
Due to the economic and political reforms, the central-local relationship gradually 
entered a new stage. Since the relations between Party, government, enterprise and 
society were gradually clarified, power was not only transferred within the 
government system, but enterprises and society could also act as the buffer zone and 
receivers of power. Furthermore, the implementation of a tax-sharing system had 
formed a power division process with enterprises and society for both the central and 
local governments (Wang, 1988). Thus, a power transfer between the central and 
local governments was no longer a simple shift where one falls as the other rises. The 
central government decentralized the power and duty to local government, expanded 
local power and motivated local governments, and local governments were building 
more authority on local the important economic and social management powers and 
the revenue sources. Sharing tax revenue with local governments in turn helped to 
enhance the overall regulatory capacity and authority of the central government 
(Zhang, 2000). Therefore, central authority and local authority was able to grow 
bilaterally rather than simply shift from one body to another. 
 
2.2.3 Problems within the central-local relationship 
The central government had strengthened its power via establishing a tax-sharing 
system and appointment rights. For example, in the 1980s, the fiscal extractive 
capacity of the central government kept declining until it stumbled in the early 1990s 
(Wang and Hu, 1993). However, after the significant adjustments of the tax system in 
1994, the government’s fiscal revenue – defined here as the sum of budgetary 
revenue, extra-budgetary revenue and income of the social security fund – sharply 
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increased from less than 800 billion yuan to nearly 37,000 billion (Tsui and Wang, 
2004). The central government could also control the local government to some 
extent and ensure the implementation of central policy. However, such processes 
were a kind of longitudinal extension of state power, and such an extension does not 
completely explain the centrally regulated relationship and power structure between 
the central and local. In fact, it is the unreasonable allocation of governmental power 
and the GDP-centred evaluation standards which make the local governments prefer 
to engage in the pursuit of self-interest, which may lead to regional economic barriers 
and is harmful to the national economy. Meanwhile, local governments lack the 
capacity to offer public goods and services, which is a responsibility of this level of 
government (Huang, 2010). 
Despite the tax reforms in 1994, there are still many problems with a rational division 
of tax. After the reform, those taxes which had a stable source and a potential to 
increase were determined as central tax or central-local shared revenues. For example, 
75% of the local industrial value-added tax was turned over to the central government, 
while 25% was left to the local governments. Business tax of railways, banks and 
insurance companies owned by the central government, which are left for the local 
government, are almost all sources of unstable income with dispersed sources and 
difficulties in collection and management (Huang, 2010). However, compared with 
the bottom-up process in fiscal power adjustment, there is an obvious top-down 
process in government power distribution. Moreover, lower-level government has 
less flexibility and more rigidity in their administrative power. For example, several 
centrally formulated policies such as preferential policies for laid-off workers, 
low-rent housing, preferential policies to support technological innovation and 
compulsory education are mainly funded by business tax, personal income tax, 
income tax and other main resources of local finance. Such an arrangement has 
resulted in more and more work for local government with fewer and fewer financial 
resources to show for the time expended. We are able to observe the change of 
proportion of local governments’ fiscal revenue accounted for in the national fiscal 
revenue and the expenditure proportion from Table 1 (Huang, 2010). This is an 
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important manifestation of the irrational distribution of fiscal rights and 
administrative powers between central government and local governments. 
 
 
Table 1: Proportion of local fiscal revenue and fiscal expenditure from 2000–2007. 
Year 
Local fiscal revenue as 
percentage of national 
fiscal revenue (%) 
Local fiscal expenditure as 
percentage of national 
fiscal expenditure (%) 
2000 47.80 65.30 
2001 47.60 69.50 
2002 45.40 69.29 
2003 45.36 69.90 
2004 45.06 72.29 
2005 47.71 74.14 
2006 47.22 75.28 
2007 45.90 77.00 
Source: Huang (2010), converted by author. 
The fiscal responsibility of the government to provide public goods was excessively 
decentralized, so that fiscal self-sufficiency of local government declined and leads to 
local fiscal deficit. Meanwhile, the redistribution system was not improved to 
adequately solve such local deficits. Local governments now have to turn their 
attention to increasing local economic and fiscal revenue. In the process of pursuing 
income, local governments fall back on some of the “unsuitable” behaviours, such as 
government intervention in the normal operation of the market, market segmentation, 
local protectionism, self-aggrandisement, “grey power” and pursuit of income 
sources outside the tax system (Ping, 2007). In addition, the tax-sharing system only 
regulates the revenue within the budget and thus those extra-budgetary funds lack 
strict oversight. Therefore, local governments attempt to seek extra-budgetary 
revenue. The most typical manifestation of this is the “land finance” of local 
government. Since 1994, the land premium (income through selling land) belongs to 
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the local government and is not handed over to the central government. Since then, 
the land transfer income has become a major source of extra-budgetary revenue for 
local governments, who rely on land sales finance (Ping, 2007). The government gets 
land through land acquisition at a low price from farmers, and then resells it at a 
higher price to meet various expenses. In developed areas, there is a huge amount of 
land premium, which has become the most important source of extra-budgetary 
revenue for local governments. In 2004, the local government land sales revenue 
reached 615 billion yuan and local governments gained 1,612.6 square kilometres of 
land, including land in the provinces of Guangdong, Shandong, Jiangsu in east China 
and Hunan in central China (Ping, 2007). The land expropriated by these four 
provinces was equivalent to half of the national land acquisition acreage in that year. 
In the same year, the provincial revenue obtained through land sale in Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang and Hunan reached 325.8 billion yuan, which was close to half of national 
land sale revenue (Ping, 2007). This type of land finance harms the interests of the 
farmers whose land is requisitioned and results in potential social instability. 
According to 2005 data from the National Bureau of Rural Economic Surveys, 
provided by the Rural Development Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences and the Team for the Development of the Rural Economy, from the 
perspective of distribution of benefits of land acquisition, local governments 
accounted for 20–30%, enterprises accounted for 40–50% and farmers accounted for 
5–10% of these benefits (Ping, 2007). From 1952 to 2002, Chinese farmers have 
given up their rights to 26 trillion yuan worth of land (calculated with an interest rate 
of 3%) (Dang, 2005). Moreover, the local governments tend to sell as much land as 
possible to obtain benefits and real estate-related taxes. With internal driving forces 
pushing up land premium prices and real estate prices, local governments have both 
directly and indirectly accelerated the rise in real estate prices, resulting in a serious 
blow to the future spending power of residents. However, such a large amount of land 
sales revenue has not been used to provide public goods such as education, health 
care and social security. It has been used for administrative overhead, highway repair 
and urban infrastructure construction. In 2004, extra-budgetary fiscal revenue of 
local governments reached 469.918 billion yuan, with 313.38 billion yuan directly 
54 
spent on “administrative expenses” (Ping, 2007). Among the administrative expenses 
of the local government, 58.9% is spent “off budget” (ibid.). The central government 
has introduced a number of policies to local governments trying to control this land 
finance phenomenon in recent years. However, facing such a huge economic interest 
and the evaluation system based on GDP, local governments selectively or 
completely ignored the policies introduced by the central government. Such a 
situation reduces the effects of the national regulatory policies. 
On the other hand, most local government officials are concerned about their own 
interests in political promotion. The main indicator of the recent performance 
evaluation system is the economic performance of and urban construction in 
provinces and cities. This performance evaluation system is conducive to local GDP 
growth and economic development. However, it is also an evaluation system that 
makes local government officials consider what they can get from provision of public 
goods, so that local officials have different preferences for the provision of different 
public goods. Some public goods are supplied excessively, while others are 
insufficiently supplied. Local government officials often prefer to provide public 
goods with high economic returns in order to pursue personal achievements and 
promotions. They often choose projects which have a high degree of observability 
and can be objectively evaluated. For example, they tend to invest in establishing 
development zones, building highways and bridges and constructing “image 
projects”, while other public goods like environmental protection, education, 
healthcare and social security are more neglected. Although the central government 
has focused more on these areas and balanced development in recent years, there are 
insurmountable contradictions between the central government's macro-control goals 
and local governments’ evaluations. Such a situation shows that the central 
government is in some respects powerless when facing local government 
interference. 
This chapter has provided a brief summary of the political system in China, together 
with an overview of central-local relations in China. It has reviewed the government 
and Party system, which is the main arena for the interaction of the central and local 
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governments. The central-local relationship has also been reviewed historically, 
which helps to provide an understanding of the features of the central-local 
relationship in China. These two sections have offered a background of the context 
against which I will discuss the research questions more deeply. With this contextual 
understanding, the next chapter offers an in-depth discussion of the theoretical 
foundation and analytical framework chosen to examine the central-local relationship 
and its impact on social policy.  
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Chapter 3: Literature review  
 
As demonstrated in previous chapters, the central-local relationship in China has a 
long history and has experienced several rounds of change. Divergence of 
relation-type between the central and different local governments has also been 
illustrated, as well as policy outcomes that were influenced by the central-local 
relationship. How seriously does this institutional setting affect social policy, or to 
dig somewhat deeper, what role does this relationship play in our impression of the 
divergence of social policy across different countries and regions? It is argued that a 
rigorous understanding of the central-local relationship and its impact on social 
policy reasonably requires a combination of Chinese circumstance and ideas drawn 
from Western public policy theory. This chapter will review relevant Western 
literature that could provide theoretical background and foundation for this research, 
and literature that could help identify the central-local relationship and explore how 
central-local relations affect social policy.   
 
Section 3.1: Theoretical context  
The two key terms in this research are the central-local relationship and the policy 
process. It is reasonable to start with theory that involves the policy process and the 
central-local relationship, or on a broader level, political institutional settings. There 
are various theories studying policy process, for example: Multiple Streams Analysis, 
Policy Feedback Theory, Narrative Policy Framework and Advocacy Coalition 
Development Framework. However, these theories mainly focus on different aspects 
of the policy process. From the perspectives of theoretical scope, Multiple Streams 
Analysis emphasizes “exploring how government makes policies under conditions of 
ambiguity” (Cairney and Heikkila, 2014, p. 368; Kingdon, 1984). Policy Feedback 
Theory pays attention to the policy formulation stage and focuses on how policy 
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shapes politics and subsequent policy making (Mettler and SoRelle, 2014). The 
Narrative Policy Framework and Advocacy Coalition Development Framework 
study policy formulation and policy change; while Narrative Policy Framework 
discusses how narratives influence public opinion and how they reflect policy beliefs, 
the Advocacy Coalition Development Framework draws attention to how coalitions 
are formed and learned (Cairney and Heikkila, 2014; Weible, 2014). However, these 
theories rarely put a premium on studying institutional settings, so they do not 
constitute an appropriate theoretical background for this research. Policy network 
theory and historical institutionalism, which incorporate institutional settings and the 
policy process, could be a better choice. The following sections will review these two 
theories. 
      
3.1.1 Policy network theory  
3.1.1.1 The rise of the policy network concept 
Social problems, economic problems and environment problems have grown 
increasingly along with the globalization and information era. Modern states are 
much more difficult to control when dealing with expanding political and economic 
issues, than when solely relying on the bureaucratic system. On the other hand, policy 
making and implementation involves more and more organizations, different level of 
governments, public institutions, social groups and private sectors. The concept of 
the “policy network” was introduced into policy process analysis in the mid-1970s to 
early 1980s (Klijn, 1996), formed from the theoretical base of inter-organizational 
relations research, the iron triangle model of policy formulation and research on 
subsystems and policy communities (Klijn, 1996). Over the past two or three decades, 
public policy researchers from the United States, United Kingdom and Europe have 
made extensive use of the policy network concept for policy analysis, with different 
analytical priorities and results. In 1978, American scholar Hugh Heclo pointed out 
that the iron triangle formed by Congress, governmental bureaucracy and interest 
groups can no longer obtain a stable structure for policy formulation (Heclo, 1978; 
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Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). By studying the policy process of federal government in 
the US, Heclo stated that the Congress, bureaucracy, lobbyists, businessmen, experts 
and social media have formed an “issue network” that surrounds specific policy 
formulation, and each actor influences the policy process in their own way (Marsh 
and Rhodes, 1992). However, Heclo’s research focused on the informal operation 
between interest groups and stakeholders within Congress and the executive branches, 
emphasizing the personal relationships among the key actors rather than the structure 
relation within the network or among different organizations (Marsh, 1998). British 
scholar R.A.W. Rhodes, who may have been inspired by inter-organizational relation 
theory, took a different research approach. Rhodes drew attention to 
inter-governmental relations and emphasized the structure formed surrounding 
resource dependence (Rhodes, 1997). He developed the “Rhodes Model” based on 
resource dependence. Afterwards, more and more scholars correct or improved 
policy network theory and models. Policy network analysis gradually replaced 
pluralism and corporatism with the complex situation of social change. The rise of 
policy network research has been considered as a main contribution to politics and 
public policy research, as well as an important result of scholars’ attempts to 
re-conceptualize the policy process over the past two or three decades (Kenis and 
Schneider, 1991)    
 
3.1.1.2 The policy network analysis paradigm 
Due to different political systems and academic traditions, policy network analysis 
has different paradigms in different countries. Policy network analysis can be divided 
into three different paradigms: the so-called US paradigm, the British paradigm and 
the German-Dutch paradigm. 
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The US micro-level analysis paradigm 
Scholars in the US defined policy networks based on the concept of sub-government 
according to their political research focuses such as pluralism and interest group 
theory. As Jordan (1990) pointed out, the concept of policy networks originated in the 
1950s and 1960s, when American political scientists emphasized the regular contact 
between interest groups, bureaucracies and individuals within the government which 
provided the foundation of sub-government. A large amount of American literature 
focused on the micro-level, dealing with the personal relationship among the main 
actors rather than the structural relationship between institutions. At first, the focus 
was on the existence of sub-governments and was seen as a limitation of democratic 
politics (Marsh, 1998). For example, McConnell (1969) pointed out that the 
privileged few are closely associated with the government; they not only express their 
“private” interests but also “hijack” government agencies and lead to a well-known 
phenomenon of "agent capture", which exclude other interests when formulating 
policies. Heclo (1978) and McFarland (1987) criticized the sub-government model 
and emphasized the importance of issue networks, which were defined as the 
communication network formed by those who are interested in specific policy field, 
including government authorities, legislators, businessmen, lobbyists and even 
scholars and journalists. However, analysis on issue networks or policy networks in 
the US drew attention to personal relationships between actors, and was more likely 
to be a micro-level analysis. 
 
British meso-level analysis paradigm 
The United Kingdom is a parliamentary country with no obvious “tripartite” political 
system. The legislative branch plays a less important role than the US legislature in 
the policy process. The main players in the UK policy networks usually include 
government officials and policy stakeholders. Policy network analysis in the UK 
mainly emphasizes the continuity of the relations between interest groups and 
government departments, and the analysis is usually located on the meso-level. 
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The main representative of policy network research in the UK is R.A.W. Rhodes, 
who combined and applied the European literature on intergovernmental relations, 
and emphasized the structural relationship between political institutions on the 
micro-level and meso-level rather than the personal relationships between actors on 
sub-governmental level (Rhodes, 2008). Rhodes accepted Benson’s (1982) definition 
and defined policy networks as a set of institutional linkages between the government 
and other actors who have interests in public policy making and implementation 
(Rhodes, 1997). These actors are independent but dependant on other actors 
(organizations) for resources (ibid). Rhodes took a government-centred approach to 
analyze the policy process and focused on intergovernmental action; policy networks 
were demonstrated to be interactive network where players are dependent on or 
exchange constitutional – legal, organizational, financial, political, or informational – 
resources with other players (Rhodes, 1997; Rhodes, 2008). From the high-level 
integrated policy community to low-level integrated issue networks, Rhodes 
categorised policy networks into five types according to the number of participants, 
the stability of membership, restrictions, the degree of integration and resource 
allocation; these five types were policy community, professionalized networks, 
inter-governmental networks, producer networks and issue networks (Marsh and 
Rhodes, 1992). Thus, a policy network is more likely to be a meso-level concept that 
links with the micro level of analysis and deals with the role of interests and 
government in particular policy decisions.  
 
The German-Dutch macro-level paradigm          
In the 1970s and 1980s, profound changes were taking place in European society. 
Private organizations developed rapidly while the role of government was weakened. 
There was an increasingly blurred distinction between the state and civil society, and 
consequently a new governance model was required to deal with this drastic change 
(Mayntz, 1993). The policy network concept was selected by scholars and became a 
macro-level analysis. German and Dutch scholars focused on the relationship 
between the state and civil society, and treated policy networks as a new governance 
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model that differed from bureaucracy and the market (Mayntz, 1993; Kickert et al., 
1997a; Schneider, 1991). The German Max Planck School argued that modern 
society is increasingly complex, dynamic and diverse, that governments are unable to 
achieve governance alone and must rely on resources and collaboration from other 
social subjects outside their hierarchical control (Kenis and Schneider, 1991). They 
maintained that states and social organizations interact and form interdependent 
policy networks, which have been seen as a third form of social structure and a new 
model of state governance that is aligned with markets and bureaucratic 
organizations (Kenis and Schneider, 1991). Dutch scholars put the policy network 
together with the national government as the two pillars of governance, and pointed 
out that the key to effective governance lies in effective network management 
(Kickert et al., 1997a). They argued that it is impossible for the government to play 
the role of omnipotent in the context of various governmental and social 
organizations participating in the network of the decision-making process, therefore 
policy consultation, cooperation, coordination and consensus-building among 
different policy players is inevitable and is usually promoted by policy networks 
(ibid.). However, the government still plays a key and indispensable role, with a 
major responsibility for coordination in complex and diversified policy networks, 
particularly in the management of policy networks. The policy network is regarded as 
a governance model on the macro-level, and such an institutional relationship 
between the state and civil society could potentially find solutions to government 
failure and market failure (Mayntz, 1993).  
 
3.1.1.3 Limitations  
Policy network theory was initially developed in the 1970s, mainly for the analysis of 
intergovernmental relations. In the 1980s, it was mainly used for comparative policy 
analysis, and developed into an analysis framework to explain how multiple policy 
stakeholders interact with each other in the policy process. After the 1990s, the policy 
network was mainly regarded as a new governance model which makes up for the 
weaknesses of pluralism and corporatism as a tool of policy process analysis, and 
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provides a possible solution to government failure and market failure (Lin, 2002). 
Moreover, Marsh and Rhodes (1992) continually explore the central-local 
government relations in the UK through policy network analysis. In their book The 
Policy Network in British Government, they provide a more complete description of 
the classification and the structure of the policy network. It is believed that the policy 
network as an analytical method can help to understand the complexity of modern 
society, and the political processes between diverse actors such as central and local 
governments. 
Since the central-local relationship and the policy process are the main research focus 
of this thesis, the policy network has potential to be a good reference or theoretical 
foundation to help understand what the central-local relationship is in China and how 
it shapes social policy. However, policy network theory does have methodological 
and operational limitations that make it less relevant to this research. Firstly, it is 
difficult to clearly define the boundaries of the network. In the process of public 
policy formation, it is impossible to grasp the beginning and the end of the network 
(Qiu, 2000). It focuses on describing the change of the network relationship rather 
than practically explaining the meaning of the change, and is more likely to provided 
a static description of how actors link with each other rather than a description of the 
structural factors that restrict or shape such a network (Dowding, 1995). From this 
perspective, it is clear that the policy network theory (partly) ignores the role of state 
and institutions which have a significant influence on policy formation. Policy 
network theory might offer some support in analyzing the linkage and interaction 
between the central and local governments within the policy process, but as for the 
research purpose of exploring the nature and features of institutions such as the 
central-local relationship beyond the specific policy process, policy network theory 
perhaps has a “natural” limitation as it ignores the role of state and institutions.  
Secondly, policy network theory ignores the operation of the public authority of 
government agencies. Although Rhodes (1997) uses a Power Dependence Model to 
explain the interaction between network members such as the central government and 
local governments, this relationship is seen through negotiations and bargaining on 
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material interests; the “one-side coercion power” of government has not been taken 
into account. Chinese government has long been famous for its strong executive 
(coercion) power. Policy network theory that emphasizes only negotiation relations 
between central and local governments could miss important content when analyzing 
the interaction of central and local government in the policy process. This has limited 
the analytical capacity of policy network theory in the case of China. Moreover, in 
Western literature and political operations, there are several independent players or 
social actors outside government within the policy network. However, in China most 
of the players involved in the policy process are associated with or even subordinate 
to government. There are very few social actors that are independent from 
government. In other words, policy networks as defined by the Western definition are 
weak, or even struggle to survive in China. Therefore, although policy network 
theory has some advantages in analyzing the interaction between central and local 
governments within the policy process, it is probably not the appropriate literature to 
provide a theoretical foundation for this research, which focuses on institutions and 
the case of China. 
 
3.1.2 Historical institutionalism 
While policy network theory begins with the policy process and players within it, 
historical institutionalism has an “entry point” of institutions and employs 
institution-centred analysis. Historical institutionalism could offer a theoretical 
background and analytical approach for this research not only because it provides a 
comprehensive understanding of the central-local relationship as a kind of institution, 
but it also emphasizes how institutions shape the policy process and how policies 
produce feedback into institutions. Therefore, historical institutionalism may be more 
appropriate to grasp the nature and features of the central-local relationship in China 
by studying its long history. 
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3.1.2.1 Origins of the “new institutionalism”  
Institutions have been at the centre of political research for a very long time (Peters, 
1999). In ancient Greece Plato compared types of political institutions, and Aristotle 
emphasized governmental institutions in his famous book Politics. They both 
believed that institutions shaped political motivation and regulation, and influenced 
political actions and outcomes. In the “old institutionalism” era prior to the 1950s, 
institutional studies, which included comparing constitutions, governmental 
structures and legal systems, provided nearly all the content of political research 
(Lowndes, 2002). Social science researchers put the “state” at the centre of their 
research during this period, and most of the research is static comparisons and 
typological studies (Peters, 1999).  
After the rise of behaviorism in late 1950s, old institutionalism received extensive 
criticism from the supporters of behavioralism, who tried to abolish the formalism of 
any political research that included institutions, organization charts and the “myth” of 
constitutions (Goodin and Klingemann, 1996). Old institutionalism research was 
criticized as too static and unable to cover all the relevant variables, and was unable 
to provide explanations of actual political operations and decision-making processes 
(Easton, 1971). Meanwhile, the hyperfactualism which occurred in historical 
description within old institutionalism research was also criticized as the main reason 
leading to theoretical malnutrition (ibid.). Behaviorists imitate natural science and the 
proclaimed that research should be based on the principle of positivism, which 
examines political phenomena and individual behaviour through the process of 
hypothesis, quantitative testing or experiments, establishing general rules and then 
developing the general theory (Isaak, 1985). The old institutionalism was regarded as 
strongly prejudiced and lacking in scientific objectivity by the supporters of 
behaviorism (Peters, 1999).  Discussion about the “state” or “institutions” rarely 
appeared and individual behaviour was the central focus of social science until the 
1980s. Social science restricted itself to factors that could be measured, counted and 
analyzed such as social attitudes or votes (Steinmo, 2008).  
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However, behaviorism also has its limitations. There are certain differences between 
natural science and social science. It is questionable to discuss social issues and 
develop theories based solely on the logic and approach of natural science. Focusing 
too much on atheoretical micro-analysis of political behaviour and rejecting 
institutional analysis out of social science could largely restrict the research scale of 
social science and creativity of researchers (Sanders, 2002). Moreover, the interests 
and motivation of individuals are actually greatly shaped by social structure and 
culture such as social norms, ideology and rules (Ward, 2002). On the one hand, 
behaviorists over-estimate individual behaviour and its effect on social factors; on the 
other hand they neglect the function and autonomy of the state and institutions, which 
can be a prejudiced assumption that is divorced from social reality (March and Olsen, 
1984). When many countries were caught in the oil crisis in the 1970s, researchers 
noticed that the different economic-political institutions in different countries lead to 
different policy outcomes (for example, Katzenstein’s (1977)  Between Power and 
Plenty). “Institutions” and the “state” gradually came back on the radar of researchers. 
Krasner (1984) was the first scholar to re-focus on the state, and his research on state 
autonomy put institutional analysis back squarely as a main topic of social science.  
March and Olsen (1984) took up the opportunity and proposed the “new 
institutionalism.” It played a crucial role in analyzing the social change processes in 
East Asia and Latin America in the 1980s, and constitution, state structure, election 
systems and party systems had become the core of social science research (Linz and 
Valenzuela, 1994; Lijphart, 1984; Shugart and Carey, 1992; Lijphart and Waisman, 
1996). The new institutionalism put institutions at the centre of social research and 
compared real-world cases rather than variables (Steinmo, 2008). However, scholars 
inherited research assumptions and approaches from economics, political science and 
sociology, and developed diverse schools and research approaches. According to 
Hall and Taylor (1996), there are three major schools of new institutionalism: rational 
choice institutionalism which mainly takes the calculus approach; sociological 
institutionalism which mainly take the cultural approach; and historical 
institutionalism in the middle. Historical institutionalism formally became a research 
approach in 1990 when Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth published their book 
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Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. In the book, 
they emphasized the research on dynamism and change of institutions (Steinmo et al., 
1990). In fact, the focus on institutional change was highly affected by the global 
political situation. Some old countries disappeared and some new countries or even 
supranational regimes appeared from 1980s to 1990s. All these major changes 
constrained social researchers to pay more attention to institutional change and 
research on the “state” (Migdal, 1997).                
 
3.1.2.2 The three schools of the new institutionalism  
There are at least three main types of “new” institutional analysis, namely rational 
choice, sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism (Steinmo, 2008). 
Rational choice institutionalism was largely influenced by social choice theory, 
particularly new developments such as “the paradoxes of voting” and “path 
dependency” (Lane and Ersson, 2005). Institutions, sometimes as game rules, play an 
important role in shaping policy outcomes (ibid.). It believed that institutions could 
produce stable and positive effects, the so-called equilibria, or as Shepsle stated 
“structure-induced equilibrium” (Shepsle, 1989). Institutional economics also 
contributed to rational choice institutionalism from perspectives such as positivism 
and deductive approaches to help analyze institutional choice and development 
(Shepsle, 1989). Under rational choice institutionalism, individuals are assumed to be 
rational and calculate cost and benefits in every single case (Shepsle and Weingast, 
1987). Institutions act as strategic context that structure individuals’ choices on 
chasing maximum benefits (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). However, the dominating 
factor is still rationality not institutions (Koelble, 1995). 
Sociological intuitionalism developed from organizational theory and learning theory 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; March and Olsen, 1984; 
1989). It emphasizes the influence of cultural factors. Under sociological 
intuitionalism, individuals are not self-interested or rational beings who chase 
maximum self interest, but “satisficers” who follow a “logic of appropriateness”, 
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meaning that individuals seek to act appropriately (Steinmo, 2008). Individuals are 
embedded in many social, economic or political relationships which they cannot 
control. Institutions act as “culture-specific practices” which determine the meaning 
of individuals and economic, political or cultural activities in which they are involved 
(Hall and Taylor, 1996; Meyer, 1987). Institutions not only “tell” individuals what to 
do but also shape their preferences and identity (Hall and Taylor, 1996). According to 
sociological institutionalism, institutions are not only formal norms or standard 
programs, but also “taken-for-granted worldview” and “shared normative notions of 
appropriateness” (Scharpf, 2000). Such definitions break the boundary between 
institutions and culture, and even culture itself is sometimes regarded as a type of 
institution (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Macro inductive approaches and cultural 
interpretations are employed together with case study research to explore the 
long-term interaction between individuals and society. 
Historical institutionalism seeks to combine the other two institutionalisms and 
individuals are seen as both norm-abiding rule followers and self-interested rational 
actors (Steinmo, 2008). Historical institutionalism is also interested in why or what 
influenced a certain outcome to occur, so the historical record is a crucial source or 
evidence to help find out (ibid.). On the one hand, the formal or informal 
arrangements of institutions as autonomous actors could limit or determine the 
interest of individuals (Krasner, 1984). One the other hand, existing institutions are 
the production of critical history, therefore history – especially that related to the 
establishment of institutions – is extremely important evidence that historical 
institutionalists study. 
 
3.1.2.3 The main aspects of historical institutionalism 
Fundamental assumptions   
The power struggles among various groups in the political process are the focus of 
historical institutionalism, with particular attention paid to institutions that shape 
behaviour and institutions that relate to power distribution. Institutions, according to 
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Hall and Taylor (1996), are defined as formal or informal programs, norms or rules 
that are embedded in a political unit regime or economic-political organizations. 
Institutions also demonstrate a high degree of “stickiness” over time which 
consequently shows a great level of continuity and an incremental nature of 
institutional change (Hudson and Lowe, 2004). Therefore, institutions always act as a 
barrier or a guiding force to policy change, which in turn shapes the policy outcomes 
or political actions (ibid.).   
It is argued that institutions not only define the strategic choice of individual or social 
actors, but also preferences, goals and rationalities; different actors with different 
social statuses and different positions within the structure could have neither similar 
nor fixed preference (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). Institutions are more likely to 
provide a structure to actors, however, historical institutionalism does not entirely 
stand by the structurism. Institutions are stated as a meso-level concept that connect 
structures on a macro-level and individual behaviour on a micro-level. Individual 
behaviour, according to Koelble (1995), is not only the dependent variable of 
institutional structure but is also an independent variable, which means individuals 
are believed to have rational intention and will calculate interest gains and loss. But 
individuals are also restricted by the institutional structure and incompleteness of 
information which results in the “bounded rationality” of individuals, therefore, in 
the case of unpredictable and determinative outcomes of individual behavior, 
political outcomes are produced through the interaction between various groups, 
interests, ideas and institutional structures, and usually appears as an unintended 
consequence (Koelble, 1995; Hall and Taylor, 1996). Historical institutionalism also 
tries to avoid considering individuals as “the prisoners of institutions”; in contrast, 
ideas are also emphasized and are believed to tell individuals what is appropriate and 
shape their cognition and choice, and eventually may contribute to historical or 
political changes (Steinmo, 2008). Therefore, historical institutionalism does not 
stand by structuralism nor intentionalism/voluntarism; it tries to build a 
“structure-agency” relationship to integrate ideas and individual behaviour with 
institutions in order to grasp the restrictive and creative factors in social science 
analysis (Hall and Taylor, 1998).     
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How institutions shape policies  
The complexity of public policy is, to a large extent, restricted by the hierarchical 
nature of institutional structure. Peter Hall (1992) has analyzed how institutional 
structures shape policy outcomes from three aspects. Firstly on the macro-level, the 
basic institutional structure associated with democracy and the capitalist economy 
forms a macro balance between capitalism and labour, which has an impact on the 
policy direction (Hall, 1992). Notable here is that the economic institutions led to 
private ownership of the means of production, which had broad constraints on the 
policy direction (ibid.). Institutions provide the “rules of the game” and are influential 
prior to the policy process. At this overarching level, institutions such as election 
rules restrict the scope of possibilities available to policy makers and block some of 
the paths of policy development (Hudson and Lowe, 2004). 
Secondly, at the meso-level, the institutional features of basic governmental and 
social organizations also affect the power distribution between these groups and 
consequently have an impact on relevant policy formulation (Hall, 1992). These 
features may include the structure of organization such as the degree of centralization 
within the government system or trade union movement, and the organization of 
capital (for example the relationship between segments of capital), or other 
production means such as labour (ibid.). On the one hand, institutions at this level 
define and distribute interest and power to different social groups; on the other hand, 
it forms the structure of “veto points” within the state and “in fact set the agenda of 
what is politically possible” (Hudson and Lowe, 2004, p. 184).  
The relationship between the national legislative branch and executive branch could 
be a good example. The US Constitution sets its national legislative branches and 
executive branch as clearly separate bodies. Members of both of them are elected 
independently and cannot occupy seats in the legislative branch and executive branch 
simultaneously. It can be easily observed when a president’s policy proposal lacks 
support in both chambers of Congress; it is more difficult for the executive branch to 
implement a policy by its own will. Unlike this presidential federalism in America, 
countries such as Germany and Canada have a different model, namely parliamentary 
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federalism. The parliament is the source of legitimacy for the executive branch, 
which must hold a relative majority of parliamentary seats (France, 2008). In other 
words, the loss of a majority in parliament means a loss of the right to govern. Since 
the executive branch is, to some extent, produced by a majority of seats in the 
parliament, policy proposals are less susceptible to being blocked. Due to the 
derivative relationship between the legislative branch and executive branch, more 
effective continuity and improvements of national policy are achieved (Altenstetter 
and Busse, 2005) 
Electoral rules are also typical examples. For the ruling party, the biggest constraint is 
the need for re-election. This requires the ruling party to take the interests and 
demands of the opposition party and interest groups into account during the 
decision-making process. In the UK, a political party could enjoy a strong 
single-party government by winning 40% of the vote, thus, the ruling party in UK 
may have more space to deploy strategies and policy plans which are adversarial to 
the opposition parties than political parties in Sweden where they have to win 60% of 
the vote to form a strong single-party government (Hudson and Lowe, 2004). In fact, 
in the 1980s when Margaret Thatcher came to power, the minor campaign pressure 
from the Labour Party provided political space for the Thatcher government to 
embrace a radical reform strategy. Both the UK and Sweden reformed their pension 
systems in the 20th century. However, the process of their reforms was quite different. 
The British Conservative government released the Social Security Reform Green 
Paper in June 1985 and received criticism from all sides. The Labour Party even 
threatened that if the SERPS system (the previous state pension) was cancelled, they 
would be seeking to restore it when they came into power (Attanasio and Rohwedder, 
2003). However, the Thatcher government held its radical attitude and made only a 
few minor adjustments of the original Green Paper and the consequent Social 
Security Act which was enacted in July 1986. From the subsequent implementation 
of the policy, the achievement was even greater than the Conservative government 
expected.  
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However, the reform process in Sweden was quite different. In the 1990s, the 
economic crisis pushed the reform of the pension system to the political forefront 
(Attanasio and Rohwedder, 2003). The Social Democratic Party was defeated in the 
election of 1991 and the non-socialist parties formed a minority coalition government. 
This coalition government started the reform of the pension system, but due to the 
minority status of the coalition government, the reforms required external support 
and needed to be a result of a bargain by all political parties (ibid.). The principles of 
reform were enacted in 1994 based on the negotiation and compromise of all political 
parties. Compared with the reform in UK, the reform measures in Sweden were 
relatively conservative.  
Based on the processes above, it is not difficult to notice that the results of the reform 
under the Thatcher government and Swedish government are quite different. Such 
divergence demonstrates that institutions such as the election rules really matter in 
social policy-making and implementation. From the perspective of pension reform in 
the two countries, the British Conservative government responded to criticisms to a 
lesser degree, while the Swedish government actively absorbed the opponent. The 
Thatcher government was able to take a tough attitude to promote reform and 
practically ignored the voice of the opposition because the Conservative Party had an 
absolute majority at that time. The pressure for re-election was not as strong as in 
Sweden, which provides a great deal of legislative freedom for the ruling government. 
From 1979 to 1992, the Conservative Party won an absolute majority of seats in the 
parliamentary elections in the UK, which meant that the government’s policies could 
be easily passed in Parliament, therefore, more flexibility and space were available to 
formulate and implement policy, with little regard for the opposition party. In the 
pension reform example mentioned above, the ruling coalition government in 
Sweden came into power in 1991. Due to its minority position in Parliament, its 
policies and proposals were subject to the constraints of the Social Democratic Party. 
The coalition government inevitably adopted an attitude of mutual cooperation in the 
bargaining process in order to ensure that the motion was smoothly accepted by 
Parliament (Reynaud and International Labor Office, 2000). In addition, the pressure 
of the re-election campaign forced them to give full consideration to the demands of 
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interest groups. It is also not easy to boldly reconfigure the existing system, as it 
would completely undermine the gains of the vested interest group.  
Finally, at the micro-level, institutions such as standardized operational procedures, 
rules and routine procedures in public agencies and organizations, can be seen as 
institutional factors that have an impact on policy outcomes (Hall, 1992). These 
institutional factors are more uncertain than those in the two dimensions above, 
because regulations are more likely to change than regimes. However, such routines 
and regulations are by no means fleeting, enabling certain social groups to gain the 
initiative or practical advantage of winning over other social groups, ultimately 
benefiting from the distribution of power and the direction of policy (ibid.). 
Focusing on institutional analysis in the historical process, historical institutionalists 
pay more attention to how institutional change drives the process of policy change 
and its causation. For example, Immergut (1992) pointed out how important the 
institutional structure and change are upon policies. Her analysis showed that a 
country’s electoral rules and constitutional framework provide institutional “rules of 
the game”, which in turn constrain future political struggles. She gave a strong 
example of how France, Switzerland and Sweden have shaped vastly different 
systems of national healthcare, with different institutional structures providing 
different “veto points” when the three countries were attempting to reform healthcare 
budgets and implementation. She argued that such institutions “established strategic 
context for the actions of these political actors that changed the outcome of specific 
policy conflicts” (Immergut, 1992, p. 83). 
However, Immergut made a clear distinction between “political actors and their 
strategies” and the “institutional structure in which they operate”. As she has pointed 
out, institutions are often created and transformed in the struggle for political power 
(Immergut, 1992). According to Immergut, the long-term impact of institutional 
changes on specific policies is unpredictable, or at least very uncertain. Indeed, as 
shown in her case of Sweden, constitutional reform which intended to preserve the 
interests of the Conservative Party actually produced isolated effects at the turn of the 
century and contributed to the establishment of the Social-Democratic Government; 
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in the healthcare sector, it decreased the number of veto points available to the 
medical interest groups in the National Health Insurance reform (Immergut, 1992). 
In summary from the perspective of historical institutionalists, actors always compete 
for the institutions and results of policies; the reason why there are such game or 
conflict around institutions and their policy output is that broad policy path will 
follow the results of institutional selection.  
 
3.1.2.4 The historical approach 
Context and temporal sequence 
Historical institutionalism is both historical and institutional (Pierson, 1996). On the 
one hand, political development must be understood as a process of development 
over time; on the other hand, historical institutionalism emphasizes that the main 
political significance in the process of time is embedded in institutions (Pierson, 
1996). The context has a significant influence on the political system, the power 
structure and the political outcome in each country; the same events can have 
different effects in different countries, mainly depending on the timing and sequences 
of event (Pierson, 2000). According to Pierson and Skocpol (2002), context may 
include types of regime, historical era, region and culture. Historical institutionalists 
believe that institutions are not only the product of historical processes but also a 
great force to promote the development of history towards a specific path. Therefore, 
they advocate tracing the formation of an institution in the temporal sequence in 
which historical events took place. In practice, as Steinmo (2008) explains, the 
temporal sequence should first be elaborated to explain the causes of transition, as 
well as the degree of historical change; secondly, political actors learn from historical 
experience, their behaviour, attitudes and strategic choices are born within the 
specific socio-economic and cultural context of the history; lastly the expectations of 
the actors are also shaped by history, therefore, researchers should follow the timeline 
to trace the development of specific events in order to explain how the previous event 
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changed the subsequent events, then work out the interpretation through models of 
temporal sequence and institutional analysis.    
Such a history tracing and analytical method, according to Pierson and Skocpol 
(2002), could have the following effect: firstly, it extends the horizons of time and the 
scope of social processes, and may produce more information and data to help find 
variables which are significant; secondly, examining the historical order of social 
events help to explain the causal relationship between variables. Scholars are not only 
able to explain the causal relationship between variables, but also explain the specific 
time relationship between the variables. It helps to obtain a more profound 
understanding of major events, and propose a more powerful cause and effect 
judgment. Lastly, on the basis of historical data, the time horizon and the timeliness 
of the explanation in the argument of cause and effect could be improved; if the 
analyst neglects the historical background or studies it in a narrow time horizon, the 
timeliness of the interpretation will be severely limited (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002). 
 
Path dependence and critical juncture  
As historical context directly affects the occurrence of specific political events, the 
time of occurrence and order of events is essential. With the same starting point 
conditions, different contexts may result in different outcomes due to the different 
time of occurence and the order of the small or occasional events in the relevant 
history; once political choices are introduced, the follow-up development path is 
almost impossible to reverse, not only limiting the future paths and the possible 
direction of political choice, but also the subsequent stages of a series of events may 
result (Pierson, 2000). This is path dependence, a core concept of the historical 
institutionalist method. It implies a “self-reinforcing” or a “positive feedback” 
mechanisms of the political system in the historical process, which clearly states that: 
1). under certain contexts, the cost of switching from one path to another will 
significantly increase over time; and 2). the temporal sequence should be particularly 
emphasized, and the critical juncture before the formation of institution and 
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self-reinforcing period after the formation should be clearly separated (Pierson, 
2000). For explaining (major) institutional change, Krasner (1984) has a view of 
“punctuated equilibrium”, which underlines that the major crisis events that take 
place under certain political environments will lead to the change and even collapse 
of the old institution; the power struggle among the actors at the critical juncture are 
shaped by cultural tradition, the legacy of the old institution, the rationality of the 
actors and innovation of the ideas, so that the final outcome of the conflict leads to a 
new institution (Krasner, 1984). 
When conflict events occur at critical moments, the main actors have different 
options. Once a particular path has been chosen, it becomes increasingly difficult to 
recourse to the options that were not selected previously; therefore, the initial choice 
made by actors at a critical juncture prior to institutional formation is often the 
starting point for path-dependent analysis (Thelen, 1999). Based on this, historical 
institutionalists tend to use the methods of temporal sequence and path dependence to 
analyze the initial choice of actors and its influence, to conclusively explain the 
continuity and change of institutions.  
 
3.1.2.5 Implications for this research  
The core of historical institutionalism is to locate institutions at the centre of social 
science research. Historical institutionalism defines institutions as formal or informal 
programs, norms and rules that are embedded in a political unit regime or 
economic-political organizations (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Institutions may be 
political arrangements, the structure of a party system or policy networks between the 
government and economic organizations, which identify the motivations and 
constraining contexts for political actors. In real daily life, it is easy to find the same 
kind of policy resulting in different outcomes in different countries, or countries 
responding differently to the same global situation. Institutions on the one hand affect 
the power distribution of actors within organizations or in the policy process; on the 
other hand, they establish institutional relations and responsibility to identify the 
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actors’ interest and status (Hall, 1986). Therefore, individual or organizational 
strategies are not the only factor that affects policy choice; the interactions between 
individuals and organizations also have influence. This reminds us that it is important 
to examine the relationships between actors within a certain institution to understand 
the policy process. This thesis is trying to understand the central-local relationship in 
China and its role in the healthcare policy process. Such a research topic involves 
central government, local governments and other actors within the healthcare policy 
network. Historical institutionalism, as a meso-level approach, provides a more 
comprehensive research vision that emphasizes both individual behaviour (or 
relevant interests) and the great influence of political tradition and structure. It is also 
helpful to test how de facto federalism and Pierson’s three institutional factors theory 
operate in China in a more comprehensive way (which will be discussed in more 
depth in Chapter 8).   
Another key issue that historical institutionalism focuses on is how policy may stay 
stable and how it changes over time, which involves path dependency and 
institutional change. Historical institutionalists argue that the most influential factor 
is temporal sequence. Institutional context often provides a certain environment such 
as “the institutional density of politics” or a “far murkier environment” to cause path 
dependency (North, 1990). Meanwhile the distribution or the structure of veto points 
could influence institutional change or keep punctuating the equilibrium (Krasner, 
1984). Therefore, studying history becomes extremely important; especially the 
focus on the timing, sequence, critical juncture and contingencies (Pierson, 2000). In 
fact, historical institutionalism offers an epistemological solution; a historicals 
(context) study. It helps to find out how the historical context shapes the political 
structure, power distribution and policy outcomes.  
China has a rich culture and a long history. There are many institutions, traditions, 
and ideas formed over thousands of years. The old bureaucratic institution used to be 
the most stable institution in China’s history (Qian, 2001). This may form a relatively 
“strong” context for path dependency. The central-local relationship is a common 
topic in China’s history. Understanding how the old traditions, ideas, and institutions 
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influenced current politics is naturally required. Meanwhile, China has experienced 
several major changes over the past century. There must be some critical junctures 
which have had a great impact on the central-local relationship and social policy in 
China. Therefore, historical institutionalism could offer an appropriate 
methodological approach to achieve an understanding of the central-local 
relationship in China through a rich history.  
In summary, historical institutionalism is an important reference and could lay 
important theoretical foundations for answering the research question. On the one 
hand, its meso-level theory provides an ontological solution to comprehensively 
clarify “what is the central-local relationship?”, “what factors are involved?” and 
“how do actors interact with each other?”. On the other hand, historical 
institutionalism also offers an analytical approach to answer the research questions 
with both long-lived political traditions and rapid institutional change. 
 
Section3. 2: The central-local relationship as an institution  
As discussed above, historical institutionalism is taken as the theoretical background 
for exploring the research questions of this thesis. Through historical institutionalist 
perspectives, the central-local relationship could be regarded as a form of institution. 
According to Thelen and Steimo (1992), institutions that have been central in 
historical institutionalists’ research, normally include “formal rules, compliance 
procedures and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between 
individuals in various units of the polity and economy” (Thelen and Steimo, 1992, 
p.2). The rules of electoral competition, the structure of party systems, and the 
relations between various branches of government are widely accepted as typical 
examples of institutions (Thelen and Steimo, 1992; Hall, 1986). The following 
section will try to understand the central-local relationship from the perspective of 
historical institutionalism.  
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3.2.1 Types of central-local relationships  
The concept of the central-local relationship is normally regarded as a set of political 
and economic arrangements between central government and local government as 
well as an interaction mode between the central and local. Federalist systems and 
unitary systems have long been regarded as the main modes that systematically 
describe the institutional setting of the central-local relationship. The distinguishing 
difference between the federalist system and the unitary system reflect different 
forms of the central-local relationship. Hence, understanding the central-local 
relationship could start from a discussion regarding these two broad types of 
central-local relationship.  
 
3.2.1.1 The federalist system 
The Latin etymology of “federal” is “foedus”, which means “covenant” or “compact” 
(Elazar, 1984). The covenant idea was obtained by the Puritans from the Bible and it 
stresses true cooperation during the pursuit of justice among individuals, groups and 
government and the partnership in power-sharing-based negotiations (Elazar, 1984). 
A covenant is a promise or guarantee that everyone will regard each other’s freedom 
as partly theirs, support each other’s legal freedom, engage in a common cause 
decided upon through a common democracy and oppose the common enemy in 
defense of their liberty (ibid.). Therefore, federalism originated in the idea of 
covenant and is a sort of logical extension of such a concept. 
A federalist system or federal system of government suggests that there are two 
entities, which are independent to one another, which share control over the same 
territory (Smith, 2004). Or as Ronald Watts puts it, “a combination of shared-rule for 
some purposes and regional self-rule for others within a single political system so 
neither is subordinate to the other” (Watts, 1999, p.1). Shared power and 
independence are essential features of the federalist system, in which governments on 
both a national and sub-national level have autonomous decision-making power 
within their territories. Meanwhile, for the sake of securing the independence of 
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central government and local government, there should be constitutional protections 
on the autonomy of government on each level, and on preventing “any one 
government or federation from making changes to the constitution unilaterally” 
(Smith, 2004, pp.15).    
The United States (US) is considered to be a typical federal state in the earliest 
modern sense. But in fact, federalism was not invented by the Americans. The Greeks, 
Swiss, Dutch, and even the Holy Roman Empire provided examples for the founders 
of the US (Elazar, 1991). The Republic of the United Netherlands had a particularly 
great impact on American federalism. In fact, the 1787 Constitution of the United 
States actually took some of its measures and arrangements from the Union of 
Utrecht (Nordholt, 1979). In reality, in different aspects of federalism, such as the 
distribution of legislative power and administrative power, the features are diverse 
and vary in different federalist countries. One type of power distribution is where the 
power of the federal government is listed by the constitution and the power of the 
state is reserved by the broad provisions of the constitution. Typical examples are the 
US, Switzerland and Australia. Federal power is specifically enumerated in these 
countries and is narrow and limited to two main aspects: the necessary power to 
safeguard the existence of the community through defence, foreign affairs and 
taxation, and the necessary power to maintain the unity of basic economic life 
through currency, weights and measures, foreign trade and interstate commerce. The 
second type of power distribution is where the powers of the federal and state 
governments are both listed in the constitution. Canada, India and Malaysia are 
typical examples. In Canada, the exclusive powers of federal and provincial 
governments are listed in detail and any residual power is placed under the federal 
government. It is obvious that the power distribution in these two different types of 
federalist countries may significantly differ. Countries like the US tend to place more 
power on the states, whereas the power distribution in Canada tilts towards the 
federal body. 
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3.2.1.2 Unitary system 
The unitary system, which is always considered as a political structure and 
arrangement opposed to federalism, generally has no direct definition. Researchers 
usually describe a unitary system by generalizing the specified characteristics on the 
basis of a form of state structure which distinguishes it from a federalist system. The 
significant features of the unitary system are that there is only one constitution and 
one central governing system and various administrative units and autonomous units 
must accept the unified leadership of the central authorities and have no independent 
powers separate from the centre, regardless of the extent of decentralization between 
the central and local governments (He, 1988). Local governments are more likely to 
be “employed” by the central to help administer policy made by the central 
government (Smith, 2004). The powers of the local government must be defined or 
changed by central legal documents.  
The relationship between the central government and local governments in unitary 
countries is largely one-sided. However, local governments could have different 
levels of autonomous devolved power from the central government. There are some 
unitary countries in which local governments possess no autonomy, for example, 
Norway. Other unitary countries such as the United Kingdom and France have 
granted a certain degree of autonomous power to sub-national governments. There 
will be further discussion on the UK and France cases in following sections.  
 
3.2.2 Power distribution in the central-local relationship  
Power distribution between the central and local governments has long been 
recognized as a crucial feature that distinguishes federalism systems from unitary 
systems. It is certainly an essential concept when studying the central-local 
relationship. The following sections will mainly discuss power distribution between 
central government and local governments within a federalist system and a unitary 
system.      
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3.2.2.1 Power distribution in a federalist system  
In general, there are two modes of the constitutional division of power between 
federal and state governments. The first is where federal laws are implemented by the 
federal government and constituent unit laws are run by constituent unit governments. 
The second is where federal laws are implemented partly by the federal government 
and partly by constituent unit governments; constituent unit laws are run by the state. 
The US, Canada, Argentina, Brazil and Australia could be put into the first mode, 
where the distribution of legislative and executive power is coincident. The 
respective executive powers of federal and state governments are based on the scope 
of their legislative powers. Although there are common areas of legislative power, 
federal law is executed by the federal government and constituent unit law is run by 
constituent unit governments. Both federal and state administrative agencies coexist 
within the state to implement respective laws and policies (Elazar, 1991). European 
federalist countries like Switzerland, Germany, Austria, and Russia take the second 
mode. There are certain composite parts of administrative power between the federal 
government and state members. Federal law is partly executed by the federal body 
and partly executed by the state according to the constitution. 
Therefore, we can observe three different administrative powers which constituent 
unit governments could hold in a federal system (Wang, 2000). The first is the power 
to implement state laws. The second power is where a constituent unit government 
implements federal laws according to its own power. The third is where a constituent 
unit government enforces official federal duties as the executive body of federal 
agencies. The first administrative power is the inherent power of the constituent unit 
government and therefore is less subject to direct federal control and intervention. 
The latter two administrative powers are enforcement powers of a constituent unit 
government for federal laws and therefore are subject to varying degrees of control 
by the federal executive branch. 
As the first administrative power allocation mode demonstrated above, the 
administrative power of the constituent unit is the power to carry out its own laws, 
therefore under such a principle, the administration of a constituent unit should be 
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excluded from federal control. The US and Australia are the countries which 
implement this principle most radically. In accordance with the constitutions of the 
US and Australia, their federal governments do not have any control over state 
administration; the autonomous administrative capacity of state members are 
completely protected (Wang, 2000). In Canada, the federal government has control 
over provincial administration, which means the federal authority has the 
appointment and removal power of a provincial governor (known as a lieutenant 
governor). But the impact of this kind of control should not be overstated, because 
under the parliamentary cabinet system in the Canadian provinces, the real power lies 
in the hands of the provincial premier; the administrative power of the lieutenant 
governor is in name only (Watts, 1987). 
For countries which belong to the second administrative power allocation model, 
their state members are under various degrees of federal control when implementing 
federal law. In Switzerland, implementing federal law is the constituent state’s own 
duty. The constitution only provides federal supervision for states on particular 
matters such as the construction and maintenance of national highways. Therefore, 
state members implement federal laws with a high degree of autonomy. In Germany, 
according to the constitution, state governments seem to be under more control from 
the federal government. In the case of implementing federal laws on the state’s own 
authority, the federal government has the right to guide and supervise the state’s 
implementation (Nordholt, 1979). The federal government could enact general 
administrative regulations and send representatives to the state governments. The 
federal government can also issue an order to a state government according to the 
power authorized by federal laws (Nordholt, 1979). When a state government is 
acting as a federal agent to implement federal law, the federal government has full 
power over it. The federal government can publish general administrative regulations 
agreed upon by the senate. The appointment of the head of the state member should 
be agreed by the federal government. Competent federal authorities can also issue 
orders to competent state authorities and the state government should ensure the 
orders’ implementation. The federal body not only supervises the legitimacy of the 
implementation by the state but also supervises the purposiveness of the 
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implementation (Scharpf, 1988). In general, in the federalist countries of continental 
Europe, such as Switzerland, Germany and Austria, the central legislative events 
delineated by their constitutions can be divided into two categories: one directly 
executed by the authorities and officials of the central government, such as postal, 
telegraph, etc., and another implemented after the federal government establishes the 
principle of a specific administrative regulation and state government enacts detailed 
rules and regulations. However, in the federalist countries in North America and 
Australia, state governments are strongly separated from the central government. 
 
3.2.2.2 Power distribution in a unitary system 
Several features of the power distribution in a unitary system can be generalized as 
follows. First, similar to federalism system, there is a relatively clear division of 
responsibilities between the various levels of government in a unitary system, 
however such divisions are always broadened or narrowed by the central government. 
Different levels of government have their own specific duties and all levels of 
government have full exclusive powers within their exclusive jurisdiction. There is 
also a clear division of duty between the different levels of government in the same 
policy area. However, the responsibilities of each level of government are 
“incomplete”. The government in each level is responsible only for a limited scope of 
affairs according to the law, rather than for the management of all the affairs of the 
relevant administrative areas.  
The scope of responsibilities of the local government can be generally divided into 
three categories: obligatory responsibilities, permissive responsibilities and 
responsibilities that are prohibited (De Vries, 2000). Obligatory responsibilities 
include inherent affairs and commissioned affairs. Inherent affairs refer to those 
affairs local government should assume according to the law. Commissioned affairs 
refer to the responsibilities of the central government which have been entrusted to 
local government for implementation. The local government must implement 
policies based on the strategies and standards set by the central government. The 
84 
second category, permissive responsibilities, are responsibilities chosen by the 
central government for local governments through legal provisions but where local 
governments have the right to decide whether or not to perform them (Tong, 1996). 
For example, local governments in the UK can care for and offer help on their own 
terms to disadvantaged children. The last category of “prohibited” responsibilities 
mostly includes military, diplomatic and judicial affairs. For example, according to 
the Japanese Local Autonomy Law, local governments cannot handle the following 
affairs: judicial and national punishment affairs; postal and national communications; 
transportation services; national meteorological, aviation, water transportation 
facilities; national education, research, healthcare, convalescent facilities; the 
national library and the national museum (Tong, 1996). 
Secondly, the central government has specialized agencies in charge of local affairs. 
In order to control and supervise the activities of the local government, most unitary 
countries have set up specialized institutions to deal with local affairs. For example, 
within the French central government there is the Ministry of the Interior, the 
Ministry of National Security and the Ministry of Local Autonomy. In the central 
government of the UK, before devolution there was a Scotland Office, a Wales Office 
and a Northern Ireland Office, and several departments which were in charge of 
relevant local affairs (devolution in the UK will be discussed in following sections). 
Finally, there is an unequal partnership between central ministries and local 
government. Each level of government in a typical unitary state is only responsible 
for specific matters. Central ministries and local governments rely on mutual 
friendship and cooperation to carry out their mandates. It is a partnership 
characterized by consultations, negotiations, interdependence and cooperation. 
However, relatively speaking, this partnership is unequal. The central ministries are 
in the dominant position. In any country, the central government cannot give up the 
supervision or control of local governments. Naturally, as part of the central 
government, ministries take on this function. Central ministries are more powerful, 
and they try to pass much more important decisions such as new laws, including those 
granting new powers to a local government (Goldsmith, 2010). In fact, according to 
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Goldsmith (2010), there is no real negotiation between the central and the local 
authorities in unitary countries. Accordingly, powers are always unified and 
centralized in unitary countries and local governments rarely have powers of their 
own (Tong, 1997a). Hence, centralized power was simply linked to the unitary 
system and decentralized power was linked to federalism. 
The corresponding relationship between the unitary system and centralized power 
and federalism and decentralized power seems inevitable. However, if we look 
beyond such a simple linkage and observe across the continents, this description of 
the power distribution in unitary and federal systems is overly simple. In some 
unitary countries such as the UK and Japan, the degree of vertical decentralization of 
power sometimes far exceeds that of federalist countries. Some old states with 
unitary systems started to run decentralization or devolution at the end of 20th 
century.  
 
3.2.2.3 Development of the federalist and unitary systems 
Devolution in the United Kingdom 
In May 1997, the Labour government of Tony Blair was elected in the UK with a 
promise of creating devolved institutions in Scotland. In late 1997, a referendum was 
held which resulted in a “yes” vote. As a result of the Scotland Act 1998, the newly 
created Scottish Parliament had powers to make primary legislation in certain 
“devolved” areas of policy in addition to some limited tax varying powers (which to 
date have not been exercised). Other policy areas remained reserved for the UK 
government and parliament. Power was devolved from London to Edinburgh and 
from an old policy network towards a more pluralistic political community (Keating, 
2005). After the devolution, the Scottish Parliament was granted a wide range of 
powers with some exceptions such as taxation. Its power can be divided into three 
types: reserved, devolved and shared (Keating, 2005), which are similar to the 
powers of state members in federalist countries. Scotland received even more overall 
power than Wales and North Ireland. But specifically, very little of it is shared power 
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when compared with the power of federal states in Germany, where state members 
share much power with the central government. However, since the appearance of 
new social policies such as labour market policy, more space for shared responsibility 
has been created between the Westminster government and the devolved executive 
branch or the Scottish Parliament (Keating, 2005). Other social issues such as 
environmental protection and rural affairs even require cooperation between multiple 
levels of government including the European Union. 
However, the UK has implemented a high degree of asymmetric devolution, as 
Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and England have quite distinct governmental 
structures. Between the UK central government and the Scottish executive branch, 
the Westminster government reserves the power of constitution, foreign affairs, 
national defence and security, monetary and fiscal policies, employment legislation, 
social security, traffic control, etc., while the Scottish Parliament holds legislative 
power in issues concerning health, education, training, local government, housing, 
social work, transportation, the environment, agriculture, fisheries, forestry, sports, 
arts research and statistics. Unlike Scotland, the Welsh Parliament has no basic 
legislative power. All legislation involving Wales is still passed by the UK 
Parliament. The Welsh government took over responsibilities previously exercised 
by the Secretary of State for Wales and is responsible for education, health, local 
government, transport, planning, economic development, social services, culture, the 
Welsh language and environmental, agricultural and rural affairs (Llywodraeth 
Cymru, 2014). However, England does not have similar mid-level governance. As 
Keating argues, “the UK government doubles up as the domestic government of 
England […] departments are sometimes predominantly English where their 
responsibility corresponds to devolved powers in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland” (Keating, 2005, p. 456). A prime example is the Department of Education 
and Skills and the Department of Health. One could argue that devolved 
administrations are pulled along by initiatives from England (ibid.), however, the 
devolved administrations have often taken the initiative in area such as health policy 
(Holden and Hawkins, 2012). The recent political changes in the UK have 
significantly influenced devolution. Firstly, the recent referendum on Scottish 
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independence has led to the devolution of even greater powers to the Scottish 
parliament, because the decision to stay in the UK was quite close. Secondly, the 
recent Brexit result for the UK to leave the EU has raised more debate and 
disagreement about Scottish devolution/ independence, because even though the UK 
as a whole voted to leave the EU, Scotland had a majority vote to remain.   
 
Decentralization in France 
The regional administrative system is the key feature of traditional French policy and 
the political model in the central-local relationship of France. The system relies on 
the consistency of the national administration, and the interests of the central 
government are regarded as a priority beyond the political party, region, interest 
groups and local government. Therefore, the policies made by ministries are 
implemented by local government and coordinated by the governor and the 
representatives of the central government in the province. The central government of 
France used to be a highly centralized government which relied too heavily on its 
ministries and dispatched branches and this overreliance on the mechanisms of the 
central government eventually led to a break up of these powers (Humes, 1991).  
In 1982, France launched its decentralization process, which confirmed that cities, 
provinces and regions are self-governed by an elected parliament. The speaker of the 
local parliament replaced the previous head of local government as the individual 
responsible for local administration and the implementation of the council’s 
resolutions. After decentralization, the specific power of government at each level 
was clear. The central government was responsible for internal affairs, diplomacy, 
defence, the economy and cultural aspects, as well as the macro-management of the 
Strategic Development Plan. The powers of the constituent units were mainly located 
on the implementation of national medium- and long-term plans to promote 
economic development of the region and to develop a five-year plan to support the 
provincial jurisdiction in the region. Provincial government is responsible for a 
province’s budget, local taxes, the management of the province’s transportation, 
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construction and equipping of primary and secondary education facilities, 
management of social health and social insurance costs, development and finance of 
rural territorial management discussion and allocation of central redistributed 
benefits, social insurance, and initiatives for tackling joblessness. The municipal 
government is in charge of organizing and establishing the administrative bodies and 
other public institutions, managing public property and managing the day-to-day life 
of their citizens (Cole and John, 2001) 
Therefore, after decentralization, local parliaments in France obtained a greater 
power to self-determination and self-management. The functioning of welfare 
services had also been decentralized to the provincial and municipal levels and those 
governments became the main managers and funding resource while the central 
government shouldered the responsibility of legal protection and supervision (Humes, 
1991). The latter laws enhanced the decentralization, for example, Act 2003-705 of 1 
August details the scope of local referenda and conditions for optional referenda, 
while the Act of 13 August 2004 institutionalized the new power devolved to local 
governments (Thoenig, 2005; French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006). Such a 
“decentralized France” provides a powerful example to challenge the simple linkage 
between a unitary system and centralization. Decentralization is indeed a striking 
phenomenon manifested in the running of a unitary state, rather than an essential 
feature of federalism. 
In summary, in federalist states the powers of the federal government have been 
constantly strengthened in recent years as socio-economic affairs are increasingly 
complex. This process shows a tendency of centralization in traditional federalist 
countries such as the United States and Germany. In the US, for example, even 
though the constitution clearly defines the legislative jurisdiction of the federal and 
state governments, since the 1920s there has been an expansion of federal powers. 
The US federal government uses legislative “priority power” frequently to achieve its 
goal, which has gradually restricted the states’ legislative autonomy. Between 1969 
and 1989, a duration which accounts for only one-tenth of America’s history, the US 
Congress used the legislative priority power 190 times, accounting for 54% of the 
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total priority power used for the whole 200 years since American Independence 
(Doring and Schnellenbach, 2011; Xu, 1999).  
The development of the unitary and federalist systems has meant that their 
connotations are different now compared to the 19th century and even the first half of 
the 20th century. The difference between these two systems is in fact no longer about 
a separable or inseparable nation, unified or dispersed sovereignty, or whether 
geographical constituent units have exit power or not. Some scholars have 
insightfully pointed out that the debate of unitary or federal is essentially how to 
vertically configure the state executive power and how to regulate the process of 
exercising power (Tong, 1997a). Focusing on vertical decentralization and 
centralization of state powers as the standard to distinguish between the unitary 
system and federalism was accurate in the early stages of their development. But in 
the second half of the 20th century and even the early 21st century, political economy 
and cultural affairs have become so complex in the era of globalization that sticking 
to the traditional standards to measure and examine the unitary and federalist systems 
is clearly inappropriate. A unitary system may present decentralization as its 
characteristics and a federalist state may be characterized by centralization (Wolman, 
1990). Even the distinction between the unitary system and federalism has become 
increasingly blurred – federalist countries increasingly subordinate state members’ 
powers and unitary countries increasingly enhance decentralization. 
 
Section 3.3: How the central-local relationship affects social 
policy 
Institutions such as the central-local relationship can have a profound impact on 
social policy. Although almost all researchers accept that the central-local 
relationship as a political arrangement does affect the making and implementation of 
social policies, what role it plays in these processes is considered differently. Some 
researchers stress that the intergovernmental relations could be particularly dense and 
produce a more cooperative atmosphere between governments (Elazar, 1984). On the 
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contrary, other researchers argue that intergovernmental relations seem to be more 
competitive, and autonomous constituent units are encouraged to compete with each 
other (Cairns, 1979). When the policymaking depends on actors from different tiers 
of government, the competitive environment will push the policy outcome towards a 
lowest-common-denominator policy and the original policy goals are usually 
replaced with acceptable compromises because all constituent units are sensitive to 
their own interests (Scharpf, 1988). In contrast, cooperative intergovernmental 
relations may encourage positive cooperation between local governments. Such a 
(cooperative) intergovernmental relation can also “generate ‘positive-sum’ efforts to 
sort out responsibilities across tiers in a way that best meets the needs of many parties” 
(Pierson, 1995, p. 458). Under such a cooperative environment, a central government 
will be able to create a level playing field for competition over investment attraction, 
combine job creation with environmental protection and easily create win-win 
policies between the federal government and local government (Montpetit, 2002). 
However, some researchers consider competitive intergovernmental relations as a 
positive factor which encourages policy innovation and policy learning (Montpetit, 
2002). Governments of constituent units can act as incubating laboratories to 
experiment with policy innovations and protect against the risks of a policy being 
rashly implemented in the whole country (Radin, 2000). Once such a policy 
experiment has been proven successful, it becomes easier for the central government 
to persuade other constituent units to launch a countrywide policy adoption. The 
national healthcare policy in Canada is a typical example of such a strategy; the 
Saskatchewan province was chosen as the initial experimental ground (Montpetit, 
2002). Moreover, the experiment process offers opportunity for both central 
government and provincial governments to learn which types of policy work well and 
which do not (Montpetit, 2002). This section will review theories that discuss how 
institutions affect social policy.  
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3.3.1 Public choice theory 
Compared with the brief description of how the central-local relationship can affect 
social policy mentioned above, some scholars systematically discuss how the 
central-local relationship can affect social policy. As Obinger et al. (2005) mention in 
their book that analyses the effects of federalism on social policy, there is a closed 
feedback loop between federalism and social policy. The variation in social policies 
between sub-national states can be attributed to the federal arrangement as social 
policies in turn affects the federal system. The public choice theory, which analyses 
the issue from an economic point of view (normally refering to chasing personal or 
organizational benefits), suggests that it is easier to expand the scale of a social 
welfare system in a centralized country than in a federal one, since the state members 
under federalism tend to restrict the fiscal ability of central government in order to 
avoid the appearance of a big federal government which may infract on the interest of 
state members (Obinger et al., 2005). Investors with mobile capital are free to choose 
a more beneficial business environment, hence states would not want to enhance the 
extent of social welfare and would even deny the establishment of a national social 
welfare mechanism because this may cause capital to withdraw and damage the states’ 
interests (Obinger et al., 2005). Meanwhile, since the implementation of 
sub-governmental social policy, for example, social policy against child labour, may 
be affected by relevant interest groups, the “race to the bottom” effect may occur in 
areas of social welfare and the setting of social security standards (ibid.). The public 
choice theory also analyses the relationship between a federal system and policy 
outcome from the perspective of the fiscal source of sub-government. It argues that 
the fiscal source of state government would affect the scale of public spending 
because if a state government obtains its income via revenue sharing or 
intergovernmental grants, then the state government tends to “overfish”, which 
means the government expands the scale of spending on social welfare in order to 
obtain more fiscal resources from the central or other government (ibid.). In contrast, 
if governmental income relies on local taxation, the government will not be so active 
in enlarging welfare expenditure. 
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Obinger et al. (2005) tried to explore the relationship between political settings such 
as the central-local relationship and social policy through an economic perspective, 
however, this also makes it (public choice theory) difficult to form a more 
comprehensive understanding of this research topic, especially from an institutional 
perspective. Institutional settings and economic factors interact with each other 
actively under federalism, so it may not be suitable to analyze such an issue divorced 
from either perspectives, which may provide some obstacles for understanding the 
relationship between central-local relations and social policy in a wider context.  
 
3.3.2 Historical institutionalism  
As demonstrated in previous sections, historical institutionalism not only centres 
institutions in social science research, but also emphasizes how institutions shape the 
policy process and how policies produce feedback to institutions. Many historical 
institutionalists make an effort to explore how institutions affect social policy 
through qualitative or quantitative research. This section will mainly discuss how the 
central-local relationship, as an important institution, influences social policy through 
a historical institutionalist perspective.   
According to historical institutionalists, institutions affect social policy at different 
stages during the policy process, even before policy creation. “Institutions establish 
the rules of the game and limit the scope of possibilities open to policy makers, 
blocking off some paths of policy development” (Hudson and Lowe, 2004, p.181). 
On the one hand, a static central-local relationship such as the power distribution 
between the central and local government could set boundaries for policy makers 
even before policy is initiated. For example, in Australia, the federal government is 
directly responsible for funding and organizing physician services, pharmaceutical 
care, veterans’ care, nursing-home care and for regulating health insurance, while the 
individual states have the task of organizing the provision and financing (with federal 
aid) of hospital care, dental care, mental care, home and community care, prevention 
services and public health as well as regulating health personnel (France, 2008). 
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Therefore, the Australian federal government has direct power to organize, operate 
and deliver healthcare policies, so there could be wider scope of possibilities open to 
the central government. Conversely, in Canada the direct responsibility for healthcare 
is exclusively reserved for the provinces and the federal government is only 
accountable for quite limited aspects such as healthcare for soldiers and prisoners 
(Marchildon, 2005). Although, according to the constitution, the federal government 
has a duty to protect the health of Canadians, it can only establish the guiding 
principles and has to let provinces directly organize, run and fund healthcare 
programs. Thus, more possibilities are open to healthcare policy which local 
governments can benefit from. The situation in Germany is slightly different, since 
Germany has a shared healthcare provision system according to the constitution. The 
federal states (Länder) traditionally hold the responsibility for organizing and 
investing in healthcare. However, hospitals have increasingly become self-governing 
bodies, separating from the local in negotiation processes, and become more and 
more national (France, 2008). Thus, healthcare policy may have more possibility to 
compromise the interests of central government, local government and hospitals.     
On the other hand, dynamic central-local relations such as intergovernmental 
interactions and historical experience of such interaction can also influence social 
policy. How central government interact(ed) with local government may lay an 
important foundation for the cooperation and bargaining between the central 
government and local government during the policy process. A better interaction may 
lead to a more cooperative rather than competitive atmosphere between governments 
and a smoother policymaking process.  
Intergovernmental relations in Canada are a little bit tense since the federal 
government holds limited responsibility on healthcare but has large demands and 
plays a key role in making policies. The Canadian federal government used to 
exercise federal unilateralism in setting conditions and funding levels for provinces 
in the area of healthcare (France, 2008). Although the relevant agreement such as the 
Social Union Framework Agreement was established to ease the contradiction, 
intergovernmental relations in Canada are still tense. Provincial governments do not 
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trust the federal government which causes a serious barrier for policy processes and 
implementation. 
Australia perhaps offers a totally different example for intergovernmental relations. 
As mentioned above, the Australian federal government has a significant leading role 
in healthcare policies. However, the federal government has tended to employ 
intergovernmental negotiation and cooperation in making and implementing 
healthcare policies in recent decades (Bellamy and Brown, 2007). Other cooperative 
bodies such as the Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory Council were established 
for “adopting common policies, coordinating programs and drawing up common 
legislation” (Bellamy and Brown, 2007, pp. 88). Thus, Australia has more trustful 
intergovernmental relations and a smoother policy process. 
The situation in the US is more complex., and similar to that in Canada. In the US, 
state members have long complained about the federal government intervening in 
their affairs. They are also wary of whether the federal government has become too 
powerful and are a threat to their own status. However, more and more states think 
that, as Donahue (1999) argues, their ability to formulate and implement policies has 
significantly improved. Even the policy standards created by state governments in 
some areas have exceeded federal ones (ibid.). Therefore, there are plenty of states 
that still do not trust the federal government, and such distrust threatens to weaken the 
federal role in social policymaking and frequent blocks to policies by the states 
(France, 2008). 
 
3.3.3 Pierson’s three characteristics 
Paul Pierson integrated relevant research and developed a comprehensive theory 
(framework) to explore how the central-local relationship affects the social policy 
process through a historical institutionalist analysis consistent with economic 
analysis such as fiscal arrangement analysis. In his research published in 1995, he 
suggests three characteristics of federalism which have relevance to the social policy 
process, namely reservation of specific powers to constituent units; interest 
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expression to the centre of different tiers; and finally, the extent of commitment to 
fiscal equalization across the states (Pierson, 1995). In short, Pierson has offered an 
analytical framework to study the issue from perspectives of constituent units’ power, 
an interaction model between the central government and state government, and 
fiscal relations between all constituent units.  
The first characteristic, the reservation of constituent units’ power, affects social 
policy outcomes differently in different countries mostly because of constitutional 
differences. As described in the first section, the possession of power and specific 
policy responsibility varies across countries according to their constitutional 
provision. Moreover, this characteristic not only involves constituent units’ power 
but also potentially restricts the policy intervention abilities of the central 
government. For example, the body who is responsible for healthcare policies 
(include funding) varies across countries. In Canada, hospital and psychiatric 
institutions were assigned as provincial responsibilities according to the British North 
America Act of 1867 and the federal government has no direct duty to provide 
healthcare services except for some specific groups such as soldiers and prisoners 
(France, 2008). In contrast, the federal government of Australia has a wide range of 
responsibilities on healthcare policymaking, regulating and funding. Australia’s 
constituent units have quite limited duties on healthcare provision and mainly follow 
the leadership of the federal government in this policy area (Bellamy and Brown, 
2007). Therefore, in Canada, the federal government can only set guiding principles 
for healthcare policy, but in Australia, the federal government has power to create 
and implement specific policies. 
The second characteristic mentioned by Pierson is how interests at different tiers are 
represented at the centre. Another way to consider this is to think about the extent to 
which state members can affect the central government. This characteristic is most 
relevant to the organizing model and power allocation of the congresses. In general, 
as Pierson stresses, “the stronger and more direct this representation is, the more 
likely it is that the interests of constituent members will be respected” (Pierson, 1995, 
p. 465). In the US, although members of the House of Representatives and Senate are 
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elected to represent the proportion of population based on geographical districts and 
state membership respectively, after experiencing a change and reform of nationalism, 
these representatives are more responsible for their voter groups than for their 
constituent units (Pierson, 1995). The situation in Germany is reversed. The 
Bundesrat, which is formed by representatives of the Länder (federal states), holds an 
effectively strong veto power on federal policymaking and implementation, thus the 
interests of constituent states receive more respect during the policymaking and 
regulating process than in the US. Indeed, the extent to which the interests of 
minority state members are represented affect social policies. The federal system in 
the US was designed to let minority members still have the ability to protect their own 
interests (Pierson, 1995). The American South, as the most typical example, was 
given much more respect and political power than proportionate to its population and 
economic strength to block policies that the majority of state members may have 
favoured (Bensel, 1987). 
The third characteristic, the degree of fiscal equalization across constituent units, has 
a great impact on the development of social policies. As stressed by proponents of the 
public choice theory, fiscal capacity and approach really matter in the attitude of state 
members towards social policies. State members whose income mostly relies on 
revenue redistribution usually have more passion and motivation for expansive social 
policy innovation. Other constituent units who gain their income through local 
taxation tend to hold more conservative attitudes towards social policy or even block 
welfare reform to protect the interests of local businesses, which are the main source 
of their fiscal income. Furthermore, states that mainly rely on local taxation tend to 
advocate more decentralized systems of social policy to help them gain more power 
to protect their fiscal capacity (Pierson, 1995). In countries where fiscal equalization 
is well institutionalized, such as Germany and Canada, state members can receive 
extensive financial assistance from the federal government. However, the situation in 
the US seems to go to the other end of the spectrum; weak fiscal equalization in the 
US makes it difficult for state members to pursue policies which may threaten their 
financial position and to launch policy experiments, particularly on redistributive 
issues (ibid.). 
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The way these perspectives of the central-local relationship are embedded in a 
particular political context, Pierson (1995) suggests, do matter a great deal for policy 
development. For example, as Skocpol (1992) and Ikenberry (1983) describe in their 
research, the federal government in the United States has had more freedom to shape 
interventions where state authorities had not already occupied a particular policy 
space; when state-level policy entrepreneurs from Wisconsin were centered in 
shaping plans for a national unemployment insurance system during the New Deal, 
and they acted to protect the structure of Wisconsin’s existing program, rather than 
promote more national uniformity (Skocpol, 1992; Ikenberry, 1983). This example 
indicates how state government shapes a specific policy. The constituent units, as 
powerful institutional actors within the central-local relationship in the United States, 
are able to enact their own policies and influence the actions of the central authority 
(Pierson, 1995). 
However, institutional origins are not the only thing that matters in exploring how the 
central-local relationship affects social policy. In his book Politics in Time, Pierson 
suggests that the divergences or gaps in policy outcome between different federalist 
systems in different countries are more likely to be a consequence of different 
institutional development rather than different institutional origins (Pierson, 2004). 
Pierson emphasizes placing institutions and policies in the context of time when 
doing social analysis. The particular sequences of both institutions and policy are 
crucial in producing lasting different policy outcomes. In Hacker’s cross-national 
study of healthcare systems in Canada, the United Kingdom (UK) and the US, the 
particular sequence critically determined the eventual outcome of national health 
programs in these countries (Hacker, 1998; Pierson, 2004). Questions of whether the 
government had failed to enact national health insurance before a sizable portion of 
the public was enrolled in a physician-dominated private insurance plan, whether 
initial public insurance programs were focused on residual populations and whether 
efforts to build up the medical industry preceded the universalization of access all 
determined which paths these countries eventually took (Hacker, 1998). For the US, 
consolidated physician-dominated private insurance and the staggering costs 
associated with a mature medical-industrial complex made it much more difficult for 
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the government to shift expenses to be financed publicly than it would have been to 
do so earlier (Pierson, 2004). Thus, the US faced more difficulties in introducing a 
national health program than the other two countries. 
Pierson has also criticized the “decontextualization” trend which regards context as a 
bad word to mean thick descriptions that present an obstacle to social-scientific 
analyses in social studies (Pierson, 2004). He states that “the rational choice analyst 
typically focused on variable-entities such as ‘interest groups’ and a whole range of 
institutions such as federalism, legislatures are taken to be similar units with similar 
effects” (Pierson, 2004, p. 168). Context is easily dismissed but it is critically 
important in understanding social processes. Context means spatial and temporal 
relations; actors, organizations and institutions are shaped in these relations and their 
places in those sequences are crucial to determining their meaning (ibid.). Thus, as 
Pierson suggests, it is much more important to know “when” when we intend to make 
sense of a social world (Pierson, 2004). The importance of context and thick 
description also means that a historical approach is often appropriate to 
understanding how institutions affect social policy. 
In the literature above, Pierson discusses how the consequences of a federalist 
central-local relationship leads to social policy divergence and how crucial context 
(time) is in analyzing these social relations. Pierson’s three institutional factors not 
only largely combine institutional settings between the central government and local 
government, but also provide a comprehensive approach which focuses on the 
central-local interaction such as interest expression to explore how the central-local 
relationship affects the social policy process. It provides a more comprehensive and 
appropriate theoretical framework to understand the central-local relationship and its 
impact on the social policy process.
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Chapter 4: The central-local 
relationship in China: unitary, 
federalist or neither? 
 
After the review of relevant Western literature about the central-local relationship 
and the policy process, the focus now returns to China. China has a long history of a 
centralized unitary system, however, with the rapid change in politics and the 
economy in recent decades, how we understand and categorize the central-local 
relationship in China is challenged. Some scholars such as Tong (1997b) regard 
China as a democratic centralist unitary government. Yang (2002) argues that China 
has a “mixed mode” in which features of both federalism and a unitary system can be 
found and the nature, status and power of local governments are not completely equal. 
This chapter will explore which category China belongs to, or conversely, whether 
China has its own style.  
 
Section 4.1: Debates between federalism and the unitary system 
Recently it has been fiercely discussed whether China should be an example of a 
unitary system or a federalist system. Most researchers try to find evidence to put 
China into either the unitary or federalist category. When describing the central-local 
relationship by the form of state structure, the unitary and federalist systems are two 
opposing concepts which seem to be as important as each other (Birch, 1966). 
However, the fact is the unitary system is likely to be a languishing concept compared 
with federalism. During the formation of the nation-state in Europe, the formation of 
these states as a process inhibited localism and nurtured central authority. At that time, 
the unitary system, with centralization as its main feature, was a widespread system, 
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while federalism, which forms a nation-state by power-sharing, was exceptional. But 
when nation-building was basically completed and governments began the process of 
governance, federalism, which has autonomy and joint governance as its main 
features, became more common (Yang, 2003). Federalism here not only featured as a 
structural concept but also a procedural concept. It could be argued that no matter 
how a constitution provides for a country's political system and political structure, as 
long as the procedure is in fact shared governance, such a system may be 
characterized as federalism (Yang, 2003). Therefore, when there are direct local 
elections or the local government legally obtains a certain degree of local and fiscal 
autonomy, the central-local relationship could evolve into a contract-based 
cooperation and bargaining relationship, which means the country is characterized by 
federalism. In summary, the unitary system itself may not accurately reflect 
institutional changes of intergovernmental relations in many countries. 
Meanwhile, both federalism and unitary systems are not terms that describe ultimate 
ideological or ethical judgments. They are a kind of instrumental rationality which 
reflects the nature of an approach to governance. Taking China as an example; in the 
1920s and 1930s, the CCP was the strongest federalist system (although changed 
later) and there were equal rights between the central and the local (Chen, 2005). But 
when the Common Program was officially approved in 1949, China was made a 
unitary republic. It showed that neither the unitary or federal system is a kind of 
specific solution. However, when the Soviet-style planned economy based on an 
extreme form of the unitary system caused problems, the CCP had to seek a new 
governance approach; economic reforms based on and oriented by decentralization. 
After 30 years of development, autonomy and shared governance became common in 
the economic field in China and local governments became decentralized engines of 
growth (Tsui and Wang, 2004). China’s economic reform has been implemented on 
the basis of political stability; the economic relationship between the central and local 
governments has experienced a revolutionary change, while the political structure 
remains almost unchanged. So it may be more reasonable to have a dualistic 
understanding of both the political and fiscal when talking about the relationship 
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between the central and the local in China since the political and economic systems 
have developed with very different features. This will be further discussed below. 
Although the unitary system is a concept that is constantly declining in favour, while 
the federalist system is an ongoing and expanding concept, given such a rapid period 
of change in China, the political-economic structure is more complex because of 
institutional transitions. We cannot simply define China as a unitary or a federal 
country. Only by analyzing the political and fiscal realms in a binary way, may we 
better understand and grasp the characteristics of the central-local relationship in 
China. 
 
Section 4.2: Unitary features  
4.2.1 The central leading group and governing party  
It is obvious that the Constitution clarifies China’s unitary feature by the provision 
concerning the relation between the government, the People’s Congress, and 
central-local relation. However, perhaps because of the major change brought about 
by economic reforms, the return of Hong Kong and Macao bringing in new elements, 
or the provision for ethnic regional autonomy in the Constitution, many scholars have 
been unsatisfied with the traditional unitary system in describing the central-local 
relationship. New modes such as the centralized democratic unitary system (Tong, 
1997b), the composite unitary system (Ai, 2001), the mixed model are posited (Yang, 
2005) and some describe Chinese governance as a federal system (Elazar, 1991; 
Zheng, 2007) have appeared. Such a loose definition is a result of focusing on new 
changes brought by SARs and economic reforms. But an essential premise for 
understanding China’s politics should consider not only the political structure but 
also the revolutionary change in the economy. Another important premise is to regard 
the leadership of the CCP and the relationship between the Party and the government 
as the main approach to understanding China’s politics (Yang, 2003). That means we 
need to examine the state structure not only from the Constitution but also from the 
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Party constitution. It should be examined not only from the legal provision of state 
structure but also through procedure and operation in practice. Defining China as a 
federalist system only by the constitutional provision of ethnic regional autonomy 
shows that Elazar (1991) may hold a simplistic attitude on politics in China, although 
he has made great contributions to the federalist theory. 
China has a huge administrative system which almost covers and authorizes almost 
every aspect of political, economic and social life in China. The crucial organ is the 
state council. It administers the offices of China’s executive bureaucracy, including 
ministries, commissions, and offices that it administers directly and a variety of 
offices and organizations that it administers indirectly. A handful of these offices are 
afforded “ministry-level status” by the PRC government. The State Council also 
administers numerous national leading groups, which focus on specific policy 
concerns. Such leading groups are typically headed by a senior-level leader (at the 
premier or vice-premier level), with actual administration carried out by an office 
specific to the leading group under a relevant ministry. For instance, the Office of the 
Leading Group on Western Development reports to the National Development and 
Reform Commission. It is notable that these high-level leading groups play 
outstanding roles within the political system in China. These groups are usually equal 
to a decision-making organ at the highest level in a certain policy area. As the head of 
these groups are always at premier minister or vice-premier minister level, sometimes 
even the president, these leading groups have significant power to mobilize resources 
and coordinate across different ministries and departments both in the central and 
local governments. By contrast, local governments may stay in a relatively passive 
role and their capacity on certain policy areas may be weakened. This could be a 
reflection of unitary features in political practice in China.           
Moreover, the role of the CCP presents the unitary features in China. On the one hand, 
the government and the CCP are tightly interlocked in daily political life in China. 
For example, for the leadership of the CCP the Constitution only has one sentence, 
but the leadership can be seen in every aspect of political life. Additionally, the term 
“informal politics” is often used in regard to China, which describes procedural 
103 
issues to a certain extent (Kostka and Hobbs, 2012). On the very top of the entire 
party system there stands the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). It is the most 
powerful decision-making unit. It is composed of nine members, which are regarded 
as the most powerful nine men in China and are always named “the Big Nine” (now 
“the Big Seven”). Under the PSC, there is a broader Politburo which is composed of 
25 members. Meanwhile, these 25 (now 23) people lead the Central Committee 
which is composed of nearly 400 official and alternate members. The CCP selects 
and recommends outstanding members to state organs in order to manage national, 
economic and social affairs on behalf of the CCP. Meanwhile, the CCP sets up 
corresponding agencies like the government does. Each respective party agency 
directly or indirectly leads, supervises or serves appropriate government agencies. 
The Party organization achieves its ruling power in the government through the party 
group within the national legislation organ (NPC), the judiciary organ (courts, 
procuratorates), and democratic parties and social groups (Chen, 2000).   
On the other hand, the CCP operates a highly centralized management system. The 
Article 1 in Chapter 2 of the constitution of the CCP has provisions like “individual 
members obey the party organization, minority (members) obey majority (members), 
lower obey the higher (party organization) and (party) organizations obey central 
committee”. Therefore, all-pervasive governing of the CCP in fact could make the 
central government (or more precisely, the central party committee and government) 
maintain a supreme position towards local government.    
 
4.2.2 Personnel control by the central government 
The principle of cadre management or personnel control could be another important 
institution which highly affects the central-local relationship. Systems of cadres and 
principles have been regarded as a crucial tool to achieve central authority (Yang, 
2003). The central committee changed their authority of managing officials from two 
levels to one level (only the provincial level) in 1984, dropping the number of 
officials who are directly managed by the central government from 15,000 to 3,000 
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(Chan, 2004). However, in the early 1990s, since provincial governments were 
highlighted as stakeholders, local protectionism clearly increased, and there are many 
examples in which the local actors negated the centrally recommended candidates for 
the election and elected local cadres in provinces (Li, 2002). Such a situation alerted 
the central government, which decided to maintain and strengthen its authority. The 
most convenient way to do this was to strengthen the local cadre management. So the 
Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee issued “cadre exchange 
regulations” (Gan Bu Jiao Liu Gui Ding) in 1999 to implement the principle of 
non-native and regular exchange systems. The chief provincial party secretary and 
governor come from other provinces and central ministries and the deputies are 
mainly elected from the native province. Meanwhile the mandate of the provincial 
leader was also strictly controlled. Therefore, in the late 1990s, local leaders had 
shorter terms and were replaced more quickly (Li, 2002). Since the late 1990s, cadre 
management at the province level was greatly strengthened in order to overcome 
localism and sectarianism. During the economic reforms in China, the control of local 
core leaders was the major method that the central government used to constrain the 
behaviour of the local government, which strengthened the core feature of unitary 
system in politics in China. 
In summary, the central-local relationship presents its unitary features through the 
party-governing system and personnel control, from which the central government 
achieves a certain degree of control over local government. It is notable that unitary 
features mostly locate in political aspects. The next section will discuss the 
central-local relationship with regard to fiscal aspects, and try to obtain a more 
comprehensive picture of the central-local relationship after combining the features 
in both economic and political aspects.    
 
Section 4.3: Federalist features 
4.3.1. Fiscal federalism 
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If there is any doubt in a unitary political structure in China, then “fiscal federalism” 
may be a controversial proposition. The economic reform based on decentralization 
was implemented for a quarter of century and in 1980, when the “Contracting Fiscal 
System” was introduced in China, revenues were divided into three categories: 
central revenue, local revenue and shared revenue. The shared revenue created a 
negotiating space between the central and the local. Provinces were also granted 
power over expenditure and expected to balance their budget. Another two reforms 
were introduced in 1985 and 1988 to adjust this system. This series of reforms 
established a “contract agreement system” between the central and the local, and the 
local was given maximum incentives for revenue collection. Under this fiscal system, 
an increasing share of fiscal resources was left for the local government, and the real 
volume of resources available to the central government was reduced. China 
implemented a Tax-Sharing System (TSS) in 1994 which redefined 
intergovernmental fiscal relations and revenue-sharing arrangements in order to stem 
the fiscal decline and provide adequate revenues for government, especially the 
central government. A tax-sharing bureau was established and the central 
government established its own tax-collecting administrative organ, the National Tax 
Service, which supervises the collection of its own revenue. The government’s fiscal 
revenue (defined here as the sum of budgetary revenue, extra-budgetary revenue and 
income of the social security fund) sharply increased from less than 800 billion yuan 
to nearly 37 trillion (Huang, 2010). Such significant changes via fiscal reform had 
provided bargaining and negotiation space between central and local government.         
The scope of the management power of the central government is indeed an 
important indicator when measuring central-local economic relations. However, the 
fiscal system should be another core indicator. China has experienced a revolutionary 
change in fiscal and financial systems and all these reforms are basically fiscal 
decentralization. Although the tax-sharing system (FenShui Zhi) greatly enhanced 
the proportion of national revenue going to the central government, the two most 
obvious results of the tax reform in 1994 are in the central-local relationship, in which 
the central role in direct economic management declined and macro-control capacity 
was enhanced; and in government-market relations, where the role of government 
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was undermined and the role of the market was strengthened (Yan and Chen, 2003). 
The role of local government was changed from agent to stakeholder, while the role 
of the market was changed from a supporting to a leading role. Such significant 
changes in institutional arrangements and practical economic operations resulted in 
connecting China with “fiscal federalism” or “economic federalism” (Tsai, 2000). 
Although decentralization does not simply mean federalism, it can be characterized 
as a form of federalism. When the local government legitimately obtains a certain 
degree of autonomy, local policymaking power, and fiscal autonomy rights, the 
central-local relationship itself may evolve into a contract-based cooperation and 
bargaining relationship, and these will align with the aforementioned federal 
connotations (Rodden, 2004). Therefore, describing the central-local economic 
relationship under the shared tax system with fiscal federalism has been popular, and 
has become the consensus view among some economists in China (Yan and Chen, 
2003). 
According to traditional fiscal federalism, the central government should bear 
functions such as macroeconomic stability, poverty alleviation, income redistribution 
and the provision of national public goods (such as national defence). Instead, local 
governments should assume jurisdiction to provide public goods because local 
governments have fully understood the preferences and circumstances of voters 
within their jurisdiction (Oates, 1999). In late 1950s, there was a trend of “fiscal 
decentralization” in which some functions of the central government were 
decentralized to the local government. In Europe, the “principle of subsidiarity”, in 
which public policy and its implementation should be assigned to the lowest level of 
government, was adopted by the "Maastricht Treaty" (ibid.). The reason is that 
constitutional constraints and political pressure limit the central government to 
provide a higher level of public goods for some areas rather than other areas, and 
therefore, the central government could only provide the same level of public goods 
and cannot consider regional differences (Oates, 1999). The decentralization in China 
was regarded as a similar process under a similar logic. 
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There are those who oppose the characterization of China as fiscally federalist. From 
their perspective, although such reforms have made a revolutionary change, central 
power can still be observed clearly in economic life (Zhang, 2009). The centre still 
holds the power of direct land management, mineral resources, project investment 
and coercive power in macroeconomic regulation. A coal transport project from 
western to eastern China, for example, transported 5,000 tons of coal from the west to 
the east. Even the province in which this coal was mined has no priority on coal using 
since the coal should be allocated to the east first (Li, 2002). Although monetary 
policy was used as the main method in macro-economic control, is be replaced by 
coercive powers of central government when monetary policy cannot play an 
effective role. Such a powerful central government would not exist in typically 
federal countries. These issues are always used as evidence to criticize the idea of 
fiscal federalism in China (Zhang, 2009). 
 
4.3.2 Market-preserving federalism 
The representative of “rational choice institutionalism”, Weingast, proposed a 
“market-preserving federalism” (MPF) after a comparative study of central-local 
relations in England in the 18th century, the USA in the 19th century and China after 
the reform and opening up (Weingast, 1995). The five characteristics which could be 
basically recognized as federalism are, firstly, having a hierarchical system within the 
government structure, where no one government has an absolute monopoly on 
policies and regulations, while each level of government could enjoy full autonomy 
within their power. Secondly, the autonomy of each level of government is 
institutionalized, so that the constraints of federalism can be self-enforcing. Thirdly, 
local governments have significant management rights over economic affairs within 
their jurisdiction. Moreover, a unified market which makes local governments unable 
to use their economic management rights to manufacture trade barriers; lastly, each 
level of government has to face a hard budget constraint (Weingast, 1995). The first 
condition is clearly necessary to define the basic characteristics of federalism, but it is 
not enough, because when only relying on the discretion of the highest government, 
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decentralized power can always be recovered. In practice, a sustainable federalism 
must be protected from any coercion that the local government may receive from the 
central government. So other conditions are also necessary in order to limit the 
encroachment of the central government. If both the central and the local 
governments face budget constraints, they will not be able to endlessly go beyond 
their budget, which would easily result in an unstable macroeconomic environment 
(Qian and Weingast, 1996).  
Specific to China, Weingast pointed out that the decentralized economic reform 
achieved a balance between the central and local. Firstly, the local holds full 
information of local enterprises which are difficult for the centre to access. In 
addition, economic decentralization makes the local governments gain more 
economic management power which enables them to implement economic policies 
adapted to local conditions which reduce their reliance on the central (Li, 2011). In 
other words, decentralization enhances the power and dynamics of the local economy 
while the fiscal responsibility and pressure of the centre are reduced (Qian and 
Weingast, 1996). Secondly, fiscal decentralization led to fiscal competition among 
local governments. The centralized regulation of the financial system not only limits 
bank credit to local governments but also inhibits the investment of local government, 
which together help to promote “hard budget constraints” (Li, 2011). Thirdly, as the 
enhancement of local government ability to manage economic affairs and the 
weakening of the centre in controlling the local economy takes place, the possibility 
of a reversal of decentralization becomes less likely, which makes decentralization a 
more and more reliable arrangement (Qian and Weingast, 1996). Although there are 
some problems in a unified national market and hard budget constraints such as local 
protection and excessive money supply, China is basically in line with important 
features of Weingast’s MPF. 
If fiscal federalism is a description of the central-local relations under fiscal 
decentralization, then “market-preserving federalism” can be seen as the theoretical 
summary based on the role of local governments after the fiscal decentralization and 
the strengthening of market mechanisms. However, in the Chinese context, these 
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so-called federalisms are fundamentally different from the typical form of the federal 
state. The term of federalism intends to describe autonomy and shared governance 
status that local governments have under the economic reform based on 
decentralization in China.  
Similarly, the opponents of MPF rejected the claim that it (MPF) has captured the 
nature of the central-local relationship in China. Although there is significant 
decentralization and federalist features in the economy, some researchers believe that 
China still maintains a centralized political structure, though local officials have 
enjoyed more autonomy since the reform. But the centre has considerable control 
over them, especially in the selection and appointments of personnel. The CCP has 
always insisted on the principle of Party control cadres and emphasized the Party’s 
absolute control of the appointment of cadres. The daily management of the Party 
cadres is fairly centralized; the examination, appointment and transfer of each cadre 
must be decided by a higher Party committees, and the Organization Department. So 
the personnel authority is the most fundamental constraint of local officials by the 
centre. Thus, it may be more reasonable to describe the central-local relationship of 
China in a binary fashion rather than to simply define it as a kind of unitary or 
federalist system, in which political relations are likely to be unitary while economic 
relations are much more like federalism (Zhang, 2009). Such a “mixed mode” might 
be a reflection of the transition of the economic and political system. One researcher 
argues that the dual system has captured the current features of the central-local 
relationship and may transform to another mode when China has found its direction 
of reform (Zhang, 2009)  
 
 
4.3.3 De facto federalism 
However, another researcher, Zheng Yongnian, has discovered something different 
from the studies mentioned above. He found that the central government is losing its 
absolute power not only on economic matters but also on political matters, even in 
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appointment of provincial leaders, which is treated by many researchers as the only 
effective approach for the central government to control local government (Zheng, 
2007). He developed the “de facto federalism” theory to explain the central-local 
relationship in China in practice.  
Zheng’s research combines structural, procedural and cultural approaches to explore 
the central-local relationship. His research is “thick description”, which has long 
been the preference of historical institutionalists. Zheng did a long-term study of the 
formal and practical central-local relationship and did in-depth case studies of three 
typical provinces in China. From this, he suggests that de facto federalism better 
explains the central-local relationship in China from a behavioural perspective. As he 
defines it, de facto federalism is: 
A relatively institutionalized pattern which involves an explicit or implicit 
bargain between the center and the provinces, one element in the bargain being 
that the provinces receive certain institutionalized or ad hoc benefits in return for 
guarantees by provincial officials that they will behave in certain ways on behalf 
of the center. (Zheng, 2007, p. 39)   
Moreover, according to Zheng, China’s central-local relationship could be described 
as de facto federalism because it satisfies the following conditions:  
1. A hierarchical political structure in which both central and provincial 
governments have some activities on which they make final decisions. 
2. Intergovernmental decentralization is institutionalized to such a degree that it is 
increasingly difficult for the central government to unilaterally impose its discretion 
on the provinces and alter the distribution of authority between governments.  
3. Provinces have primary responsibility over the economy and, to some extent, 
politics within their jurisdictions (Zheng, 2007, p. 39–40). 
The intergovernmental decentralization which started after 1978 could be seen as the 
starting point of de facto federalism in China. During the decentralization, many 
political and economic policy-making powers, such as local public security and road 
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construction, were obtained by local governments. As such, these local governments 
became economic planners and use these granted powers to develop their 
independent power base and increase local wealth. A large sphere of economic 
decision-making authority was decentralized from the central to individual 
enterprises as well. Such decentralization completed the economic reform which 
targeted the laissez-faire economy in which the central government does not 
intervene (Zheng, 2007). The political transition during the decentralization is 
another big step for China in the reform period. Certain rights were given to protect 
both individuals and social groups from arbitrary acts by the state while citizens were 
given more rights to participate in institutions and elections. Such a process of 
liberalization and partial democratization has included a broader portion of society in 
the process of economic and political decision-making. Therefore, this 
decentralization is not only a process which decentralizes power from the centre to 
the local, but also from government to society. Local government obtained 
institutional settings and legitimacy to intervene in economic activities in their 
jurisdiction from intergovernmental decentralization. Moreover, since the local 
government becomes less dependent on the central, the central-local relationship 
becomes more interdependent. It is necessary for the centre to seek cooperation with 
the local when the centre wants to implement policies. So the local officials also 
change their strategies when dealing with the centre (Zheng, 2007).   
The start of intergovernmental decentralization after 1978 was the initial dynamic of 
de facto federalism of China, then in the mid-1990s when China faced globalization, 
it quickly became another crucial dynamic for de facto federalism. Unlike the 
“hollowing out” effect that globalization has brought to other countries, globalization 
created two opposite forces in China: centralization and decentralization (Zheng, 
2007). On the one hand, globalization no doubt increases the decentralized economic 
power for local government and makes it more difficult for the centre to access local 
economic resources. On the other hand, globalization makes it necessary for the 
centre to find an effective way to regulate the national economy in order to 
accommodate external economic forces resulting from globalization (Zheng, 2007). 
In order to resolve the tension between the central and local governments brought 
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about by globalization, China implemented “selective recentralization” since the 
mid-1990s, which in turn gradually institutionalized de facto federalism in China 
(ibid.).   
One may wonder how the absolute power held over appointments and promotion by 
the centre may undermine the federalist character of the central-local relationship in 
China. However, as Zheng argues, the nomenklatura system is no longer the most 
efficient way to guarantee the central government’s control on the local. In the matter 
of selecting local officials, the provincial leader has an important say because the 
centre could hardly make a personnel change without information on individual 
leaders provided by the provincial leaders (Zheng, 2007). The personnel control by 
the central government cannot function well without local cooperation. The province 
is no longer the one that has no impact on central personnel decisions, although it is 
still in the subordinate position within the formal institution. Susan Shirk also 
suggested that there is so-called “mutual accountability” between central and 
provincial leaders since provincial leaders are the largest part in the Central 
Committee of the Party which elects central leaders (Shirk, 2007). On the one hand, 
provincial officials hope to be promoted and the central leaders can threaten dismissal 
as an incentive to mobilize local officials to support the reform. On the other hand, 
provincial officials constitute the majority of the Central Committee, and their 
support is necessary for any central leader. They have the strength to persuade the 
central leader to implement policies that are conducive to local interests. This also 
tells us that reciprocity, the most important characteristic of central-local relations in 
de facto federalism, becomes the most common and important mechanism in the 
political and economic relationship between the central and local governments rather 
than coercion and bargaining (Zheng, 2007). Thus, as Zheng stated, the central-local 
relationship in China operates in the way of de facto federalism even without 
institutional guarantees. 
After the general discussion about central-local relations in China, Zheng has done 
in-depth case studies in three provinces, namely Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Guangdong. 
These provinces all experienced decentralization and a great decline of the power of 
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the central government; however, each province developed an obviously different 
relationship with the central government. The Jiangsu government relatively 
smoothly achieved cooperation with the centre and did not carry out any radical 
reform, but implemented pragmatic policies to promote local development. The 
central-local relationship in Zhejiang is characterized by problem-solving. Conflict 
existed, especially in the private sector economy (such as the Wenzhou model), but 
the local leadership acted as a buffer between the outside world and the local 
community, and prevented the local private sector from actual influence by external 
forces (Zheng, 2007). But the central government has not taken back power and 
instead they solicit provincial cooperation by giving incentives to drive them to 
achieve a central goal. The situation in Guangdong is quite complicated. After the 
decentralization, Guangdong slipped into excessive localism, going beyond the 
boundaries. The central government could not tolerate this action. The centre decided 
to launch a campaign against this excessive localism. But the central government 
seems to have encountered a dilemma; excessive localism often destabilizes the 
national economy, but without strong incentives for local interests, local economic 
development will be undermined (Zheng, 2007). Finally, the centre decided to plant 
national institutions in selective areas in Guangdong to crack down on the excessive 
localism and resume the control of central government without negatively affecting 
local initiatives (ibid.).  
From these case studies, we can observe that the central government could no longer 
eliminate any localistic development in the practical structure of central-local 
relations in China. Therefore, de facto federalism may be the more reasonable 
explanation of how the central and local governments interact in practice. As Zheng 
defined the central-local relationship of China as de facto federalism, how such a 
federalist system affects social policy becomes the next question. Does it affect social 
policy in a federalist way like other federal countries, or does de facto federalism 
have its own style in affecting social policy? It might be reasonable to ascertain how 
the “old fashioned way” (which operates in other federal countries) works in China. 
Here Pierson’s three distinctive dynamics of federalism on social policy could 
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provide a theoretical framework to explore how de facto federalism affects policies in 
China.  
The reservation of specific powers to constituent units, as Pierson suggested, is an 
institutional characteristic of federalism which is of great relevance to social policy. 
Particular policy responsibilities or policy areas are reserved for determining the 
position of constituent units in the process of policy-making and even restrict the 
potential for central government action (Pierson, 1995). Compared to countries 
where the particular power of the local government is constitutionalized or clearly 
institutionalized, the boundaries between central and local power in China are quite 
blurred and lack clear definition. According to Article 64 in the Legislation Law of 
China, the local government could enact local laws and regulations according to the 
specific situation in the region in order to implement laws and regulations. Such 
ambiguous legislation provides more flexibility for “local affairs”, and the local 
government has plenty of chances to provide a self-serving interpretation of these 
affairs and expand their power against the centre. So the reserved power for the 
province is more likely to be on a practical level and there is much space for the local 
government to gain some specific power from the central. With globalization, the 
local government and local enterprises get even more autonomous power from the 
centre. So it is more and more difficult for the centre to force or drive the local 
governments to act as the central government would like them to, because the local 
government has more and more decentralized power, which is in line with Zheng’s 
idea on the central-local relationship in China. Even those powers reserved for the 
local government are not institutionalized by law in China, but there is little 
possibility for the centre to retake the decentralized power. Selective recentralization 
in specific areas, as Zheng (2007) suggests, seems to be the only option for the centre 
to retake power from the local governments.  
The case study in Zheng’s research also shows how locally reserved power performs 
in China. When the “Wenzhou model”, which went against the interests and ideology 
of the centre at the time, appeared in Zhejiang, the centre had not taken the 
decentralized power back and did not punish the Zhejiang government as it had done 
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in the past; rather, the central sought to achieve cooperation with Zhejiang and try to 
drive the local government to achieve the central goals. This provided evidence that 
although the powers reserved for local governments are not institutionalized, it is less 
possible for the centre to retake the decentralized power from the local. The case of 
Guangdong and Jiangsu shows how different reserved powers affect policy-making 
in different provinces. Guangdong, as the pilot province of the opening up and reform, 
was granted significantly more power in economic planning than other provinces, 
such as power over economic development in the private sector. Their power in hand 
expanded as quickly as their economic development and the central plan and policies 
could not be implemented as the central will in Guangdong. Eventually, the excessive 
localism in Guangdong went beyond the tolerance of the centre. The central 
implemented “selective recentralization” in Guangdong by planting national 
institutions in selective areas in Guangdong to keep Guangdong in line with the 
central (Zheng, 2007). While Jiangsu got much less reserved power than Guangdong 
during the reform and decentralization, the local government interacted with the 
central positively and achieved smooth cooperation in implementing central policies. 
Therefore, the dynamic of the reserved power to constituent units seems to have had 
obvious influence in China. 
The second institutional characteristic of federalism identified by Pierson is how 
local interests are represented at the centre. In China, the way that the local 
governments express their interest is more complicated. There are two main 
approaches local: one is the internal approval and consultation process and the other 
is via a proposal brought by a local representative mission during the National 
People’s Congress. The internal approval and consultation process refers to the 
information upload and exchange between different tiers, which is the common and 
direct way in which local government can express its interests. Since there are dual 
authorities (government and party organs) at all levels, the internal approval process 
could go through either channel. Expression through the government system is a 
worldwide phenomenon. The advantage of this approach is that it makes full use of 
the existing administrative authority, but the disadvantage is that information might 
be distorted during the expression through the tiers of bureaucracy and the low 
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efficiency of the administrative organs. In the current situation, the power of party 
committees still holds primacy at all levels. The expression of local interests through 
the internal party organization makes local governments able to circumvent a series 
of institutional and legal dilemmas in the political system (especially administrative 
systems), which is a more suitable and efficient way for local governments to achieve 
their aims (Zheng, 2012). Of course, this expression approach is based on the actual 
position of party committees in daily politics. Such asn approach has to face 
examination and cross-examination by a series of normative documents like the law 
and the party constitution. Therefore, although this means of expression for local 
interests looks quite effective, it has flaws in its legitimacy.  
The second main approach for local governments is the proposal on the National 
People’s Congress (NPC). In March of each year, all the national people’s 
representatives gather in Beijing to deliberate the report of each national executive 
(such as the State Council and the highest People’s Court) and discuss the major 
issues for the whole country. Each national representative is elected at the provincial 
level, though some are elected among the Army, to represent the local interests of 
where he or she comes from. Local interests are condensed in the proposal and 
comments of national representatives reach Beijing directly. During the annual NPC, 
top leaders will participate in the group discussion of local delegations, making it 
possible for local interests to be directly represented to the central government. 
Expression through the NPC achieves expression beyond administrative tiers and 
helps to avoid inefficiencies caused by multiple levels of bureaucracy. However, due 
to the current actual position of the NPC and its representatives (as discussed in 
Chapter 2), the effective response to local expression by means of the NPC is 
relatively limited. Furthermore, the number of national representatives in each 
province is determined by guaranteed positions and positions based on population. 
However, since China only has one parliament (NPC), it is difficult for the provinces 
with small populations to block policies which are favoured by the majority. This is a 
result of the inferior position of these provinces with minority populations in the 
NPC. 
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In fact, there is a special and informal way for the expression of local interests in 
China. Each province, district and some counties have their own Beijing liaison 
offices to lobby central ministries for policy resources such as financial support from 
the central government. Beijing liaison offices were established under the planned 
economic background. At the beginning, the centre’s initial aim was to build a 
communication platform between the center and local government. There are three 
main duties for the Beijing liaison offices, the first of which is to offer hospitality to 
local officials when they come to Beijing for public affairs. The second is to furnish 
information on the latest developments and timely reports on the central government 
to their local government. The third is to lobby the central state organs to get more 
policy support and resources on behalf of their local interests. But with the advent of 
economic development and a series of reforms, the core duty for Beijing liaison 
offices is lobbying for resources and policy support for local government. After the 
taxation system reform, some undeveloped areas relied more heavily on the central 
fiscal transfer payment, making the function of their Beijing liaison offices more 
prominent. Because Beijing liaison offices are located in Beijing and their staff are 
more familiar with the operating characteristics of the central state organs, the central 
leadership style and specific central officials than the local government, Beijing 
liaison offices have become an informal but very effective way for local governments 
to express their interests to the centre (Guo, 2010). However, this informal approach 
has experienced some setbacks. In 2010, the central government ordered all 
provinces to close their Beijing liaison offices because they had the potential to 
become a hotbed for corruption. But such a simple revocation of the Beijing liaison 
offices did not actually stop this informal means of local expression. Most of 
Beijing’s liaison offices transferred to the suburbs of Beijing or Hebei province, and 
continued their previous work. Therefore, this informal but direct approach for local 
governments remains functional as a way to express local interests to the centre. 
The level of fiscal equalization across the constituent unit is the final dynamic 
suggested by Pierson. As discussed in Chapter 3, the distribution of financial 
resources among constituent units has a significant influence on the strategies and 
policy experimentation of local government. Unlike countries which have an 
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institutionalized commitment to substantial fiscal equalization in their constitutions, 
such as Germany and Canada, China has no institutionalized commitment to fiscal 
equalization. Fiscal decentralization was a crucial part of the reform of the market 
economy after 1978. When fiscal power was increasingly decentralized, the gap 
between fiscal revenue and public service provision responsibility grew larger. Some 
poor provinces were unable to meet the expenditure responsibilities or provide basic 
public services at a very low level (Gu, 2010). These provinces needed more income 
from taxation in order to provide these public services. Therefore, transfer payments 
were inevitably used as an important means to meet the vertical fiscal gap and 
achieve vertical control by the central government. The function of transfer payments 
by the centre become more obvious after taxation reform in 1994 and local 
governments, especially poor provinces, relied more on central redistribution. 
However, the transfer payment model at that stage was a kind of tax return model, 
meaning that the central government held the initiative. The return amount was used 
as a tool to control the local governments, and to some extent relates to the behaviour 
of the local governments (Gu, 2010). With such a low level of fiscal equalization, we 
are able to understand why the provinces mentioned in the case studies in Zheng’s 
research had different policy and development plans, sometimes even daring to block 
policies proposed by the central government, as in Guangdong province. These 
provinces all have a strong local economy and were granted significant power during 
the decentralization process and are fiscally independent compared to poorer 
provinces. Therefore, the transfer payment is not an effective means of driving them 
to achieve the goals of the central government. Thus the centre needs a new effective 
tool to guarantee both local fiscal ability and its control of local government. When 
the concept of “Harmonious Society” was proposed in the Sixteenth Party 
Conference in 2006, it included the goals of “improving the public fiscal system and 
gradually reaching the equalization of basic public services”, while the Seventeenth 
Party Conference drew much attention to “promoting the equalization of basic public 
services and the main functional areas”. This means that the concept of fiscal 
equalization has been gradually embedded into the public fiscal system and has 
become a direction for future development (Gao, 2006). 
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The different consequences in the three cases listed above also remind us of Pierson’s 
research on federalism and policy outcomes as well as on time and institutions. Since 
each province has unique path-dependency with regard to local development (for 
instance, Zhejiang has a strong tradition of private economy and Guangdong has a 
history of localism), the strategies of both the central government and local 
governments vary when dealing with each other. As Pierson suggested, how federal 
institutions are embedded in a particular political context has significant 
consequences for policy development (Pierson, 1995). Then the unique political 
context in each province drives the three provinces onto different paths, and they in 
turn gain different specific decentralized powers from the central government. 
Meanwhile, three distinctive dynamics of federal institutions mentioned in Pierson’s 
research seem to play a significant role in these cases. The expression of local interest 
in the centre is different in the three provinces. For example, there are plenty of 
bureaucratic enterprises (enterprises founded, managed and controlled by the Party 
cadres, government officials and their family members) in Guangdong, offering a 
channel for Guangdong to express its local interest to the central government (Zheng, 
2007). The enterprises are a strong dynamic of Guangdong localism as well. 
Therefore, the localism could go beyond what the central government will tolerate, 
prompting the centre to launch a campaign against this localism, steps which were not 
necessary in the other two provinces. Such relations between institutions and policy 
outcomes in these three provinces may provide some evidence that the interaction 
between the centre and the local in China turns out to be quite similar to the 
central-local relationship of the federalist system described in Pierson’s research in 
1995. 
 
Summary  
In summary, after reviewing the literature on federalism and unitary systems, de facto 
federalism, which had been conducted in a historical intuitionalist framework, may 
be the most reasonable descriptor to capture the current features of how the central 
and the local governments interact with each other in political and economic arenas. 
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The emphasis by both Pierson (1995) and Zheng (2007) on particular political 
institutions also provides a good research approach to explore how these institutions 
affect specific policy in specific areas over time. The three distinctive dynamics 
mentioned in Pierson’s research also have a significant role in affecting social policy 
in the de facto federalism of China. Meanwhile, these dynamics seem to have some 
unique features or operate in unique ways in the political and economic environment 
of China. For example, China has Beijing liaison offices, an informal but efficient 
and effective system of expressing local interests. Providing reserved power to the 
constituent unit is not well-institutionalized and remains at a practical level. But these 
practical powers of local government indeed affect how the local governments 
interact with the centre and policy outcomes. Two chapters have reviewed the 
central-local relationship and how it affects social policy, and reviewed the 
arguments of a number of scholars with regard to this relation. However, does the 
literature reviewed reflect the current reality in China? Does accurately in describe 
the features of the central-local relationship after the rapid development of recent 
years? The system of de facto federalism here is a kind of procedural concept rather 
than an ultimate concept. It is more likely to describe the procedure of how the centre 
and local governments interact on a behavioral level, but this relationship has been in 
the process of transformation. Is there a trend of formal institutionalization or is it 
ultimately transforming to another model? Does reciprocity still play a significant 
role in central-local interactions in China? For the institutional dynamics which affect 
social policy distinctively, do they operate in a different way from what we have 
reviewed? Although China does not have institutionalized fiscal equalization, it is a 
developing direction for China. Has the fiscal equalization developed to a new level 
and produced new influences on social policy? All these questions should be 
answered if we aim at obtaining a clear understanding of the role of central-local 
relationship in China and how it affects social policies in reality. Thus, we need to 
explore the answer by further fieldwork and a detailed case study.
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Chapter 5: The healthcare system in 
China 
The complexity of China’s central-local governmental relationship has been 
reviewed in Chapters 2 and 4. Exploring how this relationship affects specific social 
policies is the next task of this thesis. This chapter will discuss the healthcare system, 
which is the chosen policy field of this thesis. Section 1 will discuss the reason why 
healthcare was chosen for study by reviewing the social reforms in China. Section 2 
will discuss healthcare policy, and a typology of healthcare systems, and then 
examine the developmental process of the healthcare system from 1951 onward in 
order to aid understanding of how it works and to grasp some specific features. 
 
Section5. 1: Why health? 
This section will briefly review the developing process of social welfare in China. 
Social reforms in different social areas have similar start points, however reforms in 
these areas presented more and more differences with the deepening of the reforms. 
Healthcare reform developed significantly differently from other reforms and its 
features makes healthcare a more appropriate policy field to observe how the 
central-local relationship affects social policy.     
 
5.1.1 Social policies in China  
5.1.1.1 Social policies before 1978 
After 1949, the Chinese government copied the welfare system of the Soviet Union to 
create a socialist welfare arrangement and policy mode. At that time, social welfare 
services mainly focused on rural and urban poverty relief and natural disaster relief. 
Welfare services were arranged for vulnerable groups, mainly for the old and the sick. 
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Social insurance was set for national cadres and workers in state-owned enterprises 
and social care was based on special care and placement for war veterans (Bruce and 
Harrell, 1998). The standard of social welfare stayed at the level where the key goal 
of social welfare was to alleviate poverty and provide relief after natural disasters. At 
this stage, these social cares were regarded as a kindness from a national authority 
and lacked a real basis of citizenship (Chen, 2003). However, since the reform and 
opening up in 1978, the macro social environment, social organizations at the 
meso-level and individual lifestyles have greatly changed. The social welfare system 
and remaining welfare policy model based on traditional work units experienced 
structural and revolutionary change. Prior to 1978, “the enterprises in China, 
especially the State-owned enterprises (hereafter referred to as SOE) were acting as 
an all-encompassing ‘unit’, whereby not only the full employment of all their 
workers was guaranteed but also ‘cradle to grave’ welfare was delivered” (Chen, 
2003, p. 52). Urban workers employed in SOEs, who were treated as ‘labour 
aristocrats’, enjoyed the fullest welfare of all, patterned after the Russian model. The 
welfare needs of rural residents, by contrast, were met by their communes (World 
Bank, 1997).     
The connotation and framework of social policy in China before 1978 was 
consequently different from social policy in the United States and Europe. Since 
China has its own unique history and culture, social environment, social structure, 
population structure and industrial structure, the connotation and framework of social 
policy also has a unique character. For example, the special care and placement of 
veterans and their families is an important part of the framework of social policy and 
social welfare system in China. Compared with a similar system in the West, the 
veterans special care system reflects more about the social welfare responsibilities of 
government (Liu, 2003). Moreover, environmental protection, ecological health and 
the Healthy Cities movement is an important part of the social welfare system and 
social policy framework. Social policy was introduced and primarily developed in 
China when the concept of green welfare and ecological health arose around the 
world (George and Wilding, 1994).  
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At this stage from 1949 to 1978, there were several unique difficulties that China 
faced. Firstly, the boundary between political, economic, social and cultural policies 
was unclear (Liu, 2003). Thus, there was a high degree of interpenetration, 
interdependence and mutual influences between political, economic, social, and 
cultural factors, which in turn increased the difficulty of policy formulation and 
implementation. Secondly, the social policy framework lacked corresponding basic 
values. Social policy is not value-free; on the contrary, it is often based on certain 
values and goals (Liu, 2003). A crucial essence of the practice of social policy shows 
that it is meaningless to discuss social policy at a neutral value position (ibid.). 
However, compared with social welfare as a social right in the Western world, social 
welfare has been long regarded as a kindness from the government (Liu, 2003). 
Although China now has an ambitious social welfare system, corresponding values 
such as universal social rights are still not deeply embedded. Thirdly, the target group 
of social services has a strong selective character and always needs to be qualified. 
The basic principles and the main criteria of social services prefer demand, identity, 
egalitarianism and status orientation, rather than needs, civil rights, performance 
ability, social justice, equality of opportunity, and the highest national and social 
interests (Liu, 2003). Fourthly, social policy decision-making commonly has little 
consultation or opinion polling before any decision is made. The decision-making 
power is usually concentrated in the hands of a few political elites and it is difficult 
for ordinary people and the majority of citizens to fully participate in the 
decision-making process. The policy process is essentially a political process, and an 
opportunity for a variety of social subjects to maximize their self-interest (Hill, 2005). 
The political elite should compromise, coordinate and balance the various interests of 
the community and social values and make an authoritative redistribution. Although 
experts are participating in the decision-making process more actively, the overall 
ordinary participation is still at a low level.  
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5.1.1.2 Social reforms after 1978  
When the economic reforms began in the late 1970s, China introduced market 
mechanism to switch the national focus to economic reconstruction and 
socioeconomic development (Chan and Mok, 2001). Meanwhile, privatisation and 
decentralization were attached to the tide of marketisation in China. Similarly to the 
global trend of privatisation and marketisation, state provision, subsidies and 
regulations on social welfare were reduced (LeGrand and Robinson, 1985). Heavy 
provisional and funding responsibility of central government shouldered by local 
governments and non-government sector (Chan and Mok, 2001; Johnson, 1987). 
Under the shift from the central-planned economy to a socialist market economy, 
social policy in China experienced market-oriented change. Individual responsibility 
and local initiatives were re-emphasized, and people in China started to rely more on 
themselves and the market for social welfare provision, rather than on government as 
was the case in the Mao era (Cheng, 1994; Chan and Mok, 2001).  
The following sections will briefly examine the reforms in a number of different 
social sectors. Education, housing and healthcare are chosen as they experienced 
major changes during the reform period, and there is more interaction in these policy 
fields. Through comparing the different processes of these social reforms, the 
tortuous process of healthcare reform and the features presented in the healthcare 
reform, abundant examples are provided to explore how the central-local relationship 
influenced social policy.   
 
Education reform  
In the education sector, fundamental changes occurred in financing, curriculum and 
management during the reform. In 1985, some of the responsibilities and power of 
educational management were decentralized to local governments and 
educationalists, and schools obtained more decision-making power on the 
administration of social affairs (Lewin et al., 1994). In 1993, the central government 
no longer directly “governed” schools, but had switched its role to legislation 
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guidance, funding, and planning (Chan and Mok, 2001). In 1995 decentralization in 
the education sector was taken even further; schools were granted more power on 
academic credentials and recruitment (Mok and Chan, 1998). Meanwhile, the 
concepts of efficiency and effectiveness, which were closely associated with the 
market and privatisation, became more popular in the education sector.  
These economic reforms alongside the trend of marketisation and privatisation have 
granted education several “marketized features” (Agelasto and Adamson, 1998; Mok, 
2000). Firstly, there is more diversity in educational provision. Although 
governments remain the major provider, the non-governmental sector has been 
encouraged to sponsor schools and colleges. Diversified educational services such as 
“people-run” (Minban) schools and “social-forces” (Shehui Liliang) schools 
continuously increase across the country (Lai, 1996; Zhou and Cheng,1997). 
Secondly, there are multiple financing channels for education services. In the 1980s, 
the state took nearly all the financial provision for the higher education sector, and 
free university education was provided to those qualified students who passed the 
entrance examinations. With the economic reforms and marketisation, non-state 
forces were encouraged to sponsor education and the state financial provision for 
higher education gradually reduced. In 1993, nearly 23 million yuan were raised for 
the higher education sector from the non-state sector, which amounted to more than 
one third of all funding (Ng and Li, 1997). Meanwhile “user-pay” principles were 
adopted in the mid-1990s, where all students have to pay their tuition fees, and 
scholarships and student loans become more and more popular and important to those 
who came from poor families (Agelasto and Adamson, 1998). In 2010, 47.31% of 
higher education funding was raised from the non-state sector (Ma and Liu, 2015), 
which indicates that the “marketized reform” in the education sector continues 
alongside the economic reforms and decentralization in China.                             
Lastly, internal competition among education institutions has been introduced and 
encouraged by the central government. Since the mid-1990s, the centre have 
introduced specific projects such as “Project 211” and “Project 985” to enhance the 
efficiency and effectiveness of universities. All universities are assessed by 
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quantifiable objective criteria on facilities, staffing, teaching and research (Rosen, 
1997; Chan and Mok, 2001). Those “qualified” universities will be allocated 
additional funds based on specific projects. The internal competition is increasingly 
important to universities because of the attached rewards. Alongside the 
marketization in the education sector, the internal market in Chinese universities 
gradually plays an increasing role in the education sector.     
In summary, the privatization and marketization started in the 1980s have brought 
fundamental changes to the education sector in China. The sector, especially higher 
education, has presented more and more marketized features on service provision, 
funding and internal competition. Meanwhile these market-oriented approaches still 
play a big role in current education system. In other words, the education sector 
remains relatively stable after the market-oriented approaches were introduced and 
education reforms had taken place.      
 
Housing reform  
Under the central-planned system prior to 1978, the state directly controlled the 
housing sector. Houses (especially urban houses) were directly provided by Danwei 
(work units) to their employees. The central government was responsible for capital 
provision and local government was responsible for developing, allocating and 
maintaining houses together with work units (Gibson, 2009). The ownership of these 
houses was public in nature, and they were not allowed to be sold. Housing policy 
was reformed alongside the economic reform after 1978. Market mechanisms were 
introduced into the housing sector as the main reform effort, which dramatically 
changed housing in China (Zhang, 2000). During the trend of privatization, housing 
was gradually switch to an economic good rather than a social good. From 1979, 
public houses either owned by the state or work units were allowed to be sold, which 
became a favourite form of privatization for the state in 1988 when the sale of public 
houses became a national policy (Zhang, 2000). Meanwhile, work units were not 
allowed to build houses for their employees from 1998. The housing corporatisation, 
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which refers to setting up independent development companies specializing in 
housing development, was introduced in the 1980s and separated work units from 
housing production (ibid.). Work units had to enter the housing market to buy from 
developers and then sell to employees. In addition, since the Housing Provident Fund 
became a national policy in 1994, individuals’ abilities to purchase houses were 
improved, and affordability was further enhanced in 1997 when mortgage financial 
systems was introduced (Zhang, 2000). At the end of the 1990s, all enterprises and 
work units were ordered to ban their welfare housing systems (Gibson, 2009). Since 
then, housing supply and purchasing has been largely operated on a market basis and 
a formal housing market had been gradually established.    
Similar to the education sector privatization and marketization were the two main 
themes during the housing reform. The government continuously distanced itself 
from house production and distribution. In 1979, more than 90% of housing 
investment came from the state; by 1993 it had decreased to 23% (Zhang, 2000). The 
role of the state and work units in housing gradually changed from provider to 
enabler or mediator, while individuals, which used to be the beneficiaries of the old 
housing policy, have taken the most responsibility for house purchasing (Gibson, 
2009). The government no longer directly involves itself in housing operations; 
instead, policies which spur domestic demand or cool the supply for housing (such as 
raising the benchmark loan rate) become the most common means for the 
government to manage the sector, which indicates the strong marketized features in 
housing in China. Moreover, the housing reform was mainly launched in urban areas; 
rural areas are rarely affected by major change in housing reforms. 
 
Healthcare reform  
Before the reform, healthcare service was funded by the state in China and patients 
did not pay for the services. With the economic reform and decentralization, the first 
round of healthcare reforms was launched in 1980s. Consistent with the trend of 
decentralization and marketisation, this round of reforms emphasized improving the 
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economic efficiency of hospitals and holding hospital fiscally accountable (Zhao and 
Feng, 2010). Several market-oriented innovations were implemented during the 
reforms: the pricing of services was reformed to be based on real costs in 1985, 
service contract systems were introduced in 1989 and supplementary commercial 
activities to compensate for inadequate budgetary financing was allowed in the same 
year (Zhao and Feng, 2010). After this round of healthcare reforms, healthcare 
institutions had more incentives to provide healthcare services and could earn more 
under the fee-for-service payment schedule (ibid.). As a consequence of this round of 
reforms, many fiscal and administrative powers had been decentralized to healthcare 
institutions and they started to take more responsibility for generating revenue. The 
reform was in fact the process of the government relinquishing its responsibility to 
raise money for healthcare funding, and transferring that responsibility to individuals 
instead. Under this context, healthcare institutions had a strong “profit-driven” 
feature. Hospitals were motivated to take advantage of asymmetric information and 
to charge patients more (Gao et al., 2009).  
The second round of healthcare reforms was launched in 1996 to tackle the emerging 
issues. This round of healthcare reforms recognized healthcare as part of social 
welfare, and tried to balance economic benefits and social welfare. The role of the 
government was re-emphasized as the coordinator of national economic development 
and social benefits (Zhao, 2005). The healthcare insurance system, which combined a 
social pool and individual accounts, was established during this round of reforms. 
The central government made an effort to organize different kinds of healthcare 
insurance for different groups of people. However, the vested interests which 
hospitals gained from market-oriented reform was further strengthened in healthcare 
insurance reform, forming interest groups which exacerbated interest distribution and 
plundered the healthcare market. Many responsibilities which were originally held by 
the government were transferred and released through its fiscal exit from the supply 
and demand side of the healthcare service market, which resulted in an unbalanced 
situation in supply and demand, meaning patients higher and higher prices for 
healthcare service (Gao et al., 2009).  
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The third round of healthcare reforms started in 2007 in order to address the 
consequent outcry on reducing the individual burden for healthcare (Zhao and Feng, 
2010). The “Implementation Plan of the Key Reform of the Health-Care System in 
the Near Future (2009-2011)” was released in 2009, and its goals included:  
 To develop the public health system, and to maintain all public health institutions 
fully budgeted to provide public health services without user charges. 
 To strengthen the rural health delivery system and the urban community service 
delivery system, and to develop appropriate basic health service facilities to 
provide services at a low cost. 
 To reform the hospital management and operational system, maintain the nature 
of public hospitals, and ban supply-side induced demands for medical personnel 
to earn more. 
 To develop a health protection system basically comprising three insurance 
plans: (1) basic medical insurance for urban employees including civil servants, 
(2) urban residence medical insurance, and (3) rural new cooperative medical 
insurance for farmers. The Ministry of Civil Affairs will develop a medical relief 
system for the low-income population (Zhao and Feng, 2010, p. 35). 
It is notable that the role of government was re-emphasized in healthcare funding, 
service delivery and operation supervision. The difference between this new round of 
reforms and the previous reforms was the high level of government involvement. 
With this reform, the government took on the primary responsibility for supply and 
supervision of healthcare services.   
 
5.1.1.3 Summary  
As discussed in previous sections, along with the economic reform and 
decentralization, the modern social policy framework and social welfare system, 
which is compatible with the market economy, were gradually established. The 
modern social welfare structure consists of state, market and community. The 
non-government sector was formed and began to play a more and more important 
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role in China (Yang, 2002). Since then, the transformation of China's social structure, 
coordination of socio-economic development and social services have entered a new 
stage. 
Social policy sectors such as housing, education and healthcare in China experienced 
market-oriented change since 1978. Consistent with the decentralization, many 
responsibilities had been decentralized from the central government to local 
government, and from the government to non-government sectors. It is in fact a 
process of “bigger market and less government” during the social and economic 
reforms.  
 
5.1.2 Why healthcare? 
After the reform and opening up of China, the role of central government in the social 
security and social welfare system has retreated – the central government has even 
completely relinquished control in some fields. However, among different social 
policy sectors, healthcare reform presents different features compared to other social 
policy sectors such as education and housing. Firstly, the government is involved in 
healthcare policy more than in other sectors. Most social policy reforms are 
consistent with the trend of decentralization and marketization, where the 
government gradually distanced itself from direct control of social policy and 
regarded market mechanisms as the most important operating mechanism. However, 
during the healthcare reforms mentioned above, we could observe that the role of 
government in healthcare policy and systems didn’t “fade out” like it in other sectors. 
The role of government has actually been re-emphasized several times, and in the 
third round of healthcare reforms in 2007, a state-controlled basic medical delivery 
system is set as one of the main goals. The government have planned to take on more 
responsibilities in the healthcare sector not only in urban areas but also in rural areas. 
There could therefore be more interaction between the government and healthcare 
policies across the country than in other social sectors, which makes healthcare the 
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most suitable sector to be selected to examine how the government influences social 
policy.         
Secondly, healthcare reform in China is more tortuous than reform in other social 
sectors. Other social reforms such as the housing and education reforms are relatively 
stable, and privatisation and marketization have been kept as the main features till 
now. In contrast, healthcare reform has many twists and turns. These changes could 
provide abundant material to explore the role of government than in other social 
sectors.  
In addition, since China’s territory is vast, the development of urban and rural areas is 
quite uneven. Coupled with the division of the household registration system, many 
fields of social policy have a localized feature that leads to obvious differences in the 
social security system and the actual level of social welfare. Together with the 
strengthening of local social policy innovation, the gap between local social welfare 
arrangements and levels of social welfare between different areas in China further 
increased. Such welfare differences are especially significant in the healthcare system 
since the healthcare gap appears not only between urban areas and rural areas or 
between different provinces, but also appears between different counties in the same 
district. For example, from 1982 to 2001, the total number of beds in town hospitals 
increased from 832,000 to 1,959,000. This was an increase of 135.3%, but in rural 
areas a significant decrease of 16.7% was seen (1,221,000 to 1,017,000) (Li and Jiang, 
2008). In 1982, the ratio of the number of hospital beds per thousand people between 
the highest and lowest area (Shanghai and Guangxi) was 3.1:1, but it had expanded to 
4.2:1 by 2001 (ibid.). Meanwhile, since the introduction of market mechanisms into 
the healthcare system, medical service resources rapidly transferred from towns to 
big cities or from undeveloped areas to developed areas. Large hospitals have 
increasingly advanced technology, equipment, and other conditions for growth, while 
institutions such as rural township hospitals, health centers, and other urban 
community medical institutions are gradually shrinking – many cannot survive. 
Meanwhile, a huge number of workers from the poor central and western regions (the 
major exporters of labour in the eastern region) pay health insurance costs without 
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being able to actually enjoy medical insurance when they return home or get sick, due 
to Medicare account transfer problems between different regions and the household 
registration system; exported workers who have paid in their hometown cannot enjoy 
the healthcare insurance benefits in their workplace until they start to pay there (Li 
and Jiang, 2008). Consequently, there is also a big gap between migrant workers and 
native workers. 
Such an increasing gap in the healthcare system seems to be the result of the changes 
in the central-local relationship after the market economy and tax system reforms. 
The role of the central and local governments was greatly changed during these 
reforms, because both of them wanted to survive and continue developing while 
facing the new pressures brought by the reforms. The game of bargaining and 
cooperating between the central and local governments makes the healthcare system 
more and more complex and inefficient after the reform. Thus, the healthcare sector 
is a good policy field to explore how the centre interacts with the local during the 
policy process, and how they impact on a specific social policy.  
In sum, with so much difference among different provinces, between the urban and 
rural and the rich and the poor, the healthcare system could be a good policy field 
than other policy sector to reflect the direct and indirect influence of central-local 
relationship in China. The tortuous process of healthcare reform also provides 
abundant examples that reflect how central government and local government 
interact with each other within policy process, therefore, healthcare sector could be a 
better choice to help achieving the research objectives of this thesis.  
In the next section, I will go on to examine in more detail the features of the Chinese 
healthcare system and discuss these with reference to a typology of healthcare 
systems in other countries. Firstly, I will discuss the nature of healthcare systems and 
relevant typologies, before looking in more detail at the development of the Chinese 
system.  
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Section5. 2: The healthcare system in China  
5.2.1 What is a healthcare system? 
A healthcare system, as a kind of socioeconomic system, is structured to serve a 
certain social purpose (Hsiao, 2003). Thus, a wealth of literature has defined the 
healthcare system by focusing on the function. Healthcare systems used to be 
described in terms of indicators and activity such as total number of hospital beds or 
number of physicians (Roemer, 1993; Hsiao, 2003). The OECD had defined a 
healthcare system as “an ideal typical set of macro-institutional characteristics based 
on variations in the funding of healthcare and corresponding differences in the 
organization of healthcare provision” (OECD, 1987, p. 24). Characteristics such as 
productive resources, organization of programs and service delivery should be 
emphasized according to Reomer (1993). Hsiao (2003) conceptualized healthcare 
systems differently to the OECD (1992), describing them as a series of funding flows 
and payment methods between patients and institutions. Londono and Frenk (1997) 
also pointed out that healthcare systems are formed by four functions namely 
financing, delivery, articulation and modulation.  
Another body of literature describes healthcare systems by emphasizing the 
relationship between participants in the healthcare system. According to Frenk, 
healthcare is “the vehicle for the organized social response to the health condition of 
the population” (Frenk, 1994, p. 23).  However, these approaches neither adequately 
address the relationship between the outcome and function of healthcare systems, nor 
explain why and how healthcare systems yield a given outcome. Therefore, in order 
to merge the “why” and “how” of healthcare systems, Hsiao (2003, p.5) defines 
healthcare system as “a set of relationships (or causal connections) between 
components and goals or outcomes such as promote, restore or maintain health”. 
Such a comprehensive definition could not only help to understand the major factors 
that may explain varied system goals, but also provide instruments for policy makers 
to manage healthcare system performance (ibid.).  
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5.2.2 Typology of healthcare systems  
Welfare state typologies, from Castles’ (1993) notion of “families of nations” to 
Esping-Anderson’s (1990) welfare state regimes, and to Lijphart’s (1999) democratic 
and state regimes, generate abundant information about policy emergence, policy 
making and policy cycles. Typologies have been popularly used by researchers to 
conceptualize institutional context in which policies are embedded (Burau and Blank, 
2006). Comparative study of healthcare systems is also commonly used in order to 
capture the institutional context and identify important dimensions in healthcare 
system across countries.               
Field (1973) was one of the first researchers to develop an influential typology of 
healthcare systems. Doctors’ autonomy and ownership of healthcare organization 
were the two dimensions he focused to differentiate healthcare systems. Then the 
OECD developed a seminal framework for a healthcare system typology, which 
classified healthcare systems on the basis of funding and provision of healthcare 
(OECD, 1987). This research introduced three basic models of healthcare system; 
namely the national healthcare service model (for example the UK and Sweden), the 
social insurance model (for example Germany and the Netherlands) and the private 
insurance model (for example the USA and Australia). All these models are 
characterized by their different “performances” on patient sovereignty and social 
equity (Burau and Blank, 2006). This OECD typology has been widely used in 
comparative analysis of healthcare policies, especially those analyzing how relevant 
institutions shape healthcare policy (see for example Freeman, 2000; Scott, 2001).    
In more recent research, other dimensions have been included when comparing 
healthcare systems in different countries. For instance, the governance of healthcare 
system has been gradually regarded as another salient dimension. Frenk (1994) states 
that the degree of state involvement in financing, delivery and regulation of 
healthcare systems could be the most significant attribute that differentiate healthcare 
systems. Freeman (2000) also suggests that the mechanism by which healthcare is 
coordinated, in other words healthcare governance, should be included in order to 
capture the diverse forms of healthcare systems. Similarly, in the framework of the 
135 
WHO, how governments deal with policy-making, implementation and monitoring 
has been assessed to be as important as other pillars such as financing and provision 
(WHO, 2000). On the basis of shifting focus to the governance of healthcare, Moran 
(1999) introduced a new healthcare system typology of healthcare state, which 
consists of the governing on healthcare consumption, provision and production. 
Under Moran’s typology, countries are divided into “entrenched command and 
control healthcare state”, “corporatist healthcare state” and “supply healthcare state” 
based on distinctions among institutions related to the governance of consumption, 
provision and production (Moran, 1999; Burau and Blank, 2006).  
Other researchers emphasize the influence of relevant institutional arrangements, 
such as public/private entities and the degree of regulation (involvement) by 
central/local governments, when categorizing healthcare systems. For instance, Ma 
and Sood (2008) focus on public and private entities together with regulation 
accompanying healthcare financing and payment in comparing healthcare systems in 
China and India. Likewise, Hsiao (2003) underlines institutional factors such as 
decentralization of finance programs and service delivery. In the typology introduced 
by International Transport Forum, OECD countries are classified by different levels 
of regulation and control on healthcare delivery and the diverse modality of 
public-private relationship in healthcare system (International Transport Forum, 
2011). 
The discussion above demonstrates that there are different dimensions which help to 
build typologies of healthcare system. It can be observed that financing, provision 
and regulation are the significant dimensions that have been most frequently 
mentioned by analysts. The recent research also indicate that governance of 
healthcare together with institutional factors such as the role of public/private sector 
and the relationship between different levels of governments should be addressed 
when comparing healthcare systems in different countries.         
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5.2.3 The development of the healthcare system in China  
5.2.3.1 1951–1984: The public healthcare stage 
The development process  
The earliest healthcare system in China was the publicly funded healthcare system, 
which started in 1951 with the “labor insurance regulation”. Most of the beneficiaries 
were officials in governmental offices and institutions. The state council later 
expanded the scope of beneficiaries to rural cadres and college students. In June 1979, 
retired officials were also included into the healthcare system (Wang, 2012). All the 
beneficiaries could go to designated medical institutions for treatment, 
hospitalization or referral with public bursaries for certain expenses. Additional costs 
would be subsidized by national finance. Since the healthcare system was applied to 
governmental departments and institutions that have no business income or at least 
insufficient business income to cover healthcare expenses, the healthcare system was 
financed by the national budget. The amount was based on the beneficiaries’ actual 
medical need, national fiscal capacity, and available resources of medical institutions. 
The fixed budget of healthcare per person per year was calculated and given to local 
governments to manage and use; any cost over this amount would be subsided by 
national finance.  
There was another type of healthcare called the “labour healthcare system”. 
According to the “labour insurance regulation” and “labour insurance regulation 
implementing Rules draft” (Laodong Baoxian Tiaoli Shishi Xize Xiuzheng Cao’an) 
issued in 1951, people who worked in state-owned, public-private partnerships, 
private, or co-operative factories, mines, and their subsidiary units could join the 
labour healthcare system. Their immediate family members also share the same 
benefit. Later the scheme expanded to workers in the railways, shipping, 
telecommunications, transportation, construction, and other industries as well as 
collective enterprises above the county level. Unlike the publicly funded healthcare 
system, the finance for the labour healthcare system came from enterprise net income; 
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the expense was taken from a certain percentage of workers’ wages and was 
accounted as production costs (Chen et al., 2008). 
There was also a special healthcare system in early China called the “cooperative 
medical care system”. It is still an important form of healthcare in rural areas today. 
Back in the early days of the PRC, the Northeastern provinces had been actively 
organizing a cooperative medical care unit which became the prototype of the 
cooperative medical care system. In 1955, Gaopin County in Shanxi Province first 
implemented a collective healthcare system that combined medical cooperatives and 
producers’ cooperatives together (Wang, 2012). After this official appearance of the 
cooperative medical care system and Chairman Mao’s instruction on innovation 
experience of cooperative medical in Changyang, the cooperative medical care 
system flourished around the country (Gao et al., 2009). 
 
Achievements and problems 
During this period, the healthcare system in China had the following characteristics. 
Firstly, the government had strict administrative controls on the healthcare system. 
The government dominated investment in healthcare, and private capital was 
prohibited from entering the field of medical services; the government directly priced 
medical services and provided low-cost or even free medical services (Wang and Liu, 
2005). The central government greatly reduced medical fees in 1952, 1960 and 1972. 
Secondly, government intervened in micro-management of the medical care sector. 
The government directly set up and managed hospitals, and it also allocated medical 
care resources. For example, the hospitals’ key administrative officials were 
appointed by healthcare management departments and ministries. The government 
was also responsible for hospitals’ daily operations and investment. Thirdly, the 
healthcare system was highly centralized in a system combining vertical and 
horizontal administration. Governments at all levels set up appropriate health 
administrative bodies that were responsible for health resource planning and 
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supervision of all levels of medical institutions and medical personnel management 
(ibid.).  
At the end of 1952, more than 90% of counties had established healthcare agencies, 
and the number of county hospitals reached 2,123 by that time (Huang, 1986). By the 
late 1970s, these three basic healthcare systems covered almost the whole country. 
Since the level of national economic development was low and the people’s demand 
for healthcare was still at its most basic level, China fulfilled people’s basic medical 
and health service needs with 3% of GDP. 
However, since consumers paid very little for medical expenses under the public 
healthcare system, excessive use of medical resources was encouraged, which 
accelerated the expansion of healthcare expenditure. Therefore, after the 
establishment of this system, the effort to repair the institutional defects of the public 
healthcare system never stopped. In 1957, the government tried to curb the abuse of 
medical expenses by stipulating ten kinds of circumstances that should not be 
reimbursed, and tightening the permits for free public healthcare (Wang and Liu, 
2005). These principles were put forward in more detail in 1958, 1961 and 1962, but 
the effect did not seem obvious. The solution to increasing healthcare expenses in this 
period was to try to restrict patients’ behaviour to reduce the expenditure. However, 
these measures were inevitably weakly implemented and became formalistic under a 
healthcare system that combined operation and supervision. The government tried to 
sharpen the boundaries between private payment and public payment in two ways in 
order to control healthcare spending; they established group demarcation criteria to 
clarify who should be included, and clearly stated what healthcare services 
beneficiaries could enjoy by establishing medicine demarcation criteria (Wang, 
2012). Although the government made extensive efforts on this front, in actuality the 
boundaries between private payment and public payment are still vague. The reasons 
are that both the hospitals and the patients have no incentive to save medical 
resources and the appropriate agencies have less incentive to monitor use and 
expenditure. 
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5.2.3.2: 1984–2005: The market-oriented healthcare system stage 
Development processes and reform actions in this period  
During 1984–2005, China basically established a market-oriented healthcare system. 
Learning from the experience of enterprise contract responsibility reform, healthcare 
providers started operations and management like other enterprises. The direction of 
reform had been closely related to the great fiscal pressures on the public healthcare 
and labour insurance systems (Gu et al., 2006). Since the inadequate investment in 
healthcare greatly affected the healthcare system operations before 1979, the new 
system encouraged healthcare service providers to be self-supporting rather than 
relying on governmental payments (Gao et al., 2009). This system bundled doctors, 
the income of medical service providers and service suppliers together. Some 
detailed changes to the healthcare system were as follows: 
 
Gradual reduction of direct economic regulation on healthcare providers 
In 1980, the State Council approved “The Report on The Issue Allows Individuals To 
Practice Medical Consultation” by the Ministry of Health and the individual 
healthcare practice was included in the government management system (Li et al., 
2008). In 1985, the government broke the monopoly held by public and collective 
hospitals, and thus other forms of medical institutions emerged. Price management of 
healthcare service was also changed. The State Council issued “Guidance on the 
Urban Medical and Health System Reform”, according to which hospitals were 
divided into for-profit and non-profit categorizations. In the same year, direct 
government pricing was abolished. For-profit medical institutions were able to price 
their services on their own, whereas non-profit medical institutions had government 
guidance on price. Through these changes, the role of government changed from a 
business management role to supervisory role (ibid.). In 2001, the “National Medical 
Price Item Specification” was released, which prominently announced the name and 
price of major service projects and accepted inquiries and monitoring from the public. 
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Since then, the names and prices of medical services have been unified across the 
country and hospitals have been asked to increase price transparency. 
 
Reducing micro-management within public hospitals 
In 1989, the State Council approved the report of the Ministry of Health and actively 
implemented various forms of the Medical Institutions Contract Responsibility 
System (Xia and Luo, 2009). Medical and health institutions could self-manage after 
signing the contract to complete tasks given by the government or healthcare 
department. Thus, hospitals had power to distribute collective benefits, salaries, and 
bonuses according to doctors’ performances. Some hospitals and doctors with good 
facilities and resources were also allowed to engage in other paid services (ibid.). 
Since then, the autonomy of healthcare service institutions has continued to increase. 
In 1992, the State Council issued “Comments on Deepening the Medical and Health 
System Reform”. Healthcare institutions received more autonomy and were directed 
to actively set up medical and health services or other extension industries. 
Meanwhile, the medical service market was more open and social capital was 
allowed to enter in order to encourage fair competition (Xia and Luo, 2009). After the 
urban medical and health system reform in 2000, some local public hospitals tried to 
reform. The auction of public hospitals in Suqian in 2000 was the prelude to the 
reform of property rights. The Wuxi government put forward the idea of trusteeship 
in 2001 and the Shanghai government launched an investment and financing program 
for healthcare service institutions in early 2002, which was an exploration of property 
rights reform for healthcare institutions. 
 
Exploring the urban medical insurance system reform 
In 1988, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Labour and 
eight other departments set up a health insurance reform discussion group to study the 
social health insurance reform program. Dandong, Siping, Huangshi and Zhuzhou 
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were picked as medical insurance system reform pilot cities in 1989 (Deng and Liu, 
2009). For the public healthcare system and labour insurance, the government 
introduced a reform on payment and reimbursement for medical expenses in order to 
control healthcare expenditure (ibid.). 
 
Changing the management system of medical service institutions 
In 1988, the “Hospital Financial Management Regulation” (Yiyuan Caiwu Guanli 
Banfa) and “Accounting System (Trial)” (Kuaiji Zhidu (Shixing)) were established. 
A great change had taken place in 1989 after “Administration Measures for the 
Medical Institutions Grading (trial)” (Yiliao Jigou Fenji Guanli Banfa) was released. 
Healthcare institutions were no longer divided according to administrative affiliation 
and administrative level, but graded according to its comprehensive level such as 
function, conditions and technical service quality. Medical management institutions 
changed their direct management model of medical institutions into an indirect 
management model.  
 
Establishing a social healthcare regulation system  
The government was committed to the establishment of an urban and rural social 
health insurance system. In 1994, the central government, the Ministry of Finance, 
the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labour started to explore social healthcare 
insurance which combined a social pool and individual accounts. After Zhenjiang 
and Jiujiang were chosen as pilot cities for the healthcare insurance system by the 
State Council in 1994, 56 more pilot cities were chosen in 1996. On the basis of these 
pilot experiences, the State Council issued “The Decision on Establishing Urban 
Basic Healthcare Insurance” (Jianli Chengzhen Jiben Yiliao Baoxian de Jueding), 
with which the social healthcare insurance system was officially founded (Deng and 
Liu, 2009). Meanwhile, the period of public healthcare for urban workers and the 
labour healthcare system came to an end. Thereafter, the rural healthcare system 
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reform was relaunched. In 2003, the State Council proposed the establishment of a 
new cooperative medical system which would cover all rural people, gradually 
increase the level of healthcare, and transition the rural healthcare system to social 
healthcare insurance (Wang, 2012). In addition, a new standardized, nationwide 
urban medical aid system was founded in 2005 by the State Council, the Ministry of 
Health, and Ministry of Labour and Social Security. 
 
Achievements and problems 
China basically established a market-oriented healthcare reform mode during this 
period. It was a market-oriented reform because the contract responsibility system 
and enterprise operation mode was introduced within healthcare institutions. The 
direction of reform was closely related to fiscal pressures since the public healthcare 
system and labour insurance system had caused major fiscal pressure. 
Market-oriented reform in the healthcare system was introduced in order to ease this 
financial pressure. The core intentions of the reform were for the government to 
lessen its fiscal responsibility and involve the individual in participating in healthcare 
supply (Xu, 2005). The previous public healthcare and labour insurance system had 
essentially no personal cost to the user. Even if some areas required personal 
spending, the amount was very low. When the system failed to control hospitals 
wantonly expanding the numbers of beneficiaries and limiting patients for excessive 
medical treatment, reforms that could regulate both hospitals and patients was 
required (Chen et al., 2008). The way to constrain patient behaviour was to place the 
cost of healthcare service on individuals. 
The first step for this fiscal exit was encouraging hospitals to increase their income 
and let the hospital be the institution to accept budgetary pressure. The specific 
approach was to increase the number of hospital’s charging project and to standardize 
the charges. The major feature of this institutional change was that the profit-driven 
behaviour of small entities in the healthcare system had been established and thus the 
suppliers of medical services were able to carry out market-oriented financing (Xu, 
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2005). Detailed records in the reform file of the government show that hospitals were 
encouraged to make financial provision for income to solve their development 
constraints and the medical department hiring contract and part-time doctors was also 
allowed in order to increase revenue (ibid.). 
However, China’s reform of the healthcare system during this period only established 
market financing for healthcare services. Market-oriented healthcare service itself 
had not been achieved yet (Chen et al., 2008). The way to raise healthcare funds had 
changed – raised by local government rather than by the healthcare institution itself in 
order to increase health insurance funds’ ability to defend against risks. The 
introduction of market mechanisms was aimed at increasing the cost for those 
demanding medical services – in order to restrict those who have excessive demand 
on the healthcare services. Therefore, market-oriented healthcare reform is in fact the 
process of the government removing its responsibility to raise money for healthcare 
fund and individuals taking on that responsibility instead. A market-oriented 
healthcare system has a strong incentive feature; at this stage there is sufficient 
incentive for medical institutions to propose “supply-induced demand” in order to 
achieve maximum revenue. Due to such incentives, problems like inadequate funding 
and lack of healthcare revenue can be resolved through charging consumers; medical 
institutions will be motivated to take advantage of asymmetric information and 
expand this asymmetry to seek departmental interests, where patients will bear the 
high transaction costs (Gao et al., 2009).  
After the establishment of a healthcare insurance system which combined social pool 
and individual accounts in 1997, the reform focus changed from the supply side to the 
demand side. The reform of the healthcare insurance system seemed to be the process 
of establishing financial payment to further emphasize the demand side (ibid.). Since 
then, the price of healthcare services has become higher and higher. Healthcare 
service providers took full advantage of information asymmetry and uncertainty to 
increase the patient payment level. Increasing the cost sharing of individual patients 
was mainly done by medical service institutions to increase their own income (Xia 
and Luo, 2009). Billing commission and drugs rebates are common tricks that 
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hospitals like to use. So the price of medication became an important way to gain 
profit. Such “medicine supporting medical [doctors]” phenomena made medication 
more and more expensive, making it more and more difficult for the public to bear 
such costs. Therefore, contradictions in the healthcare market became more 
prominent for two main reasons: firstly, the vested interest which hospitals gained 
from market-oriented reform was further strengthened in healthcare insurance reform, 
forming interests group who exacerbated interest distribution and plundered the 
healthcare market; secondly, the forces on the demand side of the medical market 
were weaker. Most of the responsibilities which were originally held by the 
government were transferred and released through its fiscal exit from the supply and 
demand side of the healthcare service market, which exacerbated the conflict 
between healthcare service providers and patients in the market (Gao et al., 2009). 
It must be noted that the phenomena of market anomie and interest groups are results 
of the healthcare system reform. When the government and relevant departments 
pushed healthcare service providers into the market and removed their own fiscal 
burdens, they used a decentralized and shirking management model to regulate the 
healthcare market instead. On the one hand, the government and relevant 
departments decentralized their supervision duties; on the other hand, they were able 
to reap the benefits of the healthcare service market through their authority to 
approve access to the healthcare market (Gao et al., 2009). 
 
5.2.3.3 After 2006: Regulatory reform and the adjustment-innovation period 
Developing process 
The “difficult and expensive” problem of medical services has increasingly become a 
prominent contradiction in the healthcare field after the previous reforms, because the 
established regulatory system could no longer match the current situation and 
required adjustment. So the Chinese government implemented reforms to the 
regulatory system of the healthcare market. Firstly, the control of medical service 
charges was strengthened. In 2006, multiple ministries frequently published 
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documents to further rectify the price order of medicines and medical services in the 
market. In 2009, the National Development Reform Committee (NDRC) issued “The 
Regulations on the National Retail Prices of Essential Drugs”, which implemented 
price caps on the essential medicine list which included a total of 2,349 specific 
formulation specifications medicines. By the end of June 2011, 98% of essential 
medicines had started to be used in rural hospitals and community health service 
institutions and 28 provinces had achieved full-coverage goals (Wang, 2012). After 
the implementation of essential medicine price guidance, the cost of nearly half of the 
prescription medications on the market fell by an average of 12% (Wang, 2011). In 
areas where this was most effectively implemented, essential medicine prices 
generally decreased by 30–40% (Mao, 2011). 
In 2009, a healthcare reform coordination group was formed by eleven ministries of 
the State Council, and the new guidance of healthcare system reform which had been 
discussed at length was published, setting the new healthcare reform into motion. The 
differences between this new reform and the previous reform were the high levels of 
government involvement and the return to a public welfare service. With this reform, 
the government took on the primary responsibility for supply and supervision of 
healthcare services.  
Since then, a new “mixed mode” healthcare system, different from many existing 
models across the world, has appeared in China. From the experience of much of the 
world, healthcare systems led by the government usually conform to either the 
services security model (represented by institutions like the National Health Service) 
or financing security model (represented by the provision of national health insurance) 
(Mao, 2011). The so-called services security model (Li et al., 2008) is a method in 
which national tax is used to finance hospitals and the government directly provides 
medical services as well as universal free medical care. The so-called financing 
security model (Cai and Chen, 2008) means that either the government or the 
individual pays for medical expenses through medical insurance institutions (also 
known as the purchasing service mode). Accordingly, being the funding body, the 
government’s input can also be classified as supply side (subsidized hospitals and 
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doctors) or demand side (subsidized health insurance), based on the way in which 
medical services are made available. Choosing the supply-side or the demand side 
was a fierce debate at the beginning of the health care reform in 2009. During three 
years of medical reform, the government made efforts to increase governmental 
spending while implementing a series of institutional reforms, which gradually 
formed a special mode; governmental investment would fill both the supply and the 
demand sides. Specifically from government spending on healthcare, the fiscal 
expenditure reached 448.6 billion yuan from 2009 to 2012 (Li and Chen, 2012). 
Among all this spending, the central government spent 230 billion yuan – 51.2% of 
the total healthcare expenditure – on healthcare insurance (used to increase the 
insurance level for urban residents and rural cooperative healthcare members). More 
than 110 billion yuan was spent on upgrading primary healthcare conditions, 
supporting the implementation of the essential medicine system, and helping to bring 
down the cost of medications from 2009 to 2012. The remaining part was used for 
subsiding public healthcare and local government (Wang, 2011). From the 
perspective of hospital revenue structure, hospitals received more from governmental 
subsidies and insurance payments in order to ensure that medical institutions no 
longer pursued profit and to prevent hospitals from nibbling healthcare insurance. 
One case from Anhui province exemplifies this; payment from the healthcare 
insurance pool to one city hospital in Anhui increased from 87.99 million yuan in 
2008 to 141.94 million in 2010, accounting for 43.71% of the hospital’s total revenue 
(Li and Chen, 2012). 
The urban and rural basic healthcare insurance system was also improved in this 
period. The State Council commenced a large-scale medical insurance pilot for urban 
residents in 2007 in order to deal with the issue of healthcare insurance for school 
children, the elderly, the disabled and others who may not work. Seventy-nine cities 
were picked as pilot cities and the healthcare insurance system for residents was 
implemented nationwide in 2010. More than 200 million urban non-employed 
residents benefited from it. Thus, the national healthcare insurance system, which 
includes basic healthcare insurance for urban workers, healthcare insurance for urban 
residents, and the new rural cooperative medical insurance, had basically been 
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established. The healthcare insurance coverage increased from 15% in 2000 to 95% 
in 2011 and more than 1.28 billion people were covered by the end of 2011 (China 
Health Statistics Yearbook, 2011). 
 
Problems 
There have been significant achievements since the new healthcare reform was 
started. However, many problems were exposed and the situation is not optimistic. 
The national healthcare operating mechanisms have not been fully established and 
medical services remain difficult to access and expensive for the majority of the 
public. What follows highlights the main issues facing the current system. Firstly, the 
total health expenditure is rising faster than ever, eroding the effect of health 
insurance. China's total healthcare expenditure grew from 984.3 billion yuan in 2006 
to 1.72 trillion yuan in 2009 and reached 2,222.4 billion yuan in 2011, more than 
doubling expenditure in just four years (China Health Statistics Yearbook, 2011). 
Thus, although the proportion of insurance claims has risen, there are still masses of 
medical expenses that patients have to pay themselves while the medical service 
payment has not significantly declined. Secondly, the interest chain, or in other words, 
collusion between doctors and manufacturers of pharmaceuticals has not yet been 
broken – the artificially high cost of medicine has not really decreased, thus the actual 
drop in the price of medicine is not obvious. Thirdly, the hospital's profit-driven 
mechanism has not completely changed. The prices of medication are controlled by 
the government while the hospitals alternatively increase fees of medical inspection. 
For example, in the cost of both outpatient care and hospitalization, the total cost of 
seeing a physician and getting prescribed medication remained basically unchanged 
(China Health Statistics Yearbook, 2010). The underlying cause of the problems 
mentioned above is that the game between the reform sponsors and stakeholders 
diverts the healthcare reform process from its original intent. 
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The game between the central government and local government 
The game under central-local relations is mainly the mismatch of property rights and 
“administrative powers”. Healthcare reform is not an exception. After the tax system 
reform in 1994, the proportion of the central fiscal revenue in the national fiscal 
revenue increased year by year (reaching 54.1% in 2007) but the local government 
bears the primary responsibility for the expenditure (local fiscal expenditure 
accounted for 77.3% of the national fiscal expenditure in 2007) (Tang and Tan, 2013). 
The proportion of central government expenditure against the total national 
expenditure decreased from 30.3% in 1994 to 17.8% in 2010 (Zhou, 2010). In 2011, 
the total expenditure of local governments reached 84.9% on the national expenditure 
while the central government only bore 15.1% of the expenditure (Li and Ma, 2012). 
Meanwhile, the county governments bear huge obligations for public services. 
Fifty-five to 60% of public healthcare expenditure within budget was taken on by 
county governments (Zhou, 2010). This situation is a product of China’s unique 
unitary political system and decentralized economic system. Under this system, the 
local governments lack the independent legislative power of local governments in 
other federal systems. Healthcare reform was promoted top-down, so the local 
governments did not participate in the decision-making process. However, as we can 
see from the proportions of expenditure above, the central government was charged 
less than the local, with central government three-year cumulative expenditure 
accounting for 31.81% of total expenditure (Wang, 2011). In other words, local 
governments had to bear a greater fiscal burden than the central government. 
Meanwhile, tax reform only clarifies the fiscal relations between the central and 
provincial government, while the fiscal system below the provincial level was less 
clearly delineated. So provincial governments often follow the practice of the central 
government in centralizing revenue from lower levels of government and 
decentralizing affairs and fiscal burdens to governments in these lower levels. 
Therefore, local governments at a primary level were essentially unable to refuse 
responsibilities assigned by higher levels of government even though they may have 
extremely difficult fiscal situations. Lower governments, especially county 
governments, always have to bear large fiscal burdens. For example, in Anhui 
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Province, the total expenditure for promoting comprehensive healthcare reform was 
31.85 million yuan, which includes 11.12 million yuan from provincial finance, 
11.21 from municipal finance, 0.43 million from town finance, and 19.07 million 
from county finance (Li and Chen, 2012).  
Thus, the game between the central government and the provincial governments is 
that the local governments try to obtain more money from the central government to 
implement the healthcare reform and ease fiscal pressures, while the central 
government tries to pay less to the local governments and let them spend the subsidy 
in line with the central government’s plan. Implementation of healthcare policies 
would be damaged if local governments think they do not have enough money from 
the central. For example, the proportion contributed by all levels of government is 
clarified by policy in regard to construction funds for medical and health institutions. 
However, many local governments deliberately reduced their contribution, forcing 
healthcare institutions to raise money by themselves. Some local governments 
deliberately slow down the pace of implementation of reform policy. For example, 
the full subsidy for public healthcare agencies is not implemented in many counties. 
Those public healthcare agencies have to rely on administrative fees, income from 
confiscation, prophylactic medical examinations and selling vaccines to sustain their 
essential operations. Some local governments even changed the use of healthcare 
insurance funds without authorization (Li and Chen, 2012). All these factors are 
obstacles that impede healthcare system reform. 
Another game between the centre and local governments is that the central 
government tries to make local governments provide more public services while local 
governments are keener on economic growth because of promotion rules. The 
promotion incentives cause local government officials to focus on their own 
achievements in local economic growth, but make them indifferent to offering basic 
public services (Tang and Tan, 2013). Zhou (2004) has also proven that local 
government promotion incentives have a significant influence on local economic 
competition and cooperation by establishing a game model between the promotion of 
local officials and local government performance. Thus, the healthcare policy can 
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also be damaged since the local government tends to spend less on such public 
services. 
Therefore, in order to select sample provinces to study how the central-local 
relationship affects the healthcare system in different provinces, the central transfer 
payments should be taken into consideration since how much money a province can 
get from the central government largely determines how smooth the implementation 
is and how active the local government is in implementing healthcare policy. Another 
important factor that may influence healthcare policy implementation is the level of 
central control of local governments. The stricter the central control is, the more the 
local government will be in line with the requirements and plans of the central 
government. 
 
Strong interest groups hinder healthcare reform 
Interest groups are another important force that affects healthcare reform. There are 
two main interest groups in China: one is the interest group (or interest chain) related 
to pharmaceutical production and the other is the complex interest group of public 
hospitals. During the process of designing the new healthcare reform program, 
compromise with pharmaceutical companies can be observed. For example, in the 
draft of “Views on Promoting the Healthcare System Reform”, “production of 
medicine, unified distribution, and labelling prices on the packaging” was proposed 
for essential medicines (Li and Chen, 2012). In the process of soliciting opinions, 
these requirements were deleted and changed to bidding at the provincial level 
because of the strength of requests from pharmaceutical companies (ibid.). Judging 
from the results, the increase in drug prices has become a major factor in the rise of 
total health expenditure. General hospital outpatient medical expenses and medical 
expenses of discharged patients grew by 9.1% and 9.7% in 2009 when compared with 
2008 (China Health Statistics Yearbook, 2010). 
In the context of market mechanisms and hospital autonomy, informal income 
becomes the main source of revenue for some doctors. This has caused a major 
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income gap among medical staff. Thus, a complex interest relationship was formed 
among pharmaceutical companies, pharmaceutical representatives, doctors, and 
nurses. Ultimately, the burden was passed on to patients and the healthcare insurance 
funds. The source of this problem is that the profit-driven motives of hospitals and 
doctors have not changed. On the one hand this is because of insufficient government 
subsidies, but it is exacerbated by the defence of operational autonomy by hospitals 
as an interest group (Li and Chen, 2012). According to Li and Chen’s research, 
income from medicine sales of a county hospital increased from 4.60 million yuan to 
25.14 million yuan from 2008 to 2010 (Li and Chen, 2012). The cost for medicine per 
hospital stay grew from 741 yuan to 3068 yuan, and the proportion of medicine sale 
grew from 47% to 62% during the same period (ibid.). The behaviour of the hospitals 
is indicative of a profit-driven mindset. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explained why healthcare is a suitable policy field to examine the 
central-local relationship in China and its impact on policy process. By reviewing the 
literature on healthcare systems we find that more and more analysts have realised 
that institutional factors such as relations between governments on different levels 
significantly influence healthcare systems and cannot be ignored when comparing 
healthcare systems across countries. In other words, it indicates that there are certain 
levels of government involvement in healthcare systems and the healthcare policy 
field can offer plenty of opportunities to examine the central-local relationship. 
Likewise, after reviewing the development of healthcare systems in China, the 
tortuous process of healthcare reform has also provided more opportunities and space 
to analyze how the central-local relationship has impacted social policy processes 
than on other policy fields in China. Meanwhile, we can observe that there is a 
diversity of healthcare performances in different parts of China and the game 
between the central and local governments does affect healthcare policymaking and 
implementation. As different provinces have differing relationships with the central 
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government in formal or informal ways, different healthcare policies in different 
provinces could be a significant reflection of how different central-local relationships 
produce different influences on the social policy process. Therefore, healthcare could 
be the appropriate policy field that helps to achieve the research goals of this thesis.
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Chapter 6: Methodology  
This chapter sets out how the research was carried out. It not only discusses what has 
been done, but it also chronicles the development of the study and the consideration 
of appropriate methodologies, as well as how these approaches draw on literature 
concerning research methods. 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
6.1.1 Research objectives 
After a rigorous review of the relevant literature, it is not difficult to find that there is 
a substantial literature discussing the central-local relationship in general, such as 
discussions on federalism and unitary systems, or the literature on the policy process 
and its impact on policy outcomes (Cairney and Heikkila, 2014; Kingdon, 1984; 
Weible, 2014; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). However, much of the literature tends to 
explore what influence the central-local setting has on the policy process and specific 
policy outcomes, particularly with reference to China and healthcare policy. 
Researchers like Zheng and Pierson have only discussed the influence that the 
central-local relationship has produced on the general policy process and outcomes; 
there are few attempts to focus on specific policy fields such as healthcare policy. 
Therefore, there is a need for empirical research on the central-local relationship of 
China and its impact on a specific policy. 
In addition, several literatures relate to the central-local relation in China have been 
reviewed in previous chapters (Steinmo et al., 1990; Pierson, 1995; Zheng, 2007). 
However, the latest systematic research on this topic was published in 2007. Some 
new mechanisms or elements might appear and play an important role on changing 
the central-local relationship in China. This means that there is a need to operate 
updated research on this topic. Moreover, existing research tends to employ 
quantitative methods as the main approach to data collection; few attempts have been 
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made to obtain data via in-depth interviews with participants who are closely 
involved in the central-local relationship and healthcare policy process. This may 
result in a misunderstanding of the practical operation of the central-local 
relationship in China, and may miss the opportunity to discover the facts that hide 
behind the numbers and figures. Thus, there is need for an updated and in-depth 
qualitative research with those who are highly involved in the daily operation of the 
central-local relationship and the healthcare policy process. 
As a result, in order to fill the research gap, the objective of this research is to offer an 
updated and practical exploration of the central-local relationship and its impact on 
healthcare policy.      
 
6.1.2 Research questions  
As discussed above, this thesis attempts to understand the role of the central-local 
relationship in China and to illustrate how this relationship affects the healthcare 
system. In particular, after the cross-provincial analysis, substantial attention will be 
given to understanding the specific influence of this relationship on policymaking 
and implementation. 
The discussion so far allows us to formulate two research questions to be investigated 
in the remainder of the thesis:  
1. How can we best characterise the central-local relationship in China?  
2. How do central-local relationships affect healthcare policy in China? 
 
6.1.3 Analytical framework 
6.1.3.1 Why a comparative framework? 
As Bryman points out, “social phenomena can be better understood when they are in 
relation to two or more meaningfully contrasting cases” (Bryman, 2012: 72). 
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Comparative perspectives have been widely used in the field of public policy analysis 
(Castles, 1998), especially in the healthcare sector. A comparative research design 
helps demonstrate how similar factors generate different outcomes under different 
backgrounds, and highlights the convergence of health policies that are being shaped. 
Since this research aims to seek a deeper understanding of how central-local 
relationships shape healthcare performance in different provinces of China, a 
comparative design to study several cases of the healthcare system in different 
provinces, which also allows for the analysis of context as noted by Pierson (1995), 
was adopted in this research. 
 
6.1.3.2 Why Pierson’s framework 
As the central-local relationship is the crucial research subject of this thesis, one may 
argue that the framework of de facto federalism, which was carried out by Zheng 
(2005), could be a direct and appropriate choice to be followed as the analytical 
framework. As Zheng discussed, de facto federalism has three conditions; 
hierarchical political structure, a level of institutionalized intergovernmental 
decentralization and primary responsibility of province (please see Chapter 3, 
Section 1.3), which provides clear dimensions to explore the central-local 
relationship in China. However, as the de facto federalism framework draws most of 
the attention of the central-local relationship to the local government aspect, it rarely 
offers a comprehensive research perspective of the policy process, and how this can 
be understood together with the central-local relationship. Pierson’s framework, 
which follows his three “institutional factors” (see Chapter 2, Section 1.3.2), is 
composed of institutional factors which are very relevant to social policy outcomes 
such as level of fiscal equalization. As the complete goal of this research is 
understanding the central-local relation in healthcare policy, Pierson’s framework not 
only better combines the central-local relationship with policy outcomes, but also 
provides a more comprehensive approach with which to focus on the central-local 
interactions such as interest expression to explore the central-local relationship itself. 
156 
Therefore, Pierson’s framework is a more appropriate framework than Zheng’s to 
explore the central-local relationship and its impact on social policy outcomes.      
 
Constructing the comparative framework  
This section presents a comparative framework which unveils the influence of 
central-local relationships on the healthcare system in China. The framework was 
built in mainly dimensions based on Pierson’s (1995) three institutional factors: 
1. Focus of power reserved for the provincial government in different provinces, 
that is, central-local power distribution in different provinces, and how this 
power distribution affects the healthcare system in terms of the policymaking 
and implementation process. 
2. Focus of the interest-expression model in different provinces and how this 
interest expression model affects the healthcare system in terms of the 
policymaking and implementation process. 
3. Focus of fiscal relations between the central and local governments in 
different provinces and how the fiscal relations affect the healthcare system in 
terms of the policymaking and implementation process. 
 
Dimension one: central-local power distribution in different provinces 
This dimension explores the first factor of the three institutional factors, noted by 
Pierson (1995), within the healthcare systems in different provinces. The comparison 
takes into consideration power distribution between the central and local 
governments (noted as the power reserved for constituent units of government in 
Pierson’s research) in the selected provinces. Power distribution is a big part of 
central-local relationship. The political, societal and institutional concerns of 
intergovernmental relationships have particular influence on policymaking and 
implementing (Radin, 2000). Due to the different types of provinces in China, such as 
minority autonomy provinces, municipalities and normal provinces, it is possible and 
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necessary to explore – through understanding power distribution – how governmental 
agencies interact with the central government within different provinces in the 
provision of public services.  
In this comparative framework, the research developed a category with several types 
of intergovernmental relationships based on different types of provinces. This 
category mainly considers the level of independence and cooperation between the 
central government and provincial government. As the provincial governments of 
minority autonomy provinces, municipalities and normal provinces have different 
rights on local affairs and different bargaining tactics with the central government, it 
is important to integrate this dimension into a comparative framework, which offers 
particular perspectives to analyse the influence of central-local relationships on the 
healthcare system in China. Official documents and academic articles will be 
important complementary data in this dimension. 
 
Dimension two: interest expression in sample provinces 
This dimension explores the interest-expression model in sample provinces. 
Understanding how the interests of different tiers are represented at the centre, the 
second characteristic mentioned by Pierson (1995), can be considered as 
understanding the extent to which state members can affect the central government. It 
may also offer an insight into the institutional structure of healthcare and how 
institutional organs interact with each other when making and implementing 
healthcare policies from these perspectives. Interviews with key informants are the 
main data source in this dimension and official documents will be complementary 
materials. 
 
Dimension three: central-local fiscal relations in sample provinces 
This dimension mainly explores the fiscal relationship between central and local 
governments and its impact on healthcare policy. How government income and fiscal 
158 
resources are distributed really matters in the attitude of the local government 
towards specific social policies. According to Pierson (1995), the local government 
whose income mostly relies on revenue redistribution usually has more passion and 
motivation for expansive social policy innovation. Other local governments who gain 
their income through local taxation tend to hold more conservative attitudes to social 
policy, and even block welfare reform to protect the interests of local businesses, 
which is the main source of their fiscal income (Pierson, 1995). Interviews are likely 
the most important data source in this dimension because interviewees who are 
deeply involved in the healthcare system have valuable information and experiences 
about the fiscal interaction between the central and local. Therefore, this dimension 
bases its discussions on interview transcripts. Official documents, academic articles 
and statistics yearbooks may also offer valuable insights for this dimension. 
 
Section 6.2: Data collection 
6.2.1 Quantitative and qualitative approaches 
6.2.1.1 The differences between quantitative and qualitative approaches 
When facing the issue of data collection, social researchers always have to make a 
choice on a qualitative approach or quantitative approach (although sometimes they 
are mixed). As Bryman suggests, the most obvious distinction between qualitative 
and quantitative research is that the qualitative study tends to deal with soft data, such 
as words, sentences, photos and symbols, while the quantitative study tends to deal 
with hard data in the form of numbers (Bryman, 2004; Lawrence, 2003). In fact, the 
crucial difference between quantitative and qualitative approaches is not only about 
the type of data they collect; it is also about “foundational assumptions”, which 
Willies (2007) describes as the givens that are assumed to be true. 
The basic difference of the foundational assumptions starts from ontology, which is 
“concerned with the nature of reality and reflect different prescriptions of what can be 
real and what cannot” (Willies, 2007, p. 9). Ontology is the study of “being” (Gray, 
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2013: 19) and different positions within it. One ontological position is objectivism, 
which assumes that there is singular, static and objective reality (Brewer et al., 2000; 
Creswell, 1994; Schutt, 1999). It also values that identifying the characteristics of the 
social world in terms of entities which are ordered and predictable, and can be 
identified and recorded without affecting the entities themselves (Matthews, 2010). 
Another ontological position is constructivism, which assumes there are multiple 
realities which are constructed by participants’ social interaction and reflection 
(Brewer et al., 2000; Creswell, 1994; Schutt, 1999; Matthews, 2010). Constructivism 
believes that “the social world is only real in sense and is constructed by ideas of 
social actors” (Matthews, 2010, p. 25). In fact, the basic difference between 
qualitative and quantitative approaches is often about ontological positioning. 
Quantitative approaches take objectivism as its foundational ontological position and 
believes there is an objective reality, while qualitative approaches take 
constructivism and insist that there is a constructed reality which is made up by social 
actors with their own local, everyday experience (Brewer et al., 2000)  
Another basic difference between qualitative and quantitative approaches is about 
epistemology. If ontology is about the nature of “being”, epistemology is about the 
nature of “knowing”. It tries to understand “how we know what we know” (Crotty, 
1998, p. 8). Similar to ontology, epistemology also has two broad positions, which 
are highly relevant to those two ontological positions. Interpretivism, which is 
closely linked to constructivism, believes that knowing is a process of interpretation 
that understandings and explanations of social phenomena can be interpreted rather 
than be objectively observed (Matthews, 2010). Interpretivism also insists that 
subjectivity is unavoidable and the meaningfulness of social phenomena is granted 
by the value attached by onlookers (Brower et al., 2000). Researchers are regarded as 
part of the social world, and bring their own meaning and understanding into the 
social world (Matthews, 2010). Another main epistemological position, which is 
closely linked to objectivism, is positivism. It assumes that knowing is a process of 
observing and recording rather than a subjective understanding of the social world 
(Matthews, 2010). It also insists that social reality has an external existence to 
researchers, and researchers should be seen as independent and objective observers 
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(Gray et al., 2013, p. 20). Therefore, another basic difference between quantitative 
and qualitative approaches is the epistemological difference. Qualitative approaches 
take the interpretivist position and insist that “knowing” is an interactive process 
between researchers and social phenomena (Creswell, 1994; Schutt, 1999), while 
quantitative approaches take the positivist position, and believe that “knowing” is a 
rigorous process of scientific inquiry investigating social reality which exist 
externally to researchers (Gray et al., 2013). Its researchers attempt to remain 
detached and objective to what they are trying to know (Brower et al., 2000).  
Besides ontology and epistemology, another difference between qualitative and 
quantitative approaches is the foundational assumptions regarding value bases. 
Quantitative approaches often insist that researchers are conducting research with 
value-free and unbiased data (Creswell,1994; Schutt, 1999). Thus, quantitative 
research is often written in the third person and past tense, to “enhance the sense of 
researcher detachment and value-free depiction” (Brower et al., 2000, p. 366). 
Qualitative researchers believe that participants and researchers are unavoidably 
value-laden, so qualitative research is often written in the first person and present 
tense, to help “draft” readers’ participation in interpreting evidence they present 
(Brower et al., 2000).   
As discussed above, differences in foundational assumptions such as ontology and 
epistemology lay the fundamental differential basis between quantitative approach 
and qualitative approaches. Based on these fundamental differences, researchers 
discuss methodological differences, which are commonly regarded as obvious 
differences between the qualitative and quantitative methods, and fiercely debated by 
researchers. Table 2 compares the differences between quantitative and qualitative 
approaches in methodological activities. As listed, these differences cover many 
aspects of methodological activities when doing a research such as analytic process, 
research design, research questions and sampling. In fact, quantitative and qualitative 
approaches are such different concepts that heading to different direction from 
ontology and epistemology, then go further on methodological activities. Their 
differences are not only about the type of data collected: numbers or text. “They 
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involve assumptions and beliefs on several levels and cover philosophical position 
about the nature of the world, about how we understand the world and the 
relationship between social science research and professional practice” (Willis, 2007). 
Therefore, the choice of quantitative or qualitative is not only a choice of data type or 
even methodological activities, it can be also a choice of belief about how you regard 
the world and how to understand the world.  
Table 2: Difference between qualitative and quantitative approach  
 
Although quantitative and qualitative approaches have big differences in 
philosophical assumptions, however, they are not necessarily polar opposites. Mixed 
methods, which are also referred as “multi-method,” “multi-strategy,” or 
“triangulation by method” (Bryman, 2006; Creswell, 2007), emerged in the 1980s as 
a research approach combining traditional qualitative and quantitative approaches. 
Unlike post-positivism or constructivism, this new research approach roots itself in 
another epistemological assumption of pragmatism, in which subjective and 
objective knowledge are both valued (Cherryhomes, 1992).  Pragmatists concentrate 
 
Methodological Difference between Qualitative and Quantitative 
Methodological activities Qualitative Quantitative 
Analytic process Inductive Deductive 
Basis for conclusion Evidence from naturally 
occurring, everyday 
experience  
Replicable, numerical data 
Cause-effect explanations  Idiographic; emergent, 
unfolding process of 
interconnected actions 
Nomothetic; relations among 
static variables 
Research design  Emergent, improvisational; 
openness of meaning 
Static design; meanings closed 
before study begins 
Types of research questions Marginal or hard to study 
settings and groups; 
ambiguous phenomena; 
open-ended questions 
Specific, measurable variables 
and relationships 
Goal of sampling  Explanatory power; variation 
and richness 
Generalizability  
Source: Based on Burrell and Morgan (1979), Creswell (1994), Rubin and Rubin (1995),and Schutt 
(1999) 
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on the “what works”, and focus on the “research problem” instead of the “research 
approach or method” (Creswell, 2003). Therefore, researchers who hold the position 
of pragmatism can choose research strategies from highly quantitative to mostly 
qualitative (Greenstein, 2006).    
Mixed methods have been more and more commonly used in recent decades since an 
increasing number of researchers suggested that both numerical and text data can 
help to answer research questions, and quantitative and qualitative methods could be 
compatible. One could benefit from the complement between qualitative and 
quantitative approaches and the possibility of achieving a more complete analysis 
with both of the two research approaches. Furthermore, the focus on the “research 
question”, which is highly promoted by pragmatism and mixed methods, offers 
another research pathway that goes across the loyalty to quantitative or qualitative 
approaches, and applies a wide range of methods to understand the research question.   
 
6.2.1.2 Implications for this research 
In this research, the research goal or research question is the most significant 
consideration when choosing a research method. The primary goal of this research is 
to “understand the nature of the central-local relationship in China”. Such an 
understanding does not mean exploring the appearance of power distribution 
structure, but rather to discover the in-depth characteristics of the central-local 
relationship in China including political aspect and fiscal relationships. Thus, those 
who are closely involved in the central-local relationship in China are probably the 
most important source from whom to collect the data. The daily experience of these 
participants can contribute to the understanding of the operation of central-local 
relationships in a practical sense. Qualitative research approaches typically stress the 
importance of “understanding the social world through an examination of the 
interpretation of that world by its participants” (Bryman, 2004, p. 266). It is the more 
holistic perspective which treats people as creative, compassionate living beings, not 
as objects (Lawrence, 2003). Therefore, by using a qualitative method, this research 
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had easier access to participants’ experiences of the central-local relationship and 
could gain potentially complex data (Lawrence, 2003). A qualitative research 
approach also offered an understanding of the policy process that might better answer 
the research question than a quantitative approach could. Therefore, a qualitative 
approach is a more appropriate way to collect data for this research. 
Another research goal of this thesis is to understand how the central-local relationship 
affects the healthcare policy in China. It is an exploration on the interaction between 
the daily operation of central-local relations and particular stages of healthcare policy 
process. This exploration emphasizes the policy process and context. Thus, 
participants who are involved in the healthcare policy process are a crucial data 
source. In addition, context, as Pierson stated (Pierson, 2004), is important to 
understanding social processes. The data, especially in-depth data in a “practical 
sense”, from people who are familiar with the context and healthcare policy process 
in China would make a great contribution to achieve the research goals. Qualitative 
research always uses the language of “cases and context” and focuses on detailed 
exploration of cases arising from real social life, whilst quantitative research uses 
“variables and hypotheses” as language and emphasizes measuring variables or 
testing hypotheses linked to causal explanations (Lawrence, 2003, p. 139). 
Qualitative approaches such as interviews or focus groups are very good at 
discovering the richness of the data. It also reserves the opportunity to discover some 
unexpected information. From this perspective, qualitative approaches could be a 
better choice for data collection.  
This is particularly relevant to this research, which tries to understand policy 
processes within the context of certain institutions. As context is important, this 
suggests the suitability of using qualitative case studies as part of the research. 
Meanwhile, since policy processes are the main focus, interviews with key 
participants were an appropriate way to conduct this research. Thus, based on the 
objectives of this research, a qualitative research method was the most appropriate 
research method. 
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In summary, as Shaw and Norton (2007) pointed out, the research design and method 
should fit the purpose and be justified within the context. A qualitative approach is 
suitable for this research since it attempts to further explore the nature of the 
central-local relationship and is interested in the policy process. As such, it relies on 
rich data provided by interview respondents and textual sources to provide an insight 
of the practical operation of the central-local relationship and how these relations 
affect healthcare policy processes.       
 
6.2.2 Interviews 
6.2.2.1 Why interviews?  
The interview is a common data collection method and provides a significant range of 
information that can be obtained (Desai and Potter, 2006). However, sometimes the 
interview is not the only choice or even the appropriate choice. Recently, we could 
have more accessibility to data since more and more governments or institutions 
make information online. Thus, it may be unwise to obtain information that is 
available online by asking someone to give up their time to provide similar 
information. But if the goal is to collect data such as government initiatives, or how 
different groups have responded to certain initiatives, interviews could be a more 
useful choice because they try “to get behind the bare outlines of reported behaviour 
to the underlying beliefs, strategies and constraints which had shaped that behaviour” 
(Francis, 1992: 92). As mentioned above, the research goal of this thesis is to 
understand the factual role of the central-local relationship and its impact on 
healthcare policy. It draws attention to the process, motivation and reasons behind the 
central-local relationship. Interviews also provide a good opportunity to know what 
and how the attitudes, beliefs, and strategies that shape the behaviour of those who 
are involved in the central-local relationship in China. Therefore, due to the particular 
research question and research goals of this thesis, interviews are an appropriate 
method to collect data.  
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6.2.2.2 Semi-structured interviews 
For this research, interviews were employed to collect data in three separate 
provinces in China. There are three general categories of interview design: 
unstructured interviews, structured interviews and semi-structured interviews 
(Wengraf, 2001). Structured interviews are conducted with a pre-set standardized 
question list, and all interviewees will face the same questions. There is no room for 
unforeseen topics to be introduced during the interview. The semi-structured 
interviews follow a schedule with suggested themes but do not have a standardized 
question list. Instead, semi-structure interviews leave “space” for interviewees to 
develop their responses (Desai and Potter, 2006). Unstructured interviews leave even 
more space for interviewees, so that they are able to talk about whatever they would 
like, and may cover completely unexpected topics (ibid.). In this case, structured 
interviews are likely to be a face-to-face questionnaire due to its standardized 
questions (Olsen, 2012). Unstructured interviews could be seen as a kind of 
“exploratory” conversation while semi-structured interviews allow the interviewer to 
cover important topics and ensure that the interviewees have the opportunity to 
express their own ideas and thoughts, which may not be covered by the pre-set 
questions. Such advantages of semi-structured interviews also indicate why it is the 
most popular type chosen by researchers (Desai and Potter, 2006). 
This research employs semi-structured interviews as the main data collection 
approach not only because of the advantages mentioned above. In fact, the 
ontological position of the semi-structured interview is quite close to the position this 
research holds. Semi-structured interviews value participants’ experience, 
understanding and interpretation which could be closely linked to interpretivism and 
constructivism, and treat interviewees as reflexive and constitutive knowledge 
contributors (Lewis-Beck et al., 2004).  Semi-structured interviews also hold the 
logic of interactive data generation so that the data is derived from the interaction 
rather than the simple “answer” provided by interviewees (ibid.).         
Besides these issues on the ontological and logical level, semi-structured interviews 
fit with this research on a methodological level. As Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) 
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point out, semi-structured interviews, or reflexive interviews, are more flexible and 
allow probing and follow-up questions. A semi-structured interview allows 
respondents to express their own experiences and elaborate on processes in-depth, 
rather than being constrained by fixed, standardized questions. The use of a flexible 
interview schedule based on theoretical propositions developed from the literature 
review that still has the flexibility to explore areas that are deemed important by the 
participants is the ideal way to answer the research questions. Meanwhile, a set of 
non-directive prompts were employed to encourage the participants to respond as 
much as they could. This will be helpful to allow them to elaborate on their thinking 
and attitude towards how the central government interacts with the local government, 
and to explain their own interpretation of what factors they believed had informed 
their opinions and thoughts on the case. Semi-structured interviews will be used in 
this research to unfold and probe deeply into the participants’ knowledge, values, 
attitudes and beliefs on the central-local relationship and its impact on healthcare 
policy in China. Additionally, semi-structured interviews could be more ethical than 
structured interview because the power relationship between the interviewer and 
interviewee is equalized as much as possible, as interviewees are granted multiple 
opportunities to talk about their own thoughts on their own way (Lewis-Beck et al., 
2004). 
 
6.2.2.3 Elite interview 
An interview, as Aberbach and Rockman (2002) pointed out, must be tailored to the 
purposes of the study. Thus, knowing who to interview and in what form (e.g. 
semi-structured) is the most fundamental issue that the researcher should take into 
consideration. Interviewees should be “selected on the basis of what they might know 
to help the investigator fill in pieces of a puzzle or confirm the proper alignment of 
pieces already in place” (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002, p. 673). For this research, in 
order to gain an insight of the central-local relationship and its impact on healthcare 
policy, people who might have a say on healthcare policy making, or exercise 
disproportionately high influence on the daily operation of the central-local 
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relationship or the outcome of policies, could be the ideal respondent. Such a feature 
has indicated the elite nature of interviews in this research.  
Elite interviews are commonly recognized as interviewing “those who can command 
a position of authority or privilege, often having some influence upon 
decision-making” (Wicker and Connelly, 2014, p.4). The term “elite” is an individual 
or a group of individuals who are closely linked with the abstract notion of power and 
privilege (Gubrium and Holstein, 2001). In this research, elite particularly means the 
political elite, who might be directors of relevant departments, leaders of local 
government (on multiple levels), or members of think tanks who are involved in the 
operation of the central-local relationship or the process of healthcare policy. These 
elite could be very helpful to confirm the researcher’s understanding of relevant 
documentary materials, and fill the gap or clarify the grey area that may occur in 
these (understandings of) documents. This research could also benefit from elite 
interviews as they offer opportunities to understand revelant actors’ perceptions, 
beliefs, and mindsets when they are interacting with the central-local relationship or 
playing their roles in the healthcare policy process.   
 
Common concerns around elite interviewing      
The “elite” are a group of people “who are less open to the subject of scrutiny and are 
often inaccessible” (Gubrium and Holstein, 2001, p. 299). There are always real 
barriers, such as the difficulty of identifying who they are and getting access to them, 
between the elite and researchers (ibid.). Researchers would often have problems on 
approaching target elites due to the elite nature of interview (Wicker and Connelly, 
2014). As Goldstein (2002) suggested, there is no ‘silver bullet’ solution and it takes 
a fair bit of luck to schedule and complete elite interviews, however there are that 
researchers can create their own luck. This section will discuss the common concerns 
about elite interviews and the corresponding actions that were taken in this research.    
Firstly, elites are always busy and time-limited, and would not necessarily readily 
agree to be interviewed. It is important to choose the target elite on the basis of the 
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research topic; however, it is risky to rely on any one elite to provide all the 
information. A multi-track strategy could be helpful to aim at elites on different levels 
to increase the possibility of successful approaches (Pierce, 2008a). It also brings a 
chance to get access to those “A-list” elites who may be considered to be less 
approachable than lesser elites (ibid.). After identifying the respondents (the detailed 
sampling process will be discussed in following section on sampling), asking for the 
interview becomes the next key step. Apparently constrained by time and some 
“random” factors in their daily work, elites always have tight schedules that may 
suddenly interrupt the arrangement (Wicker and Connelly, 2014). It is necessary to 
contact the respondent a few weeks in advance. In practice, I normally contacted the 
potential respondents two weeks in advance to ask for an interview. The contacting 
email was phrased briefly but included crucial points: the nature of my desk-based 
research, the potential contribution he/she could make to this research, and what I 
intend to do with the information. I always provided an information sheet which 
outlined my academic status, including my university affiliation and details of my 
supervisors, which provided credibility and legitimacy to my work (Richards, 1996) 
by ensuring that potential interviewees could authenticate my identity and status 
(Pierce, 2008). As suggested by Pierce (2008), being gently persistent could be very 
helpful to “win” a chance of elite interview. I contacted most of my interviewees 
repeatedly by follow-up email and text messages, which had been proved successful 
(Wicker and Connelly, 2014). Additionally, like Pierce (2008) mentioned in his book, 
I also benefited from a late-morning appointment. In one instance, I was luckily 
enough to be invited to have lunch with an interviewee whilst I was interviewing in 
Guangzhou. I was given substantial relevant information and some valuable contact 
information for other potential interviewees.  
When I successfully obtained permission to do an elite interview, there were still 
several issues that were significant on the outcome of interview. There were some 
subtle power dynamics; for example the elite “may announce at the onset of the 
conversation other demands on his or her schedule, and may interrupt the interview to 
conduct other business”, which could cause problems for researchers (Gubrium and 
Holstein, 2001, p. 309). As all these issues may result in shortening the length of the 
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interview, it becomes particularly important for the researcher to make the most of 
the time. Preparation beforehand about the background of the interviewee could help 
to conserve time (ibid.). In practice, I often researched the interests of the particular 
respondent, such as the respondent’s statements and press clippings, before I started 
the interviews. If I was told that there would be less time for the interview, I normally 
emphasized on the most important points rather than stick to the initial question 
strategy. “If you can prompt the interviewee into telling a chronological story of the 
subject in which you are interested, this is far more effective than firing a series of 
disjointed questions at him/her” (Richards, 1996, p. 202).  
Another crucial concern is the respondent himself/herself. As Susan Ostrander 
suggested, “elites are accustomed to ‘being in charge’ and to having others defer to 
them because they are used to being asked what they think and having what they 
think matter in other people's lives” (Ostrander, 1995, p. 143). This characteristic 
may result in the interviewee trying to guide the subject during the interview. In other 
words, there might be a “dominating” respondent. My experience is that it is quite 
beneficial to offer a copy of the question list or interview protocol to the interviewee 
in advance. Respondents could have an overall understanding of the scope of inquiry 
and reduce the chance of the appearance of a respondent-led situation. In fact, the 
“dominating respondent” rarely occurred in my interviews. Meanwhile, I luckily 
found that some of my interviewees prepared some relevant material, which 
eventually proved to be very helpful to my research, based on the question list that I 
had sent prior to the interview.      
       
6.2.2.4 Ethical and other challenges of interviewing in different cultural settings 
Beyond the universality of social research methods or approaches such as elite 
interviews mentioned above, there are still indigenous feature such as cultural and 
local contexts which play a fundamental role in authentically engaging with 
knowledge production and constructing social research practice in different countries 
or regions all over the world (Gray et al., 2008, pp. 8). Social, economic and political 
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history all play a part in forming the unique cultural context of a certain country or 
region. There is also increasing number of researchers and scholars who notice the 
cultural bias of social research methods and are concerned about the cultural 
difference (Gray et al., 2008; Munford et al, 2009; Mulder, 1997; Ryen, 2002). As 
this thesis emphasizes examining the central-local relationship in China, it is 
important to think and “develop the research practice which is embedded in the 
cultural and local context in order to make the research finding responsive and 
relevant” (Munford et al., 2009, p. 424).       
The crucial part of the cultural bias of social research methods which derived from 
western knowledge is the difference between collectivism and individualism (ibid.). 
Such ideological-level differences actually produce profound influences on many 
relationships surrounding social research. Relationships such as who can permit the 
research to be conducted, and who owns the research findings can differ under 
individualism and collectivism. Other relationships such as how the respondent 
engages with researchers is also influenced by this cultural difference. For instance, 
as Munford et al. (2009, p. 421) suggested,  
For some participants, the primary goal is to maintain a respectful relationship 
with the researcher who they see as having important status. This may make it 
difficult for them to converse about sensitive issues and to tell the ‘truth’ about 
certain matters as they are concerned to present information that they think the 
researcher wants to hear. 
In fact, the cultural difference did produce several issues and even ethical problems 
when this research was conducted in China.  
China has a strong collectivistic culture, which had big impact on recruiting 
respondent and gaining consent. Under a collectivistic structure and cultural context, 
most of the officials hold a conservative attitude to being interviewed. A university 
student, especially a student from a foreign university, will find it difficult to get 
permission to do interviews. During the fieldwork, when I contacted potential 
interviewees as a PhD student of a foreign university, I rarely got positive replies and 
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sometimes there was no response. But as a Chinese citizen who has lived in China for 
more than 20 years, I prepared an alternative approach strategy. As Gubrium and 
Holstein (2001, p. 307) pointed out, “the best entrée to elite individuals for interviews 
is provided by members of the elites’ own groups”. When I finish the first few 
interviews, I asked my interviewee to recommend some potential interviewees for my 
further research. I then contacted those potential respondents according to the 
recommendations. In my contacting email or text messages, I declared that I am a 
researcher and received a recommendation from another “elite in their own group”. 
This strategy mitigated the risk for the respondents, and made my request more 
acceptable.              
However, when I started to conduct interviews with some of the respondents, I found 
there was an ethical issue regarding gaining consent. Several of the respondents 
refused to sign the consent form. The reason they refused to do so did not come from 
an unwillingness to do the interview. In fact, under a collectivistic culture, accepting 
to be interviewed without permission from his/her organization could be seen as a 
harmful action to the interest of the collective organization. The interesting point is 
that they told me they could do the interview, that they could share their ideas and 
experiences with me; however, they were unwilling to sign the consent form because 
that might cause trouble. Although those respondents did not sign the consent form, 
most of them said that they could talk as much in an informal talk as they could in a 
formal interview. Eventually, most of them provided plenty of information regarding 
their practical experiences rather than an “official statement or description” on the 
healthcare policy process and intergovernmental interaction. Such an issue has 
resulted from the collectivistic cultural context and the corresponding tradition of 
bureaucratic culture where all things related to the central government are moderated. 
They were trying to be very prudent when formally talking about their work. It was 
obvious that they did want to share their ideas and experiences according to my 
interview questions, and some interviewees even gave me materials such as journals 
and regulation summaries, but the Chinese bureaucratic culture and regulations made 
them worried about being formally interviewed and signing the consent form. A 
similar issue occurred regarding the audio recording of the interviews. Some 
172 
respondents told me they did not want to be recorded. However, they also told me if 
the interview was not recorded, they would provide as much information as they 
could. The reason behind this is quite similar to why some of them refused to sign the 
consent form. Chinese officials are always very prudent about talking about their 
work in public. This might result not only from the traditional bureaucratic culture 
but also from memories of the Cultural Revolution, in which many officials were 
arrested and killed for what they had said about their work. This cultural difference 
played a great role and should be taken into consideration when conducting social 
research outside the Western world. In these instances I obtained verbal consent from 
the respondents although they did not sign the consent form. However, it is not hard 
to discover that those interviewees did want to talk about those interview topics but 
preferred not to have their name appeared in consent form. In other words, they give 
verbal consent to discuss the selected topic but did not consent to be “recorded or 
identified” that they have been interviewed since they had very complicated reasons. 
These cases should not be simply treated as unsuccessful interview without consent, 
but a special interview format under a cultural difference. After all, they had 
consented to discuss the topics provided by research. Such issues were checked and 
discussed with the director of Ethics Committee as soon as the interviews were 
finished. The committee also suggested that these interviews could be treated as 
consented since respondents in fact agreed to discuss the topic given by interviewer.    
Secondly, the cultural context also had an influence on the content that interviewee 
was willing to talk about. In Munford et al.’s (2009) example mentioned previously, 
interviewees may consider what the researcher would like to hear and change the way 
to tell the “truth”. In practice, under the collectivistic context, sometimes some 
interviewees tend to “protect the interest of collective organization” rather than give 
an honest account. When talking about some problem or critical points, especially 
when they know I am a student from a foreign university, they consciously or 
unconsciously kept “talking on the surface” and just provided some viewpoints that 
sounded like official statements rather than their own experience. Suspicious of 
creditability, I carefully triangulated and corroborated accounts from other 
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interviewees. Consequently some data or information they had provided has been 
categorized as unreliable data.  
Lastly, cultural differences also have an impact on understanding the communication 
between interviewee and researcher. “Individualistic cultures use low-context 
communication that relies on clear, concrete and explicit language, while 
collectivistic cultures such as Chinese culture use high-context communication which 
relies heavily on attention to contextual details and less on explicit language to 
transmit its message” (Munford et al., 2009, p. 421).  Under high-context culture, the 
meaning of what is being said could be “derived” from the specific performance of 
the communication (Ryen, 2002). “If the researcher does not understand the nuanced 
levels of interaction taking account of both verbal and non-verbal cues they may 
inadvertently misinterpret key information” (Munford et al., 2009, p. 421). It is 
important to know and identify verbal and non-verbal cues during the communication 
when conducting interviews in China, because some respondents may have overtones 
when communicating. However, this issue has not been problematic for this research. 
As a Chinese citizen, I am quite familiar with Chinese culture. And with a family 
member who is a senior official in a province, I have been taught and obtain an 
authentic understanding of communication within a high-context culture. Also, one 
of my supervisors is Chinese, who has been doing research on politics and social 
policy for many years. She was able to offer lots of help in analyzing the interview 
transcripts to maintain a correct understanding of what has been said in the interview.         
 
 
Section 6.3: Sampling 
As a qualitative approach was adopted, reviewing data, official documents, reports 
and academic literature as well as interviewing key officials within the healthcare 
system was considered appropriate within this research. It was therefore necessary 
and more effective to conduct fieldwork in China in order to get access to these 
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resources. The fieldwork is comprised of interviews with key officials within the 
healthcare system and documental analyses of relevant laws and governmental plans. 
This section will discuss the sampling process of both the sample provinces and 
sample interviewees.  
 
6.3.1 Sampling of provinces 
In order to provide a constructive cross-case analysis, this thesis selected provinces to 
compare their representativeness of different types of central-local relations and the 
relatively different features of the healthcare system in each province. Thus the thesis 
sought to capture the diversity amongst provinces, and consequently the widest range 
of healthcare services was sought. In order to choose the indicators, the Chinese 
ranking system, the Instruction of Hospitals Classification, was selected. 
An account of the indicators used and of the data analysis will be given in order to 
explore the rationale for selecting the three sample provinces. 
 
6.3.1.1 Indicator selection 
 
The Instruction of Hospitals Classification has long been used as a regular evaluation 
tool of healthcare performance. This ranking system mainly focuses on the function 
of hospitals, the medical equipment and the qualification of physicians (Ma et al., 
2008). More than half of indicators in the ranking system are about the resource 
investment in hospitals, such as physician credentials, number of beds and 
availability of facility. The others are related to the management of the hospital and 
quality of health service, which can be seen as output measures. Thus, regarding the 
focus of performance measurement in Chinese health care and the aim of exploring 
the variation in health care across different provinces, the Classification provided a 
useful database from which to select suitable provinces for analysis. 
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From the wide range of indicators that the Classification provides, four were chosen; 
two that captured “input” variables (referring to governmental input), and two 
“output” variables. Governmental healthcare spending and residents’ healthcare 
spending were chosen as the input variables, as these captured the wide discrepancies 
in healthcare spending between provinces. Hospital beds per 1,000 people and 
healthcare workers per 1,000 people were picked as the output variables, as they were 
deemed most appropriate to indicate the availability of health care. 
 
6.3.1.2 Data sources 
All the data used in this chapter is from the China Statistics Yearbook 2009–2012 and 
China Health Statistics Yearbook 2009–2012. 
 
6.3.1.3 Data description 
Although China has established a relatively unified healthcare system and healthcare 
insurance for residents, there is still an obviously huge difference between different 
provinces. For example, the Beijing government (provincial) spent 952.26 yuan per 
person on healthcare in 2010 while Henan’s government spent only 274.63 yuan (See 
Table 3). But that is just part of the picture. Varying fiscal and healthcare conditions 
in different provinces in China mean that the performance of the healthcare system in 
each province also varies. For example, Shandong, which has the lowest 
governmental healthcare spending (per person), is not a poor province. On the 
contrary, it is one of the richest provinces. 
 
Table 3: Governmental healthcare spending per person per year (yuan) 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 Average 
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  Beijing 855.76 949.44  952.26 1117.06 968.63 
  Tibet 569.85 761.54  1065.46 1163.86 890.18 
  Shanghai 647.53 691.55  695.16 809.51 710.94 
  Qinghai 444.91 582.86  691.62 834.96 638.59 
  Tianjin 356.43 441.50  539.31 668.12 501.34 
  Inner Mongolia 247.83 425.00  488.30 663.21 456.09 
  Ningxia 276.96 366.55  537.44 642.58 455.88 
  Xinjiang 275.20 393.48  473.93 599.58 435.55 
  Zhejiang 279.04 341.80  412.24 510.67 385.94 
  Hainan 218.24 348.75  400.90 573.32 385.31 
  Jilin 217.69 391.82  403.82 523.28 384.15 
  Gansu 221.89 335.32  392.20 558.38 376.95 
  Shaanxi 208.37 333.60  419.40 528.00 372.34 
  Yunnan 230.22 330.97  399.21 511.75 368.04 
  Heilongjiang 187.43 354.16  352.64 445.44 334.92 
  Liaoning 194.45 378.14  345.97 415.40 333.49 
  Guizhou 177.81 270.77  367.00 499.49 328.77 
  Chongqing 181.88 268.38  328.88 492.29 317.86 
  Shanxi 209.63 296.82  318.57 444.25 317.32 
  Guangxi 163.56 239.18  358.98 501.36 315.77 
  Sichuan 176.41 267.68  327.34 463.30 308.68 
  Jiangxi 174.82 271.98  336.19 437.39 305.09 
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  Anhui 169.27 270.33  309.27 464.53 303.35 
  Jiangsu 193.57 256.58  317.30 442.93 302.59 
  Fujian 206.09 257.49  318.40 428.23 302.55 
  Guangdong 210.76 262.35  291.20 412.90 294.30 
  Hebei 172.04 248.32  327.35 418.13 291.46 
  Hubei 166.49 243.43  312.73 429.53 288.04 
  Henan 154.28 235.22  287.29 385.04 265.46 
  Hunan 137.30 248.51  274.63 389.29 262.43 
  Shandong 149.11 199.82  261.55 373.93 246.11 
Source: China Health Statistics Yearbook 2009–2012. 
 
 
Governmental healthcare expenditure  
Governmental expenditure has long been the main source of healthcare funding. 
Although tax reform was implemented in 1994 and the central government became 
more and more important in the fiscal relationship between the central and local 
authorities as mentioned in the previous chapter, the governmental expenditure 
structure has remained relatively unchanged, especially within the healthcare system. 
In 2007, the central government only contributed 1.7% of the whole governmental 
expenditure on healthcare (Pan and Li, 2009). This chapter consequently focuses 
only on local governmental expenditure.  
Figure 2 provides the average governmental healthcare expenditure per head of each 
province from 2008 to 2011. We can find that the two super cities, Beijing and 
Shanghai, were ranked towards the top. Other provinces which ranked highly were 
the minority autonomous regions like Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Ningxia. Their 
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smaller populations and special subsidies from the central government might have 
been the main reasons for their high rankings. Coastal provinces have long been in 
the top tier of economic development, however, due to their large populations, the 
expenditure per head for these provinces ranked in the bottom group. Guangdong and 
Shandong are good examples to demonstrate this (see Figures 2 and 3). 
Figure 2: Governmental expenditure per head (yuan)  
Source: China Health Statistics Yearbook 2009–2012  
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Figure 3:  Total governmental expenditure of each province  
 
Source: China Health Statistics Yearbook 2009–2012 
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Residents’ healthcare expenditure  
Healthcare expenditure of residents is another main source of funding for the 
healthcare system. From Figure 4 we can observe the expenditure of both urban 
residents and rural residents in different provinces. For urban residents’ spending, 
Beijing and Tianjin were unsurprisingly in the first group in which urban residents 
spent more than 1,200 yuan per year (average data from 2008–2011). The second 
group consisted of Inner Mongolia, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Guangdong and nine other 
provinces. Urban residents in these provinces spent more than 800 yuan per year. 
Other provinces except for Tibet made up the third group, where urban residents 
spent more than 400 yuan on healthcare per year. Urban residents in Tibet spent 331.9 
yuan per year on healthcare. For rural residents’ healthcare spending, the difference 
between provinces was smaller than that between urban residents. Rural residents in 
most of provinces spent between 200 to 400 yuan per year on healthcare. Beijing, 
Shanghai and Zhejiang had higher rural spending while Guangxi, Hainan, Guizhou 
and Tibet had lower rural spending. 
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Figure 4: Urban and rural residents’ healthcare expenditure (yuan/year) 
Source: China Health Statistics Yearbook 2009–2012 
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Availability of healthcare services 
When talking about the availability of healthcare services, the amount of healthcare 
resources and equipment really matter. For this research I have picked hospital beds 
per 1,000 people and healthcare workers per 1,000 people as the main variables to 
measure healthcare service availability. From Figure 5, one can see that 
municipalities like Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin have the best availability among all 
provinces. Coastal provinces like Jiangsu, Guangdong and Liaoning have 
upper-medium healthcare availability. Some poor inland provinces such as Jiangxi, 
Anhui and Guizhou are located at the bottom of the ranking. Minority autonomy 
regions like Inner Mongolia and Ningxia are also in the upper-medium group; even 
Tibet does not rank at the very bottom. This is probably a result of more special 
subsidies from the central government for these regions and their relatively small 
populations. 
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Figure 5: Healthcare availability 
 
Source: China Health Statistics Yearbook 2009–2012. 
 
6.3.1.4 Different types of province 
China consists of 36 provincial units (excluding Taiwan) and most of them are 
normal provinces. However, due to historical, political-economic, and cultural 
reasons, there are other types of province namely autonomous region government, 
centrally administered cities (municipality) and special administrative regions (SARs) 
(Hong Kong and Macao) A normal province is the most common provincial unit in 
China which is indirectly governed by the central government. Its power and 
responsibilities are confirmed by the constitution. Municipalities such as Beijing and 
Shanghai are directly governed by the central government, whilst they are always 
prioritized developing areas which benefit more from the centre than normal 
provinces. Furthermore, the headers of municipalities are member of the Political 
Bureau of the CPC which is one level higher than the header in normal provinces. 
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This makes municipalities more powerful when interacting with the central 
government than normal provinces.   
Autonomous regions such as Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang are another type of 
provincial unit. These regions have long been the settlement area for minorities in 
China. Besides the constitution which confirms the basic status of autonomous 
regions, there is also a Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy which was transformed 
from ethnic customs or local customs. Thus, autonomous regions always have more 
autonomy power on perspectives such as economic development and civil 
administration than normal provinces. This has also made autonomous regions a little 
bit more flexible when implementing central policies than other provinces.      
 
Summary 
From the data presented above, the performance of the healthcare system differs from 
province to province. Super cities such as Beijing and Shanghai mostly appear in the 
“high input, high availability” group, which means healthcare expenditure largely 
matters for the performance of these healthcare systems. Coastal provinces like 
Guangdong, Jiangsu and Shandong are always in the group of “low input, high 
availability”, which means there are other key factors rather than expenditure that 
have a big influence on the healthcare performance of these provinces. Minority 
autonomy regions with better economic conditions such as Inner Mongolia and 
Ningxia are in the upper-medium group of healthcare availability, and others who 
have worse economic conditions always appear in the bottom group. Furthermore, 
different types of provincial unit refer to different types of central-local relationship. 
Combining different healthcare performances with different types of provincial unit 
provides a good opportunity to examine how the central-local relationship affects 
healthcare policy in various kinds of central-local relationship.  
Therefore, considering the performance of the healthcare system which plays a major 
role in the choice of the sample provinces for this research and the different kinds of 
provincial units, Beijing (municipality), which is in the “high input, high availability” 
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group; Guangdong (more decentralized economic power and has long been the base 
for policy innovation), which is in the “low input, high availability” group and Inner 
Mongolia (has minority autonomy on plenty of policy fields), which is in the “high 
input medium availability” group were chosen as the three sample provinces from the 
34 provinces of China (excluding Hong Kong and Macao). 
 
6.3.2 Interviewee sampling 
This fieldwork was adopted in order to get first-hand data about the healthcare system 
and intergovernmental relations in China as well as valuable insights and information 
given by key officials who are deeply involved in the healthcare system. The latest 
reform changes in the healthcare system were observed as well. Thus, interviews 
were used as the main research tool to explore the research objectives mentioned 
above. The following paragraphs describe how these interviewees were identified in 
the sample provinces. 
 
Purposive and snowballing process 
Since the target participants of this research are all officials in the healthcare system 
or involved in policymaking, all the participants were identified according to their job 
titles. Specifically, the first interviewee was identified through purposive sampling 
and further participants were identified by snowballing. The fieldwork was 
conducted in three sample provinces in China and started from the hometown of the 
researcher. A “snowball” procedure was used to approach further interviewees after 
the first few interviews. The researcher asked the interviewee to recommend 
someone else to be interviewed. If this snowball approach had not worked well, the 
back-up plan was that participants would be approached through purposive sampling 
according to the contact information published on the official website of their 
department. An email would have been sent to those participants to ask whether they 
agree to do an interview. In practice, the snowballing approach worked quite well; it 
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only stopped “rolling” once, when interviewing in Guangdong. For that instance, the 
next interviewee was approached through the purposive sampling strategy. 
The initial person in the “snowball” process was identified by his job title. This 
participant used to be the head of the healthcare department in Inner Mongolia. 
Considering the institutional structure of the healthcare system, this participant was 
the key person to help me reach other potential interviewees. Based on the vertical 
structure, this participant could help to refer key officials in lower and central levels. 
Based on the horizontal structure, this participant could help to refer the researcher to 
the head of the healthcare department in other provinces. So it was appropriate to start 
with this participant. 
During my undergraduate study in China, I had run a project investigating the 
protection of patients’ rights; I knew this first participant through my previous 
investigation. I asked him if he was willing to be the initial person for the snowball 
process and he replied that he was happy to do that for me. 
To avoid junior officials being pressured or forced by senior officials to attend the 
interviews during the snowball process, I had asked each interviewee to give me a list 
of the names of those who might be suitable for me to interview next. I contacted 
them personally rather than asking the current interviewee to help me contact that 
person. This helped to prevent senior officials from pressuring others to be 
interviewed. I also sent a form to ask each interviewee if he/she wanted to do the 
snowball process for me to make sure that everyone participated in the snowballing 
voluntarily. An anonymised list of interviewees is given in Appendix 1, and an 
interview question list is given in Appendix 2.  
 
6.3.3 Fieldwork summary 
After almost 5 months, fieldwork was completed in December 2014. Thirty-five 
respondents were interviewed in Beijing, Guangdong and Inner Mongolia. Most of 
those respondents are officials who are highly involved in the central-local 
relationship and healthcare process. The remaining respondents are academics in 
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relevant areas. Officials who had been interviewed were mainly located on the 
national or provincial level of the healthcare department or financial department ,as 
well as in relevant offices of provincial or county governments. Besides the 
information they provided during interviews, I was also given relevant documents, 
which were very helpful as complementary materials, by some interviewees.    
 
 
Section 6.4: Data analysis 
6.4.1 Approaches to qualitative data analysis 
6.4.1.1 Content analysis 
Content analysis, as Bauer (2000) stated, is “systematic classification and counting 
of text units [to] distill a large amount of material into a short description of some of 
its features” (cited in Marvasti, 2004, p. 90). It helps the researcher to translate the 
content of many pages into organized segments. Content analysis is a process of 
analyzing text which refers to “the recorded information about social life in the 
form of visual images, published written materials or transcribed interviews” 
(Marvasti, 2004, p. 90). Under content analysis, text could be seen as the reflection 
of public opinion, so it demonstrates how public opinion has been shaped, or could 
be seen as a cause of public opinion in which content analysis help to searching for 
the “themes that could connected with certain cultural practices or attitude” 
(Marvasti, 2004, p. 93).  
Content analysis was seen as a quantitative approach in its early stages, because it 
originally counted the frequency of word appearances, or how much time was 
devoted to themes (Payne and Payne, 2004). However, content analysis began to 
emphasize attitudes, values and motivations behind the words, and gradually was 
used as a qualitative approach, in which qualitative researchers could bring their 
own cultural meaning to interpretation of the texts (ibid.). Qualitative content 
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analysis, which focuses on the meaning of text (unit) itself, offers a more “objective” 
approach for social research since large amounts of descriptive data could be 
translated into quantified categories or standard codes. However, researchers have 
pointed out that content analysis always breaks the respondent’s statement into 
“quantifiable chunks”, which will miss some important information when regarding 
qualitative data in its full social context (Riessman, 2002; Marvasti, 2004).   
 
6.4.1.2 Thematic analysis 
Thematic analysis is an approach which shares some principles and procedures such 
as “themes” and “codes” with content analysis. As suggested by Given (2008), 
thematic analysis is “a data reduction and analysis strategy by which qualitative 
data are segmented, categorized, summarized, and reconstructed in a way that 
captures the important concepts within the data set” (p. 867). It “moves beyond 
counting explicit words or phrases and focus on identifying and describing both 
implicit and explicit ideas within the data, that is, themes” (Guest, et al., 2012, p. 
10). In thematic analysis, a theme or coding category is always drawn deductively 
or inductively. It could be derived from existing theoretical idea which the 
researcher brings to the data, or from the raw data (Joffe and Yardley, 2004, pp.57).  
Practically the methodology framework of thematic analysis comprises several 
approaches such as grounded theory, positivism, interpretivism, and 
phenomenology (Guest, et al., 2012). It selects from a range of techniques from 
different methodological camps to “identify and examine themes from textual data 
in a way that is transparent and credible” (ibid., p. 15). However, thematic analysis 
can be challenged if a qualitative researcher draws the richness of the themes from 
the raw information without reducing the insights to a trivial level for the sake of 
consistency of judgement (Boyatzis, 1998). In other words, it could be problematic 
if researchers simply pick text chunks to support the argument one wants to make 
(Silverman, 1993). Meanwhile, as “themes” or meanings behind symbolic texts are 
emphasized by thematic analysis, the number of times that a theme or category 
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appears does not always necessarily indicate the extent of importance or relevance; 
on the contrary, one could be of high relevance and conceptual importance even if it 
just appears once, or is mentioned by only one interviewee (Joffe and Yardley, 
2004). Therefore, it is mainly an interpretive approach.             
 
6.4.1.3 Narrative analysis 
Since stories or storytelling is a common form of sharing information, thus, 
understanding what stories convey and how they convey them becomes an 
important part of qualitative analysis (Marvasti, 2004). Narrative analysis, as 
Riessman pointed out, is analyzing data as the order in which story is told 
(Riessman, 1993). Or as Cortazzi noted, analyzing following a particular pattern of 
telling, such as the substance of the story, the structure, the purpose that story serves 
and the context of story (Cortazzi, 2001; Marvasti, 2004). Because narratives are 
made meaningful under a certain set of practices and context, thus narrative analysis 
could help to simultaneously examine what respondents say and how they make it 
meaningful (Marvasti, 2004). Furthermore, as the purpose (of storytelling) and 
context are emphasized in narrative analysis, this approach goes beyond the asking 
of whether the story is true or not.  
Narrative analysis is good at analyzing text in rich data sources such as in-depth 
interviews because it always tries to fully understand how various pieces of data 
relate to one another through the way they are articulated and the context (Riessman, 
2002; Marvasti, 2004). It intends to put discrete elements together into big picture 
in order to display individuals, cultures and societies as wholes (Riessman, 1993). 
 
6.4.1.4 Grounded theory 
Grounded theory was developed by Glaser and Strauss in 1964 (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967). This approach intends to inductively build up a systematic theory based on 
observation (Strauss and Corbin, 1994). The grounded theorists begin with 
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observation and an ongoing conceptual categorizing process upon observation, and 
then test these categories over time with more observation.  A theory will evolve 
after carefully refining and linking conceptual categories (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
In other words, using grounded theory is a process of suggesting plausible relations 
between concepts by generating concepts from qualitative data, and then carefully 
reviewing the data and developing (refining) the concepts. Grounded theory has 
experienced several changes on its original conceptualization over time (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990; Strauss and Corbin, 1994), although many ideas appeared, they do 
share some components. As Charmaz (2002, cited in Marvasti, 2004, p. 85) listed: 
 Simultaneous data collection and analysis;  
 Pursuit of emergent themes through early data analysis 
 Discovery of basic social processes within the data 
 Inductive construction of abstract categories that explain and synthesize these 
processes 
 Sampling to refine the categories through comparative processes  
 Integration of categories into a theoretical framework that specifies causes, 
conditions, and consequences of the studied processes.  
The understanding of grounded theory, as Strauss and Corbin stated, has been 
influenced by “contemporary intellectual development such as feminism, political 
economy, and varieties of postmodernism” (Strauss and Corbin, 1994, p. 276). 
Furthermore, the grounded theory approach highlights the importance of the role of 
researcher. Existing theories can offer a guideline or framework to analyze data; 
however, it could become a serious restriction for data analysis because researchers 
often intend to analyzing data in order to “fit” some theory or framework. In the 
process of grounded theory, a theory evolves by continuous interaction, such as 
refining and reviewing, between researcher and data. Meanwhile, the researcher’s 
knowledge and experience play a crucial role in understanding the data. Thus, the 
researcher plays a more influential role in grounded theory than in other approaches 
of qualitative data analysis.     
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6.4.1.5 Discourse analysis 
Discourse analysis is hard to define as a unified pattern of research since it has 
various meanings and application across many disciplines such as sociology, 
psychology and linguistics (Marvasti, 2004). Nonetheless, there are several central 
themes shared by researchers across different disciplines:  
 Viewing discourse and language as being productive of social reality (discourse 
doesn't simply describe reality but it creates it as well) 
 Treating discourse as a type of social action in its own right (discourse is not 
just a description but it does things) 
 Emphasizing the rhetorical functions of discourse (discourse is to promote one 
side of a conflict) (Gill, 2000, cited in Marvasti, 2004, p. 107). 
There are different kinds of discourse analysis according to the topic of interest. For 
example, one is interactional discourse analysis. According to Austin (1962), 
interactional discourse analysis is based on the assumption that language is akin to 
social action and examines how the spoken word make us accountable to others in 
order to illustrate “how discourses accomplish reality in everyday talk” (Silverman, 
2001, p. 178; Austin, 1962; Marvasti, 2004). Other topics such as the relationships 
between text and context, or between discourse and power also leads to different 
kinds of discourse analysis.   
 
 
6.4.1.6 Conversation analysis 
Conversation analysis, according to Silverman (2001), is an approach to investigate 
everyday conversation in order to show how social reality is produced by verbal 
exchange. The very focus of conversation analysis is the term “talk”, which could 
be categorized as ‘naturally occurring’ or ‘researcher-provoked’ (Silverman, 2001, 
p. 159). Naturally occurring talk refers to what people say in everyday common 
situations, such as at home or at the bus stop, while researcher-provoked talk refers 
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to what people say in response to specific questions, such as responses to interview 
questions (Marvasti, 2004). In conversation analysis, the conversation is always 
transcribed in as much detail as possible in order to show the “artful use of talk and 
capture every aspect of a talk such as pauses and intonations” (Baker, 1997, p. 131). 
Unlike discourse analysis, conversation analysis neither focuses on written text nor 
socio-cultural phenomena; it places emphasizes on social interaction such as 
everyday conversation and interpretations. Additionally, these interactions are often 
analyzed moment-by-moment. 
 
6.4.2 Implications for this research 
As mentioned in Section 3.1, one of the main goals of this research is trying to find 
out whether Pierson’s three institutional factors play as important a role in China as 
in Western federalist countries. Therefore, Pierson’s theory of three institutional 
factors offers a clear framework to analyze relevant data. Based on such an 
objective, thematic analysis could be the appropriate approach to achieve the 
expected goal.  
Firstly, the analyzing process of Pierson’s three factors has clear existing concept 
and theory as boundaries. To some extent, it is more likely to be a theory-testing 
analysis rather than a theory-building analysis. Therefore, grounded theory is not 
appropriate. Secondly, among all other approaches of qualitative data analysis, 
thematic analysis has an advantage to achieve the research goal. Analyzing 
Pierson’s three factors aims at finding out how these factors work in practice. 
Answers could be achieved through exploring respondents’ ideas or experiences 
about relevant institutional mechanisms or social phenomena. That means the 
meaning of the answers given by respondents is very important to this research. 
However, conversation analysis focuses on the detail of conversation and sequential 
organization. Rather than knowing what it is, conversation analysis is more likely to 
examine how it constructed. Narrative analysis focuses more on purpose and order 
as well as the “whole image” of the respondent’s response rather than content and 
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meaning. Discourse analysis focuses on the interaction or relationship between 
different genres of discourse or between discourse and other elements such as 
context or power. All three approaches listed above emphasize other perspectives of 
respondents’ answer rather than the meaning, and are less appropriate for 
understanding the policy process. Thematic analysis allows the researcher to cut 
interview data into “discrete chunks” according to the analytical framework, which 
makes it possible to understand clearly about respondents’ idea or experiences of 
Pierson’s three factors.  
However, the research does not look to only “test” Pierson’s three factors. This 
research was started with an open mind to the possibility of other factors that may 
have significant influence on the central-local relationship or the healthcare policy 
process. Based on this goal, there is space to employ an inductive thematic analysis 
approach in order to explore those “potential” factors. Codes and themes will be 
selected and the definition of the problem will be refined after careful observation 
of the interview data. Both frequency and distribution of indicators will be checked 
as well as exploring the specific relationship between the indicator and other social 
phenomena. After careful review and attempts to discover negative evidence, 
inductive thematic analysis could help to suggested plausible relations between the 
indicator and the central-local relationship or healthcare policy.       
It is often claimed that inductive approaches are always related to qualitative 
research, whilst deductive approaches are often related with quantitative research. 
Deductive approaches often start with a hypothesis which is derived from existing 
theory, then test the hypothesis by collecting data and exploring the empirical world 
(O’Reilly,2009). Therefore, a deductive approach suits testing existing theories. On 
the contrary, an inductive approach starts with as few preconceptions as possible 
and keeps an open mind to allow theory to emerge from the data (O’Reilly, 2009). 
This makes an inductive approach suitable for challenging existing ideas and 
developing new theories. However, the deductive approach is often criticized by 
qualitative researchers that a theory-testing social researcher’s focus is often 
restricted by the framework imposed from the outset, and it is hard for them to think 
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outside the framework because when data are “collected with theories in mind it has 
already been formed into working hypotheses” (O'Reilly, 2009, p. 105).   
After a series of interviews done in China, interviews were transcribed so that they 
could be analyzed. As mentioned in Section 2 of this chapter, this thesis is 
conducted based on the framework of Pierson’s (1995) three institutional factors. 
Interview transcripts were mainly coded in a “deductive way”, in which the main 
purpose of the data analysis is to explore how the three factors work in practice. 
Interview transcripts will be coded and analyzed in a structure of Pierson’s three 
factors. To some extent, this thesis is trying to find out whether these three factors 
play a role as important as that seen in Western federalist countries. Meanwhile, 
how these factors affect the central-local relationship in China will also be explored. 
Based on this, the data were mainly analyzed in a deductive way. However, it will 
not be a purely deductive analysis. Interview transcripts were also analyzed 
line-by-line in order to discover other factors (apart from Pierson’s three factors) 
that significantly influence the central-local relationship. There would be no answer 
to whether these factors exist or how these factors affect the central-local 
relationship until the data analysis has been finished. From this perspective, 
inductive analysis was also conducted in this research. Therefore, this thesis will 
employ a combination of inductive and deductive analysis, in which deductive 
analysis is the mainstream.    
    
6.4.3 Process of data analysis  
6.4.3.1 Language and tools 
Since the interviews were done in Chinese, all the transcript analysis was done in 
Chinese in order to keep data loss caused by interpreting into another language at a 
minimum level. Data analysis was done with the software “NVivo”. Such a 
computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) obviously leads to a 
more efficient and faster coding process. Moreover, NVivo allows the researcher to 
relate coded text to “facesheet variables” such as title of job and other 
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socio-demographic information, which provides an opportunity to discover new 
relations between different types of codes and develop explanations (Bryman, 2004). 
In addition, NVivo also enabled the researcher to easily count the frequency of a 
specific word or viewpoint occurring in an interview or in a series of interviews, 
which is helpful when analyzing themes or attitudes towards a specific theme.  
 
6.4.3.2 Coding process 
Initial coding stage: In this research, thematic coding was employed. The interview 
transcripts were gone through line-by-line to create detailed codes in relation to 
Pierson’s (1995) three factors. Although this research was done under the framework 
of Pierson’s three factors, there was still an open coding stage at the beginning of the 
analysis in order to avoid missing some interesting points or factor not covered by 
these three factors which may affect the central-local relationship in China or the 
healthcare policy process.  
“Code-theme” stage: In this stage, common elements were searched among codes in 
order to raise a set of relevant codes into a theme. For example, the code “express 
interest via NPC system” and code “express interest via government system” were 
raised into the theme “channel of interest expression”. The structure of the codes 
became clearer in this stage.  
Labelling stage: Themes and codes were labelled by the concept or key terms 
referring to the crucial literature of this thesis in this stage. Themes and codes were 
combined into higher-order codes. For example, the code “channel of interest 
expression” was combined with the code “capability of local interest expression” and 
the code “local enthusiasm on interest expression” into a higher-order code “local 
interest expression”, which is one of Pierson’s three factors. 
Connection exploring stage: In this stage, the researcher made an effort to explore 
possible links or connection between key themes (or codes) and to see how themes or 
codes varied in terms of features of cases. For instance, the researcher tried to 
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examine the connection between “view on central-local power distribution” and 
interviewees’ working organization. This resulted in the identification of a significant 
contrast between interviewees who work in provincial government and who work in 
the healthcare department.       
 
Section 6.5: Validity and reliability  
This research, as stated above, employs a qualitative research method to achieve its 
goals. There are criticisms of qualitative methods, which mostly revolve around 
issues of reliability and validity. 
Reliability refers to whether different researchers given the same set of data will 
agree between them on how it should be interpreted (Bryman, 2004). In qualitative 
research, data collection is more likely to be an “interactive process” that might 
illuminate different facets or dimensions of a research subject (Lawrence, 2003). 
Inter-observer reliability may be promoted by clear procedural rules for recording 
and transcribing the data provided by, for instance, interviewees. Further analysis of 
the interview transcripts will help to ensure that repeated analysis will reveal similar 
key concepts and categories.  
As Bryman claims, validity is “concerned with the integrity of conclusions that are 
generated from a piece of research” (Bryman, 2004, p. 28), or as Lawrence presents, 
is all about “truthfulness that refers to how well an idea about reality ‘fits’ with actual 
reality” (Lawrence, 2003, p. 179). In some ways, qualitative research can be seen as 
more valid, in that it allows access to the “lived” experiences of research subjects. For 
the purpose of authenticity, exploring research questions across different data sources 
(in the case of this research, interviews, textual analysis and literature reviews) could 
help to determine whether the participant gave a fair, honest and balanced account of 
the research target from his or her view (Lawrence, 2003). This is also the 
triangulation of methods which is more likely to yield a more complete picture of the 
institutions and policy process (ibid.). However, qualitative research may have 
197 
weaker external validity, which refers to the “degree to which findings can be 
generalized across social settings” (Bryman, 2004, p. 273). Since qualitative research 
usually employs small samples of respondents and lacks statistical tests of 
significance-indicating levels of probability, whether the result could be generalized 
to a wider population, which is possible with large samples of numerical data in 
quantitative research, is doubtful. In the case of this research, attempts were made to 
address how the central government interacts with local government, but to also 
identify the key factors in the central-local relationship in China which influence 
healthcare policies. This could allow other researchers to question whether or not 
these factors apply in other circumstances, and as a result address whether these 
findings may be generalised into a different context. However, there are limitations to 
this research, such as the choice of only three provinces and only one policy area 
(healthcare), so results may not be generalizable to other provinces or policy areas. 
 
Section 6.6: Document triangulation 
Triangulation is a method derived from navigation. It was used to establish the 
accurate position of a ship by taking bearing on several landmarks (Pierce, 2008). In 
social science, triangulation refers to obtaining data from various datasets or by 
different methods. It is often employed to strengthen the confidence of a research 
finding. It can be a way of “confirmation”, and overcome the issue of internal validity 
and bias (Arksey and Knight, 1999). Triangulation can also be a “completeness” that 
brings views, ideas and experiences from different angles together. It leaves the 
potential to gain new or alternative explanation based on data collected from different 
perspectives and by different methods (ibid.).  
There are different kinds of triangulation, namely methodological triangulation, data 
triangulation, investigator triangulation and theoretical triangulation. Methodological 
triangulation refers to use a range of different methods to collect or interpret data. It 
could be that triangulation involves two or more different distinct methods 
(across-method triangulation) or different techniques within one method 
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(within-method triangulation) (Denzin, 1970). Data triangulation refers to the use of 
different data sources to explore the same topic. The data sources may vary in terms 
of person, space or time. Investigator triangulation refers to employing different 
interviewers or researchers who focus on the same research topic. Theoretical 
triangulation refers to exploring a single or same set of research question with diverse 
hypotheses or even all possible theoretical points (Arksey and Knight, 1999).  
However, critics of multiple triangulations have appeared in recent decades. As 
Fielding and Fielding (1986) pointed out, theories are often generated from different 
traditions. Combining different theories could add range and depth to research 
findings rather than accuracy. Blaikie also challenged that method triangulation by 
arguing that it is inappropriate to combine different methods which founded on 
different epistemological and ontological assumptions (Blaikie, 1991, cited in Arksey 
and Knight, 1999, pp. 26). The result might be something of “hotchpotch” rather than 
any more accuracy or real findings (Arksey and Knight, 1999).  
In this research, data triangulation was used by cross-referencing documents with the 
interview transcripts. According to Hodder (2000, p. 704), documents are important 
in qualitative research because “access can be easy and low cost, ... the information 
provided may differ and may not [be] available in spoken form, and … texts endure 
and thus give historical insight”. With regards to this view, Miller argues that it is 
important to analyse texts because they mirror power relations (Miller, 1997). Similar 
to other types of data, textual documents have their limitations and advantages. Since 
documents are produced independently from a research agenda, they will be 
unaffected by the research process (Bryman, 2004). Similarly, because they are 
produced for reasons other than research, they may be fragmentary, they may not fit 
the conceptual framework of the research and their authenticity may be difficult to 
determine. Therefore, rather than being used as a single source, documents could be a 
good approach to check the interpretation of the interview data and add internal 
validity to research findings.  
Furthermore documents can also provide a useful complement to the interview data. 
For this research, they were analysed qualitatively through the contents of the reports 
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and were used in two stages. The first was as part of the research design process, 
where they helped provide a background understanding and develop specific 
questions for the interviews. The second stage was as part of the analysis. Documents 
provided another way of understanding the perspective of the central-local 
relationship in practice. In this sense, documents were not simply taken at their face 
value and read only for their content; it was necessary to understand how and why 
they were produced and the rules surrounding their production and use (Prior, 2004). 
This was particularly helpful with the interviews because I could examine the 
tensions between the official documentation and the views of the officials and experts, 
contextualising their construction and purpose. 
The documents studied in this research were mainly on the relevant laws of 
central-local power distribution, national and provincial healthcare policy plans and 
relevant official reports of healthcare policies. 
 
 
Section 6.7: Ethical scrutiny 
In the undertaking of this research, several ethical issues needed to be taken into 
consideration. Since it involves fieldwork with human interaction, the research 
method needed, and received, validation from the University of York’s research 
ethics committee. Key issues are listed as follows: 
 
6.7.1 Informed consent 
A brief description of the research, in the form “information sheet”, was attached 
with the initial email sent to all potential interviewees (see Appendix 3). This 
explained the nature of this research and the role participants would play if they 
agreed to be interviewed. Those who agreed to participate in the interview were sent a 
consent form in a follow-up email in order to arrange a suitable date and time (see 
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Appendix 4). Interviewees were asked to complete and return the consent forms 
before the interviews. 
 
6.7.2 Confidentiality and anonymity 
Although the interviews were not of a personal nature, in some cases confidential 
information regarding the internal workings of the organization they worked for were 
provided. There were also other elements of the interviews which interviewees 
specifically stated that they preferred to be treated confidentially. 
Interviewees were asked whether they would prefer their working place or 
themselves to be identifiable from the data. Although some of the interviewees were 
happy to be identified, all interview sources were regarded as confidential. All the 
quotations from the interviews have been anonymized in this thesis and all research 
outputs. Although some of the interviewees allowed their identities to remain 
recognisable, others were uncomfortable with that. In some cases, interviewees were 
happy to be identified in some sections but preferred to be anonymous in other 
controversial sections. Thus, for the sake of consistency in the results, all sections of 
the interviews were anonymized. 
For social research, confidentiality of the research participants is the norm. Although, 
as Spicker points out, anonymity may be less of a concern in interviews with public 
organizations on account of their need to be publicly accountable (Spicker, 2007). 
However, in the context of Chinese politics, most officials prefer to be publicly silent 
rather than express their views in public. It thus seemed sensible to provide 
interviewees with anonymity. 
Anonymity in this research means that the names of the interviewees and their 
working organizations are not mentioned in any part of the research without 
permission. Care has been taken so that the interviewees cannot be identified from 
details included in research outputs.  
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The documentary analysis part of the fieldwork had no confidentiality constraints, 
since the data source is publicly accessible information.  
 
6.7.3 Risk to participants 
There is very little direct risk to participants as a result of the interviews, where I 
asked for their experience and opinions based on their working life. If I was told or 
had reason to believe that the question or the line of questioning was causing distress 
for the interviewee, I would stop the interview immediately and ask him/her if he/she 
was able to go on. If the interviewee was able to, I would ask whether he/she would 
like to stop the particular question or line of questioning. In the very unfortunate 
event that the participant becomes distressed by the interview and cannot go on, I 
would stop the interview. 
 
6.7.4 Clarity and understanding 
I used plain and clear language when speaking with the participants and avoided 
using acronyms or “technical terms”, which the participants might not have 
understood. If I needed to use technical vocabulary (especially terms translated from 
English to Chinese), I would make every effort to provide additional explanatory 
information. 
 
 
Section 6.8: Limitations  
There are several limitations within this research. Firstly, as a qualitative research 
method is employed as the main method, the core limitation on external validity 
exists in this research. It is hard to provide a generalized conclusion through 
qualitative approaches compared to quantitative methods. Meanwhile, the limited 
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sample size of both provinces and interviewees also restricts the generalizability of 
this research.  
Secondly, doing interviews under a collective and high-context culture makes it 
sometimes hard to grasp the real thoughts of respondents. Interviewees may choose 
to tell a “happy story” rather than the “bitter truth” in order to protect the image and 
interest of collective organization. Although the researcher has made a great effort to 
ensure triangulation with different questions or data sources, this may weaken the 
validity of interview data. Under a high-context culture, an interview could contain 
several verbal or non-verbal cues. As a Chinese person who has lived in China for 
more than 20 years, I have tried my best to recognize any cue given by respondents. 
However, there may be some cues that I have missed, which may result in 
misinterpreting some key information or weakening the range and depth of this 
research.  
Thirdly, as I mentioned in Section 2.2.4 in this chapter, I have failed to have some of 
my interviewees sign the consent form. Although I have discussed that it has been 
influenced by cultural difference and actually these interviewees had given verbal 
consent to be interviewed. It has reflected that there is limitation in the research 
design of preparing doing elite interview under different cultures. It also reminds me 
that interviewing elites can bring big ethical issues if one underestimates the cultural 
difference, or does not have enough preparation for dealing with bureaucratic 
cultures.  
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Chapter 7: Findings 
This chapter will present some important findings from the interview transcripts and 
some governmental documents. There will be three parts to this chapter which 
represent three important aspects of the central-local relationship. 
 
Section 7.1: Administrative power distribution and local policy 
innovation 
7.1.1 Power distribution: Clear or not? 
 
Inner Mongolia  
Officials and experts from different departments have been interviewed in three 
sample provinces: Inner Mongolia, Beijing and Guangdong. Officials in different 
departments and provinces hold different attitudes towards the clarity of power 
distribution between the central and local. For Inner Mongolia, almost all the 
interviewees found the system of power distribution to be clear. In particular, 
interviewees from the healthcare department and government in Inner Mongolia hold 
positive attitudes towards the question of clear power distribution, meaning that they 
all reckon that the power distribution between the central and local is clear. 
According to the opinion of an official in the provincial government of Inner 
Mongolia, “ power distribution, especially in terms of who takes responsibility for 
expenditure and implementation, and who conducts policy supervision and 
assessment, is clear. Power distribution in the healthcare sector became clearer after 
beating the SARS crisis in 2003” (interview no. 5). 
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Beijing 
Interviewees’ attitudes towards clear power distribution in Beijing is quite different 
from those in Inner Mongolia. Most of the interviewees in Beijing hold a negative 
attitude towards power distribution. Only interviewees who come from the national 
healthcare ministry and relevant departments think that administrative power 
distribution between the central and local is clear. Those who are working in 
government, finance departments and research institutes all think the power 
distribution is not clear enough. A noted expert on healthcare reform in China pointed 
out that “the power distribution is quite fuzzy, both the central and local haven’t taken 
enough responsibility, especially during the current healthcare reform” (interview no. 
23). According to an official who works for the Beijing municipal administration of 
hospitals, “the power distribution between the central and local is not clear. The 
distribution has experienced many major and minor changes in the last three decades 
and these changes have not been institutionalized. Therefore, the power distribution 
remains unclear” (interview no. 19). 
 
Guangdong 
In Guangdong, the situation is quite similar to Beijing. Only interviewees who work 
for the healthcare department hold a positive attitude toward the clarity of power 
distribution. Other interviewees who work for the government, finance departments 
and research institutes all said that the power distribution is not clear between the 
central and local. “The power distribution is not clear. The local has taken much of 
the responsibility for expenditure but sometimes the local doesn’t know whether it 
has the relevant administrative power or not. The central is trying to set a formal list 
for the local to establish detailed local powers in order to match local fiscal and 
administrative powers”, said an official working in the finance department in 
Guangdong (interview no. 30). 
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The healthcare system 
It is very interesting that almost all the interviewees who work for the healthcare 
department in these three provinces hold a positive attitude towards healthcare power 
distribution. When asked whether power distribution between the central and local is 
clear, most of them said it is clear because there is a formal document called 
“Clarification of the Power of the Department in Three Aspects (San Ding Fang An”), 
which demonstrates the power and responsibility of the department. Both the national 
healthcare ministry and the local healthcare department have this kind of document, 
so the central and the local clearly know what they should and should not do. The 
only dissenting voice came from an official who works in the Beijing municipal 
administration of hospitals. He stated that “power distribution is not clear because of 
its changeable status. Since the changes in power distribution have not been 
institutionalized, it is hard for the local to know exactly what they can do” (interview 
no. 19). Another interviewee who works for the national healthcare ministry pointed 
out that “the power distribution is a little bit fuzzy since the current healthcare reform 
brings in some new institute and issues. The central and the local have not finished 
distributing the power and responsibility of these new elements” (interview no. 35). 
However, for the main healthcare power distribution between the central and local, 
all the interviewees agreed that there is a clear healthcare power distribution. 
 
Finance system 
When asked their thoughts about power distribution between the central and local, 
interviewees who work for finance departments and the national ministry have 
completely different attitudes to those who work within the healthcare system. All of 
these interviewees thought that the power distribution is not clear. Most of them 
claimed that the local administrative power has remained unclear for many years. As 
an expert who works at the Institute of Fiscal Science of China stated, “the limits of 
administrative power remain unclear to the local although the fiscal relation was 
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clarified through the taxation reform in 1994” (interview no. 14). Some interviewees 
in the finance system mentioned that the central is trying to make administrative 
power distribution clearer by setting a list of local powers and trying to match local 
expenditure capacity and administrative power. However, as two officials in the 
Guangdong finance department said, this kind of improvement is “only a draft which 
is planned for implementation in three years” (interview no. 30). In Inner Mongolia, 
there is no timetable for it at all. All interviewees in the finance system hold a 
negative attitude towards power distribution and think that local administrative 
power is mismatched with local expenditure capacity. 
 
Government system 
There were five interviewees who worked for the government (specifically the 
executive organ) who were interviewed, with most located in Inner Mongolia. They 
all held positive attitudes towards power distribution. When specifically asked about 
healthcare power distribution, they all answered that they clearly know what the 
central and local could do in healthcare affairs. When asked why he thinks the power 
distribution is clear, an official from the government of Inner Mongolia said that “our 
province relies much on the central, so we have to keep in line with the central very 
strictly. What they told us to do is what we could do” (interview no. 7). 
 
Summary 
There were two questions about power distribution that were asked in interviews. 
One was about general administrative power and the other was specifically about 
healthcare power. From the interview data, it is obvious that almost all the 
interviewees reckon that the healthcare power distribution between the central and 
local is clear. The only disputed point is the new institutional elements brought about 
by the current healthcare reform. A few officials and experts insisted that both the 
207 
central and the local do not know who should take on these new responsibilities, so 
the healthcare power distribution becomes blurred.  
When talking about general administrative power distribution, the situation is quite 
different. Interviewees from finance departments and research institutions all hold 
negative attitudes towards the current power distribution. They all think the local 
administrative power is not clear and does not match expenditure capacity. Some 
interviewees also reckon that the central sometimes is not sure about its power 
boundary, causing uncertainty at both the central and local levels. The only 
contrasting voice comes from Inner Mongolia, where the local is in a very passive 
position relative to the central and the local may know what they are able to do by 
virtue of the will of the central government. 
 
7.1.2 Roles in healthcare policy 
During the interviews, all participants were asked about their idea of the role of the 
central and local in relation to healthcare policy. The answers they gave were quite 
similar. For a major healthcare policy, the central no doubt takes the responsibility of 
policy design and decision making. The local is always responsible for understanding 
and specifying central policy goals, policy implementation and daily operation and 
maintenance.  
There is another important part of healthcare policy in which the central and local 
have quite different roles; raising money for implementation. According to most of 
the interviewees who discussed this topic, the central always provides start-up funds 
for major healthcare implementation in local areas. Apparently, the local should be 
responsible for the daily operation and maintenance. Sometimes the central will 
subsidize the local governments with limited financial capacity in order to implement 
policies. For example, an official who works for a county government in Inner 
Mongolia mentioned in his interview that “the central provides financial support 
through specific transfer subsidies to motivate our province to implement policies. 
Some rich provinces such as coastal provinces won’t have this kind of support from 
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the central” (interview no. 34). Meanwhile, the central will surely have a major role 
in supervising and regulating the use of this money.  
Interviewees also provided some detailed idea about the role of local government in 
healthcare policy. For the role of provincial government, some interviewees 
described it as the “main resource allocator” and the “main communicator with the 
central”. They think the provincial government has the most important role in dealing 
with resources and building communications between the central and lower tiers of 
government. However, when talking about the role of specifying central policy plans 
and goals, interviewees were divided into two camps. Some interviewees thought that 
the provincial government is the most important in specifying central policy plans 
and goals. For example, a participant from the Guangdong healthcare department 
mentioned that “the government and departments on the provincial level have a more 
important role in resource allocation and specifying central policy plans and goals 
than government on other levels” (interview no. 26). However, an interviewee who 
works for the Guangdong finance department insisted that “although the provincial 
government has a crucial role on coordinating resources, the government on the 
municipal level takes the most important role in specifying central policy goals and 
enabling implementation” (interview no. 30). The overall data shows that 
interviewees from the healthcare system, government and research institutions tend 
to agree that government at the provincial level plays the most crucial role in 
specifying and understanding central policy goals and plans. 
When asked whether the current role of the central government and local government 
in healthcare policy was reasonable or not, interviewees at both central and local 
levels expressed their dissatisfaction. Participants at the local level mentioned that the 
local has taken on too much responsibility in healthcare expenditure, straining their 
financial resources. According to an interviewee in a county government in 
Guangdong, the central provides less than 10% of the funds for healthcare 
expenditure in Guangdong, but this expenditure consumes more than one-third of 
government income in Guangdong. An official who works for the national healthcare 
ministry also pointed out that “local government had undertaken too much 
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responsibility for social welfare that is far beyond its financial capacity. This may 
cause a lot of problems when the local attempts to implement policies” (interview 
no.15). It seems that the placement of too much responsibility on the local without the 
necessary fiscal resources is the key factor leading to unreasonable roles of the 
central and local in healthcare policy. 
 
Summary 
From the interview data, most of the participants agree that the role of both the central 
and local is clear on healthcare policy, though there are a few different opinions on 
the exact role of local government. However, interviewees rarely said that the role 
allocation is reasonable. Most of them think the local has had to take on more 
responsibility than it should. 
 
 
7.1.3 Policy implementation and space for local government innovation  
Large or small space? 
The political structure of China has great elasticity and the decentralization after 1980 
provided space for local governments to participate in policy innovation. During the 
decentralization, the central government no longer appointed leaders below the 
provincial level. So the head of a province has the power to appoint or remove senior 
officers in governmental departments. This created possibilities for the local to 
independently develop its own strategy and policies. Therefore, local government 
does have space for policy innovation. 
Interviewees were asked about their experience of policy implementation and space 
for policy innovation by local government during the interviews. Generally speaking, 
the interviewees who work in the healthcare system in Beijing, Guangdong and Inner 
Mongolia think the local has a large amount of space for innovation in healthcare 
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policy. According to an official who works in the Guangdong healthcare department, 
“healthcare affairs are more regional than other policies, so the central gives the local 
plenty of space to engage in policy innovation” (interview no. 27). Even Inner 
Mongolia, which relies heavily on subsidies from the central government, has been 
granted plenty of space for policy innovation. As a senior officer in a human 
resources and social security department put it, “the central encourages the local to 
engage in policy innovation on healthcare policies such as health insurance” 
(interview no. 9). There is no doubt that Guangdong, part of the reform pilot 
programme, has much more space for policy innovation. “Guangdong has, by default, 
policy innovation space as a pilot province for reforms”, said an interviewee who 
works for the provincial healthcare department in Guangdong (interview no. 27). 
“The only thing they need to keep in mind is that you do not go beyond the red line set 
by the central,” said a senior officer in the municipal healthcare department in 
Shenzhen (interview no. 29). 
But there are differing opinions on local policy innovation space. A senior officer in 
the provincial government of Inner Mongolia said that there is less space for policy 
innovation since Inner Mongolia relies heavily on the central in terms of finances and 
policy resources. The central also has very strict supervision and management of the 
central transfer payment which the local government receives, so there is little space 
in Inner Mongolia for policy innovation compared with richer provinces. It is worth 
noting that an official who works for the Guangzhou finance department mentioned 
that healthcare policy in Guangzhou is complex, constraining policy innovation. He 
explained that “although Guangzhou has great financial capacity, the healthcare 
system is quite complicated with many departments and institutions involved in 
healthcare policy implementation. These departments and institutions can hardly 
compromise and reach agreement. That’s why Guangzhou cannot perform well in 
healthcare policy innovation” (interview no. 32). 
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Supervision by the central government 
Based on the opinions of interviewees, the central has granted plenty of power and 
space to provincial governments on healthcare policy innovation. However, the 
central government also needs to keep the local government in line with central 
policy goals. There are three main ways that the central could keep the local on the 
right track according to some interviewees. A senior officer in healthcare department 
of Inner Mongolia said that “the central uses the fiscal system and policy projects to 
achieve ‘control’ of the local. Specifically, transfer payments and the benefits 
obtained through policy projects will influence the local to keep in line with the 
central” (interview no. 33). Meanwhile, the central has the power of policy regulation 
and evaluation and could have more in the current stage, so the central could achieve 
more and more influence on local policy outcomes. However, policy and finance 
resources also play a crucial role in achieving these goals since they can help punish 
or reward local government when the central exercises its power to regulate and 
evaluate policy. Therefore, policy and finance resources are an effective way for the 
central to keep the local cooperative in achieving policy goals.  
Another way to avoid the local straying too far from the policy plans and goals of the 
central government is political pressure. This tool is used by the central government 
very often and is frequently effective. As a senior director of the healthcare policy 
and management department at Peking University puts it, “the local implements 
policies under political pressure from the central every day. This pressure could be 
the most important motivation for the local to implement central policy. Even if the 
conditions are not right for implementation, the local could be forced to implement 
policies due to strong political pressure” (interview no. 18). Political pressure is also 
the key reason why sometimes policy implementation takes the form of social 
movement.  
The Party system is the main platform from which political pressure on local 
government is generated in order to keep the local in line with central policy plans 
and goals. An official in the national healthcare ministry pointed out that “when poor 
implementation or central-local conflict is found in a local area, the central can 
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influence the local through the party system. Since it is relatively easy to reach an 
agreement within the party system, the central could convince the local party bureau 
to keep in line with the central party bureau. Then the local party could help to resolve 
the conflict or improve implementation” (interview no. 22). 
Local policy innovation: On the right track? 
When talking about local policy innovation in China, one is reminded of the policy 
innovation of the 1980s. The phrase “policy innovation” became popular at that time 
and there are many examples of successful policy innovation from that period. 
However, when comparing current policy innovation with policy innovation in this 
period, there are obvious differences. Daring and courage could be observed in the 
policy innovations in 1980s, which constituted major challenges to existing policies 
at that time. Today, there is significantly less courage displayed by local innovators 
than in past decades. A senior officer who works for the county government in 
Guangzhou expressed her worry in our interview: “Sometimes policy innovation is 
like gambling. You can only get support when a positive outcome appears. It’s very 
risky for the local to engage in policy innovation and only those who are brave and 
have enough resources are willing to try” (interview no. 31). Another difference is 
that the successful innovation of the 1980s could easily expand to other parts of the 
country and become part of reform on a national level. However, today even those 
successful policy innovations have limited influence in local areas and are not 
implemented elsewhere. 
There are several factors that lead to these differences, and non-institutionalized 
power distribution between the central and local could be one. As mentioned by some 
interviewees, the current form of power distribution has not been institutionalized. In 
this context, although the local could have much more power, any local reform and 
innovation is not protected by law since there is no constitutional basis for local 
innovation. So uncertainties and risk have been major obstacles that have kept local 
government from policy innovation. 
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Another possible reason, as Zheng put it, could be a lack of political protection 
(Zheng, 2012). Political strongmen can grant plenty of power to local governments to 
provide strong support for local reforms. Even if problems occur during the reform, 
strongmen can provide protection for local reforms. This can be clearly observed in 
the reform of “special economic zones” after the 1980s. Meanwhile, it is also very 
easy for political strongmen to translate the success of a local policy innovation to the 
national level and extend it to other parts of the country (Zheng, 2012). Nowadays 
local reformers have many concerns before they engage in policy innovation because 
they generally lack full political authorization and support from the central 
government. Thus local policy innovation hardly extends to the national level. An 
official who works in the provincial healthcare department in Guangdong mentioned 
in his interview that “Guangdong can engage in policy innovation more freely 
because many leaders who had worked in Guangdong eventually became leaders at 
the national level. It’s easy for local reformers in Guangdong to get political support 
from the central” (interview no. 27). However, Guangdong is a special example; the 
majority of local leaders choose to be low-key in terms of local reform since they do 
not have certain political support from the central government. In addition, after the 
taxation reform in 1994, there was a selective centralization trend in China. Most of 
the centralized power became the power of central ministries. In fact, central power 
was dispersed to various central ministries. This makes it even harder for local 
leaders to gain support from the central government for policy innovation because it 
is difficult to gain support from several ministries at the same time.  
The mismatch of local financial capacity and administrative responsibility may be a 
possible reason as well. Power and authority were centralized in the 1990s but not the 
responsibility, which created a huge gap between the central power and responsibility 
of local government. As some interviewees mentioned in their interviews, poor local 
financial capacity makes it very hard for local government to take on its 
responsibilities. That is why most local policy innovations happen in rich areas 
during the current healthcare reform. Therefore, limited local financial capacity has 
restricted the local government’s motivation and ability to innovate policies. 
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Summary 
The paragraphs above have discussed some findings about central-local power 
distribution. Generally speaking, interviewees tended to agree that healthcare power 
distribution between the central and local governments is relatively clear and the 
local body has much space for healthcare policy innovation. However, interviewees 
rarely agreed that such power distribution is reasonable. When talking about these 
things in the interviews, interviewees used the word “non-institutionalized” very 
frequently. 
Unlike other countries such as the US and Canada, where their constitutions formally 
provide for the power distribution between the central and local government, China 
still has no law or public document clearly demonstrating the distribution of power 
between the central and local, especially demonstrating what they should not do, even 
though China has already experienced several rounds of centralization and 
decentralization. Such a situation has profound historical causes. In 1956, Mao made 
a famous speech “On the Top Ten Guanxi (Informal Relationships)” based on his 
summary of historical experiences after the establishment of the PRC. In his speech, 
he advocated that the central government should cooperate with local government 
through conferment and evaluate the experience periodically (Mao, 1977). It is worth 
noting that such a principle naturally rejects institutionalizing the central-local 
relation (Zhu, 2004). When the PRC was newly established, the national leaders did 
not have experience managing a modern China. If, out of anxiety, central-local power 
distribution was institutionalized with the leaders’ little experience of modern 
constitutional separation of powers, once central-local power distribution was 
configured improperly, no matter if the central power was too centralized or local 
authority was too strong, it would likely bring disastrous consequences that might 
even completely ruin domestic peace. From this perspective, the non-institutionalized 
practice that involves “cooperat[ing] with local government through conferment” and 
“evaluat[ing] the experience periodically” does not overemphasize the concept of 
power distribution and principles of institutionalization, but stresses that the 
institution is a product of practice and experience, which aims at solving specific 
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social problems (Zhu, 2004). Therefore, it might have been a reasonable choice at 
that time.  
Since then, this principle has become the main rule for central-local relationships in 
China. It helps China maintain national unity and a peaceful transfer of national 
authority. On the one hand, it gradually spurred the formation of a national market 
economy and weakened regionalism and regional economic independence. On the 
other hand, it enhanced local autonomy and initiatives (ibid.). When I spoke with my 
interviewees on this topic, I could feel that the principle of “cooperate with local 
government through conferment” is still influential in the present day. However, its 
disadvantages have become more and more apparent. The non-institutional factors 
become the real problem. This means that both the central power and local power can 
be greatly affected by specific policies, by specific leaders and by shifting political 
and economic situations. Such non-institutionalized arrangements always lead to 
uncertain expectations, which limit the courage and initiative of policy innovation in 
local areas. Therefore, this kind of path dependence may be a reasonable explanation 
to why the local government has quite limited policy innovation outcomes despite 
much innovation space. 
 
Section 7.2: Central-local interaction and interest expression 
As discussed earlier, there are three institutional factors which have great influence 
on central-local relations and policy outcomes according to Paul Pierson’s work 
(Pierson, 1995). How the interests of different tiers are represented at the centre, the 
second characteristic mentioned by Pierson, can be considered as the extent to which 
state members can affect the central government. Meanwhile, how the central 
interacts with the local is important as well since the central government has vested 
interests in local government. Therefore, central-local interaction is important when 
exploring how the central and local express and maintain their own interests.  
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This section will display some interesting data found on central-local interaction and 
interest expression based on the interview transcripts and public documents. A brief 
discussion will follow. 
 
7.2.1 Channels for interaction 
When talking about interaction channels, I am referring to a platform within the 
formal or informal political system through which both the central and local can 
express their interest requests and take certain actions in order to maintain their 
interests. There is a big issue which needs to be clarified first; there is no set 
independent and formal mechanism for local interest expression in China. For 
expression of local demand in all aspects, it can only be done through the relevant 
systems, for example, the local government can express its interest through its daily 
reports within the government system or express it during the party conference. 
Therefore, the discussion below will start from the interaction channel which is 
embedded in the relevant systems.  
 
7.2.1.1 Internal approval and referral procedure 
This procedure includes information and demand exchange between the upper and 
lower levels, which is the most common and direct way of interest expression in 
practice in China. Since China has a parallel leadership system (government 
leadership and party committee leadership) in every single department, the internal 
approval and referral procedure naturally has two different channels, namely the 
procedure of the governmental executive body and procedure of party organs. When 
talking about channels and procedures for local interest expression, interviewees 
from both the governmental system and healthcare system mentioned that the 
expression channels for the local body are unobstructed and there are various ways 
for the local to express their interest to the central within the departmental system (or 
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governmental system). As an interviewee who works for the Guangdong provincial 
healthcare department mentioned: 
The local can express its demand and interests through many ways, for example, 
their demand and interests can be expressed through year-end work summaries, 
through work reports and through central inspections or supervision processes. 
The local can have direct communication with the central when it has new 
demands or ideas. For example, our province was trying to remove the limitation 
on physicians’ ability to work in multiple practices (meaning physicians would 
be able to work in different places such as hospitals or clinics). After 
communicating with the central authority, we decided to temporarily give up this 
idea because the central ministry said that it was not suitable to remove this limit 
at the moment. Generally, when the local body has an idea for a new provincial 
policy, the local will communicate with the central and ask for instructions in 
advance. … Policies in general are always strictly controlled by the central 
government and local interests have to be subordinated to national interests. The 
central has broad control on general reform policies, within which local 
government has more space to achieve its interests (interview no. 27). 
This case not only shows how the local healthcare department expressed local interest 
to the central in practice, but also that the central actually has great influence on the 
implementation of local policies. 
An official who works in a provincial government also shared his opinion: 
Generally speaking, when the local is forming a new policy, it will ask the central 
for advice and feedback. When the central has an idea for a new policy which will 
involve the local government, the central will also ask the local for feedback and 
suggestions. These communications take place through daily work processes 
within the relevant industry’s system. Healthcare issues are reported through the 
healthcare system and general administrative issues go through the 
governmental system. Interests and ideas are gradually conveyed upwards, level 
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by level. The process for change goes the same way if any problem occurs 
(interview no. 5). 
According to my interviewees, the internal interest-expression procedure through a 
sector’s system or the governmental system is the most common way local officials 
present their interests to the central authorities. The procedure goes through the 
following stages: develop a demand (interest), report, review, reply, result (request 
accepted or refused). In fact, this kind of interest expression is quite common in 
administrative executives all around the world. The advantage of this model is that it 
makes full use of the existing executive hierarchy and hence achieves a relatively 
smooth process. The disadvantage of this expression model is that the expression can 
be plagued by excessive administrative levels and the low efficiency of 
administrative executives. When local interests involve different ministries and 
departments, it is even more difficult for the local government to get a satisfactory 
reply from the central government. As an official of a county government in 
Guangdong put it: 
The working conference is an effective way of local interest expression. 
However, plenty of healthcare issues need coordination between different 
ministries and the relationships between these ministries are quite independent 
of each other. Therefore, it is very difficult for the local to get an effective 
solution even after expressing its interests to the central. Let’s take the issue of 
formulating new policy as the example, in which the human resource and social 
security ministry, finance ministry, developing and reform ministry and 
healthcare ministry are involved. If the local is willing to form a new policy of 
physicians working in multiple practices, it will definitely be difficult to achieve 
a consensus between all these ministries. Thus, the local can hardly achieve its 
interest demand via such an expression channel although the channel is 
relatively smooth (interview no. 31). 
219 
From the interview data, the procedure of governmental executive is quite a common 
channel for the local to present its interests to the central although it is very hard to 
achieve a satisfactory reply sometimes. 
The other important part of the internal approval and referral procedure is the 
procedure through party organs. This interest-expression channel is full of Chinese 
characteristics since its formation was based on the combination of 
superior–subordinate relationship and vertical intergovernmental relations under the 
rule of the CPC. The current situation of local administration is that the party 
committee in each level is still at the top position of both the central and the local 
governments. Therefore, it is possible for the local to represent its interest upwards 
through the internal superior–subordinate relationship within the party organization 
and receive a positive response from the central party committee. In fact, expressing 
interests through the internal organization of the party may help the local authority 
circumvent a range of institutional and legal difficulties, which often appear when 
expressing interests within the governmental system. As an interviewee from a 
county government in Inner Mongolia mentioned,  
Sometimes when the local government is faced with some difficulties during its 
interest expression through the governmental system, the local may choose to 
present its interest through the party system. Work reports (the documents 
written by the local government or department to report specific issues to the 
central government or ministry) or work conferences (temporary conferences 
attended by both the central and local where specific issues are discussed) are 
good opportunities for the local party organization to express its interests to the 
central party organization. The central party organization has great influence 
on the coordination of different ministries, therefore, if the local interest is 
approved by the central party organization, it would be relatively easy for the 
local to achieve its interest (interview no. 34). 
Thus, this channel is more suitable for the local to achieve efficiency in interest 
expression. 
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Meanwhile, it is also very helpful for the central to express and maintain its interests 
through the party system. When talking about what the central could do to effectively 
implement central policies, especially when the local did not perform well, an official 
from the national healthcare ministry pointed out that, 
When the central finds that the local implementation cannot satisfy the central 
government, it is very useful for the central to reach an agreement on the 
implementation with the local through the party system and then pursue the 
local to improve its implementation. The party system can provide an effective 
way for the central to express its attitude and maintain its interests (Interview 
no. 21). 
This kind of interest expression is possible because of the party committee’s presence 
at the central and local levels. However, the formation of such an actual position of 
the party committee has to be cross-examined by a series of laws and the constitution, 
even by normative documents (Zheng, 2011). Therefore, such an effective way of 
interest expression has flaws in its legitimacy, which is harmful to the 
institutionalization of central-local relationships. 
 
7.2.1.2 Procedure for formulating local policies 
The general programme for national policy implementation in China is that the 
central government produces the guiding principles and policy framework while the 
local government adapts the policy and its details according to the actual local 
situation. Thus, the local plays a big role in the accomplishment of national policies. 
In fact, the local is involved in three stages of the whole policy procedure. Firstly, 
when the central has a desire to make a new policy, a draft will be sent to the local to 
gather comments and feedback, through which the local can express its interests. 
Secondly, when the draft of the policy has been confirmed, the central will produce 
specific policy guidance and send it to the local for implementation. The local will 
refine the policy guidance and make it more detailed to be implemented locally. The 
local government could express its interest during this process as well. These two 
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stages are parts of the policymaking process. After the policy has been implemented, 
the local could express its interest through the examination or assessment of policy 
outcomes. This is the last stage in which the local could express its interest during the 
whole process of policymaking and implementation. The power to refine such policy, 
which is taken up by the local, provides local government or departments with 
significant influence on the making of national policies. When talking about this 
topic in interviews, interviewees from healthcare departments were quite familiar 
with this process. As an official who works for the healthcare department in Inner 
Mongolia put it:  
For healthcare policies, the central usually provides policy guidance which 
includes the overall plan and policy goals. For example, the central produces a 
national policy of public hospital reform, which includes the policy goal of 
cancelling the medicine price addition (increases in medicine fees) in public 
hospitals. The local needs to refine the policy and make it detailed so as to 
implement it according to its actual situation. So the local will make quite 
detailed policy on how to cancel the medicine price addition in public hospitals. 
Some local governments have instituted policy in which the government will 
provide subsidies for all the loss the public hospital will experience because of 
the cancellation. Some local governments choose to let the hospital increase its 
service fees to fill part of the loss and subsidies from the government will cover 
the rest. Some local governments may choose another way to achieve the policy 
goal. … such policy refining procedure indeed makes the local powerful in 
policymaking (interview no. 6). 
Many interviewees mentioned that the local has a lot of power to refine the guiding 
policy provided by the central. Therefore, it is obvious that the local could take 
advantage of the policy-refining power to protect and express their interests to the 
central government or ministries through the upward approval and promulgation 
process of specific policies and regulations. Moreover, due to the abstract nature of 
central policy guidance, the local could interpret and refine the central policy 
guidance to fit its own interests and benefit as much as possible during the refining 
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process. The top-down pressure mechanism which exists in the current policymaking 
and implementation process, together with the ineffective formal means of 
expressing local interest, has made the refining power of the local greater and more 
important (Zheng, 2012). On the surface, such an interpretation meets the 
requirement of relevant political mechanisms. In essence, it may conflict with the 
spirit of the rule of law, but in practice plays an effective role in the expression of 
local interest. 
However, relevant laws and existing political mechanisms provide a range of serious 
approval, recording and supervision procedures on local policymaking. Therefore, 
this channel of interest expression may be an effective one. But for interest 
maintenance, the outcome is quite restricted in practice since the initiative is tightly 
held in hands of the central government and the central possesses strong veto power 
(Zheng, 2012).  
 
7.2.1.3 The People’s Congress system 
In March of each year, all the representatives of the NPC gather in Beijing to attend 
the annual conference, review the annual work report of each national authority and 
flag up national affairs for the coming year. According to the “Election Act of the 
National People’s Congress and Local People’s Congress”, the representatives who 
have the right to attend the NPC are elected from provinces, autonomous regions, 
municipalities and People’s Liberation Army units. Most of these national 
representatives comes from provincial units so they represent the interest of their 
province. Meanwhile, representatives in the People’s Congress at a certain level are 
elected by the representatives at the lower level. Thus, each national representative is 
not only present on behalf of the interest of their province or autonomous region, but 
also on behalf of the interest of cities, counties, towns and even smaller communities. 
Therefore, the interest of local government at all levels is gathered in the proposals 
and comments of the representatives of the NPC and expressed at the central during 
the annual conference. Central leaders will attend some group discussions of 
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provincial delegations during the annual conference, which makes this kind of 
interest expression more direct. For example, during the annual NPC conference in 
2015, Chairman Xi attended the group discussion for Jilin Province while Li Keqiang, 
the Premier of the State Council, attended the group discussion concerning 
Heilongjiang Province (China News, 2015). Expressing local interest through the 
annual conference of NPC could make the expression more direct and efficient and 
since this channel offers the possibility of direct expression at the central level, it 
could avoid the inefficiencies caused by multiple levels of bureaucracy.  
From the feedback given by some of interviewees who work in the provincial 
People’s Congress, the People’s Congress Channel plays a major role in expressing 
local interests and sometimes it is the most effective and efficient way for the local to 
represent their interests at the central. A senior official of the People’s Congress in 
Inner Mongolia provided a typical example:  
Since the ecosystem of the grassland in Inner Mongolia had been devastated, the 
central had launched a ten-year protection project in 2002 in order to restore 
the ecosystem of the grassland. Under this project, both central and local 
[provincial] governments would offer subsidies for those who plant and restore 
the grass in Inner Mongolia. The outcome of this project was good and the 
ecosystem has recovered a lot. At the end of this project, local government and 
herdsmen were willing to let this project continue, but the central didn’t make 
any comments on whether to continue or cancel the project. The local 
government had reported such issues and their desire to keep the protection 
project going along with the central government, but there was no positive reply. 
In 2009, when the official from the NPC standing committee came to Inner 
Mongolia, the local government reported the issue of the grassland protection 
project. The report got the attention of the Chairman in the NPC standing 
meeting and he instructed the State Council to review and research the issue. 
Then the provincial People’s Congress was authorized by the NPC standing 
Committee to do further research on relevant issues. The result of the research 
had been reported to the NPC on behalf of the provincial People’s Congress. 
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Then during the annual conference of the NPC in 2010, the delegation from 
Inner Mongolia provided a proposal for improving grassland protection. This 
proposal had been selected as one of the top ten focus proposals of 2010. Then 
the NPC reported to the State Council concerning this proposal and the State 
Council issued a new policy of grassland protection. The local government and 
pastoralists in Inner Mongolia benefitted from this new grassland protection 
policy (interview no. 12). 
This example is quite typical of the way in which local governments express and 
maintain local interests through the People’s Congress. This channel helps the local 
government directly express their interest at the central level and leads to a more 
efficient solution for the local. However, the disadvantage of this interest expression 
channel is also obvious since the conference is held only once a year and the tight 
schedule makes the scale of local expression inadequate. The NPC can only pay 
attention to very few proposals in a single year, so this channel might be an unstable 
way for the local to express and maintain their interest. 
 
Summary 
In this section, we have discussed three channels for the local to express and maintain 
their interest. The internal approval and referral procedure is the most common 
channel for the local government, which can make full use of the existing political 
system. But local government has to face the inefficiency and pressure caused by 
multiple levels of administration. The procedure of formulating local laws and 
policies could be another useful channel of expression for the local. It is commonly 
used in practice to help the local express and maintain interest and benefit through 
specific policies or laws. When using this channel, the local has to face the serious 
approval, recording and supervision procedure set by the central for refining the 
central policy guidance. The People’s Congress channel could help the local express 
interest more directly at the central and sometimes get unexpected attention and 
results. However, this channel is full of uncertainty because of the working principle 
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of the People’s Congress. Due to the current status of China’s NPC in practice 
(nominally the government is responsible to the People’s Congress), the People’s 
Congress in actuality has limited influence on the government in daily political life in 
China and thus the effectiveness of this channel of expression is quite limited. 
 
 
 
7.2.2 Interaction during the policy process 
As mentioned above, it is quite common for the local to represent its interests to the 
central government through the policy process. This section will mainly discuss how 
the central and local interact with each other in the policymaking and policy 
implementation stage based on the information given by interviewees. 
 
Interaction in policymaking process 
In China, most policies are made under the guidance of the central government or 
ministries except for those that come from policy innovation at the local level. The 
policy outcome is usually a consequence of cooperation between the central and local. 
When talking about the policymaking process, an interviewee who works in the 
development and reform department at the provincial level said the following: 
Most of the policymaking experience is a “top-down” process. The central will 
initially have a policy idea or plan. Then the central will announce a policy draft 
internally and collect comments and feedbacks from ministries and the local. 
After several drafts improving the proposal and collecting feedback, the policy 
will be formally published and sent to the local to be implemented (interview no. 
11). 
When talking about their experience of policymaking, most interviewees described a 
similar process to the example just mentioned above. The local sufficiently 
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participates in the process of policymaking and has the chance to express its ideas and 
interests. Some interviewees reckon that the local government has a significant space 
for interest expression when offering comments and feedback to the central policy 
draft. Since the healthcare policy is more regional than some other policies, as an 
interviewee who works for a provincial healthcare department pointed out, the local 
gets even more space to represent its own ideas and interests. When interviewing an 
official who works for the national healthcare ministry, he confirmed the local has 
many chances to express their interests from the perspective of the central ministry. 
An official who works in the healthcare department in Inner Mongolia pointed out the 
following in his interview: 
When the central is willing to make a new healthcare policy, the central will 
essentially collect comments and feedback from local governments, especially 
the provincial government. This has provided significant space for the local to 
express their interest to the ministry. Let’s take the social medical policy as an 
example. When the ministry has a draft of this policy, they send it to all the 
provincial governments and healthcare departments and ask us to give 
comments and feedback. Since Inner Mongolia is sparsely populated, the 
population within hospital service radius is much less than it in other provinces. 
So we told the ministry that we’d like to reduce the entry standard and 
investment restrictions for social capital because of our special case. The 
central then approved our request. When the central was willing to equip 
ambulances for the Centre for Disease Control (CDC) in the local area, we told 
the central ministry that it is difficult to meet actual demand if we use the 
population to vehicle ratio that is used other provinces since our province is 
sparsely populated. Eventually the central made several modifications when 
implementing this policy in our province (interview no. 6). 
The examples mentioned above are quite typical for central-local interaction in the 
policymaking process. When the central is willing to make a new policy, there will be 
several rounds of feedback collection and discussion between the central and local, 
which provides plenty of chances for the local to represent interest. From the 
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examples mentioned above, we can observe that the central is likely to modify the 
policy draft in light of the requirements of the local when making healthcare policies. 
 
Interaction in the policy implementation process 
After rounds of discussion between the central and local, the formal policy will be 
ready for implementation. The local plays a major role in implementing policies since 
the local does a lot of work to refine central policy and make it detailed enough to be 
implemented in a particular local area, as has been discussed in a previous part of this 
chapter. This refining process is another chance for the local to express its interest 
because the result of local refining needs to be approved by the central. When 
interviewing an official in the national healthcare ministry, he told of an example that 
he had been involved in: 
When we were implementing the centralized medicine procurement bidding 
policy, we [the national healthcare ministry] asked each province to report their 
detailed policy plan on centralized medicine procurement bidding. The local 
expressed their interest through their refined policy. The ministry’s job is 
checking whether the local detailed policy conforms with the central. Only if the 
local policy goes against the central principle will the local policy will be 
rejected by the central and require modification. Therefore, the local has plenty 
of space to express their interests and a high probability of maintaining these 
interests as well (interview no. 21). 
This example demonstrates that the local has broad power in refining central policy 
since the local only needs to be careful that they do not go against the central 
principle and go beyond the line set by the central, such as in issues which are 
politically sensitive. 
Another interaction stage during the process of policy implementation appears when 
the local finds something wrong after the implementation of a specific policy. After a 
period of time, the local may find the outcome is different from their expectation or it 
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is hard to continue implementation of the policy, at which time the local needs to 
communicate with the central to report the issue and ask for central help or central 
approval in modifying policies. An official who works for a provincial healthcare 
department in Inner Mongolia had this to say in his interview: 
After two years of implementing the Physician Law and physician training and 
working policy, we found that we could hardly attract and retain high-quality 
physicians. This is because our province is a less-developed province and the 
wages and benefits we can offer are not competitive in attracting high-quality 
physicians. So we reported this issue via a work report to the healthcare 
ministry. We asked for a lower entry standard for those who want to be 
physicians in our province. The central then conducted fieldwork in our 
province to investigate whether it is necessary to reduce the entry standard for 
those who want to be a physician. The investigation was quite smooth and we 
expressed our concern and will to the central officials during the investigation 
as well. Eventually we got central approval on modifying admissions for 
physicians in our province (interview no. 6). 
The central-local interaction in this stage is much more difficult when compared with 
interaction in the policy refining stage. When the local reports a problem in 
implementing policy, the central would be very careful and always be alert as to 
whether this is an excuse of local government for not implementing central policies. 
Normally the central will conduct an investigation to carefully check the situation in 
local area and then make a final decision. As a senior official in county government 
pointed out the following:  
Generally speaking, implementation has priority in the local area. Although 
there might be problems during the implementation, the local is always told to 
first of all ensure the implementation. For example, when we were implementing 
the remote settlement policy on healthcare insurance for urban residents, we 
found our fiscal capacity was unable to support the implementation. When we 
reported this to the central during their regular investigation on policy 
implementation, they told us to ensure the implementation first since the central 
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ministries had measured local fiscal capacity before the implementation and it 
would be rare for the local to be unable to afford the cost of implementation. 
Therefore, we had to prioritize implementation (interview no. 34). 
This example has shown the difficulties that the local faces when interacting with the 
central in the policy implementation stage. The central will hardly be convinced by 
the local to make changes in policies which are under implementation. Although 
there are some successful examples of appeals, it is unlikely that the central 
government will relent and the local has to endure a long period of careful 
investigation by the central according to the comments given by interviewees. 
In the above paragraphs, some interesting findings relating to how the central and 
local interact with each other has been demonstrated. The local is highly involved in 
both the policymaking and implementation processes. The local has a great deal of 
space to express its own ideas and interests on specific policy during policy processes. 
However, the difficulty for the local in maintaining its interests is quite different in 
different processes. It is easier for the local to achieve its interest in the policymaking 
and policy refining stages, but it is very difficult for the local to maintain its interest in 
policy implementation because changes at this stage have to face rounds of rigorous 
investigation by the central. A notable issue among these central-local interactions is 
that the central always holds the initiative, because the central is always the one to 
make the final decision. 
 
 
Summary 
When I was analysing the interview data, a very interesting point came to light. I 
found that the central always takes the initiative and final decision-making power in 
the interaction between the central and local. From the perspective of protecting local 
interests, this might not be a wise choice. However, looking back to the development 
of local economy and politics, we may find some explanations for the gradual 
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formation of the current central-local interaction mechanism. After 30 years of 
economic reforms, China has experienced profound, intense, and lasting 
differentiation in social interest structure, which has led to a boom in the formation of 
different interest groups. When the central government decentralized power to local 
governments in the 1980s, these governments grew as entities which have strong 
political, economic and social reform interests. The local has developed more and 
more as an independent unit which has more independent interests. When the local 
government and interest groups, such as local banks and local enterprises, find that 
they have shared interests, an alliance becomes inevitable. With economic and social 
reforms, these alliances of interest groups became more and more powerful and have 
great influence on local public investment, fiscal resource allocation, local 
policymaking and even local official appointment (Ouyang and Wu, 2008). 
Motivated by increasing local autonomy, local governments are keen on 
“institutional innovation experiments”, which aim at promoting the local economy. 
On the one hand, this kind of innovation promotes sustained and rapid economic 
development in China. But on the other hand, it induces local government to distort 
central policies. Local fiscal and policy resources tend to be configured according to 
the interests of local alliances rather than by market mechanisms (ibid.). The local 
government also tends to interpret and implement central policy according to their 
own interests, and thus central macro-control policy cannot achieve its intended 
purpose. Meanwhile, a local government who mainly focuses on pursuing economic 
interests is unable to always provide public goods as they should. This might be a 
reasonable explanation of why the central government carefully maintains the 
initiative in interactions and final decision making. When facing the distinct 
possibility of misinterpretation or improper implementation of central policy by the 
local government, maintaining the initiative seems to be a frustrating but necessary 
course of action for the central government. 
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Section 7.3: Fiscal relations between the central and local 
governments 
Fiscal capacity and approaches of local government have long been regarded as key 
institutional factors influencing the outcomes of social policy. How government 
income and fiscal resources are distributed really matters in the attitude of the local 
government towards specific social policies. According to Pierson, the local 
government whose income mostly relies on revenue redistribution usually has more 
passion and motivation for expansive social policy innovation. Other local 
governments who gain their income through local taxation tend to hold more 
conservative attitudes on social policy or even block welfare reform to protect the 
interests of local businesses, which is the main source of their fiscal income (Pierson, 
1995). In addition, Pierson has argued that the local governments which rely on local 
taxation also tend to advocate for more decentralized systems during the 
implementation of social policies in order to help them gain more power to protect 
their fiscal capacity (Pierson, 1995). During the interviews, many interviewees 
pointed out that the fiscal capacity of both the central and local, together with the 
fiscal relationship between the central and local, could determine the interaction 
model between the central and the local. Therefore, this section will mainly discuss 
some of the interesting findings on the fiscal relationship between the central and 
local and try to find out whether fiscal relations affect social policy in China in the 
same way as Pierson mentions. 
 
7.3.1 The context of the central-local fiscal relationship  
When talking about the fiscal relationship between the central and local, taxation 
reform may be the most crucial context. Since entering the era of “open and reform” 
in 1978, China has gradually disposed of the planned economy and experienced a 
significant decentralization in terms of both economy and politics. During this period, 
the local government in China received a lot of fiscal management power which they 
did not have in the pre-reform period. The local government started to have 
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independent budget-making powers and was granted some fiscal autonomy, such as 
independent powers of budget and expenditure (Oksenberg and Tong, 1991). From 
1978 to 1993, there was a “fiscal responsibility system” between the central and local 
where the central provided specific targets for the revenue and fiscal expenditure of 
every single province. Once the local had reached the target set by the central, the 
remainder of the revenue became part of the local government’s own fiscal resource. 
Under this system, the fiscal flow was actually from the local to the central 
government, which could be described as the transfer of payment from the local to the 
central (Lou, 2012). The fiscal decentralization trend reached its peak in the late 
1980s and was then replaced by the tax-sharing system in 1994 (Cai and Treisman, 
2006). The central government initially launched this taxation reform in order to 
adjust the fiscal relationship formed in the 1980s and recapture the power of 
economic management in important areas (Zhang, 2006). After this reform, the 
central government succeeded in regaining most of the power over fiscal revenue, 
which was decentralized from the central to the local in the 1980s. The taxation 
reform in 1994 changed the fiscal relationship between the central and the local and 
eventually also changed the direction of transfer payment into central to local (Lou, 
2012). The portion of central fiscal revenue within the national fiscal revenue 
significantly increased from 22% to 55.7% in the first year of the taxation reform, 
which produced a great influence on the fiscal relationship between the central and 
local governments and even on the political environment (Zhang, 2006). 
Twenty years after the taxation reform, the tax-sharing system still has a great deal of 
influence over central-local fiscal relationships and even policy outcomes. It affects 
the specific fiscal relationship between the central and the government of every single 
province. For example, Inner Mongolia may receive plenty of central transfer 
payments, which can be up to 30% of its fiscal revenue, while Guangdong rarely 
receives the transfer payment from the central government (interview no. 34). The 
transfer payment initiative actually plays a crucial role in central-local fiscal relations. 
As an interviewee who works for the Institute of Fiscal Science of China (an institute 
under the Ministry of Finance) pointed out: 
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Fundamentally, the fiscal system of a country is determined by its political 
system and political objectives. As a component of the fiscal system, transfer 
payments in many cases should firstly meet the requirements in the political 
aspect, followed by the consideration of economic efficiency. From the 
perspective of fiscal power, the transfer payment system allows higher-level 
government to have a larger share of the fiscal resource and makes lower-level 
government more dependent on it [under the tax-sharing system]. The larger 
the transfer payment is, the greater the influence the government can achieve on 
lower-level governments. Therefore, the central can regulate and supervise the 
behaviour of the local government to a certain extent through transfer payment. 
In other words, transfer payment is not only about technical issues but also an 
effective tool for the central to achieve its political goals (interview no. 14). 
This example has provided insight about transfer payment from the top towards the 
bottom. The transfer payment system can regulate the fiscal relationship between the 
central and local to strong political effect. Such political aims could be observed 
during the process of taxation reform before and after 1994. The decentralized fiscal 
system before 1994 was designed to let the local assume more expenditure 
responsibility and have enough motivation to increase local revenue and pursue 
economic development. As mentioned above, the initiative of transfer payment was 
not utilised by the central government in this period (Lou, 2012). However, since the 
central could not truly grasp the information on local economic operation, the local 
had incentive to hide tax sources and reduce tax collection (because more taxes meant 
that the central would share more of its revenue). Thus, the central fiscal revenue in 
proportion to national income experienced a rise from 24.5% to 40.5% from 1980 to 
1984, but dropped to 22% in 1993, which was even lower than the situation at the 
beginning of the reform in 1979 (Chen and Gao, 2012). This in fact shows that the 
transfer payment flow was going from the local to the central, and the central lost its 
influence on the local when it gave up the initiative of transfer payments. 
This section has discussed the context of the fiscal relationship between the central 
and local governments in China. From the change of the fiscal system and 
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central-local fiscal relationships, transfer payment may be observed as a key factor 
which exerts great influence on the fiscal relation between the central and local. From 
the perspective of the central government, that it holds the initiative of transfer 
payment is very important in terms of both the economy and politics. Such an 
initiative indicates how much influence the central can have on the local government 
as well. Therefore, it is reasonable that the central has held onto the initiative of 
transfer payment and has not given it up since 1994. Thus, the transfer payment 
system may be the key to analysing the central-local fiscal relationship and will also 
be emphasized when analysing fiscal relationships and policy outcomes in the 
following parts of this chapter. 
 
7.3.2 Fiscal relationship and policy innovation 
As Pierson claims, local governments who rely on redistributive revenue have more 
passion for expansive social policy. As mentioned above, Inner Mongolia is a 
province which relies much on redistribution revenue from the central government, 
while Beijing and Guangdong are quite independent from central transfer payments. 
When interviewing officials in these provinces, I asked some questions about their 
experience and attitude towards local policy innovation in order to find some 
differences and possible motivations. 
 
7.3.2.1 Space for policy innovation 
Most of the interviewees who work in the healthcare sector agreed that the local has 
enough space for healthcare policy innovation when asked about their work 
experiences. As an interviewee working in the healthcare department of Guangdong 
province explained, 
Guangdong in fact has plenty of space for healthcare policy innovation. Firstly, 
Guangdong has long been the pilot province of reform in China. So Guangdong 
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has plenty of default space for policy innovation or experiment. The central 
government has a high level of tolerance on Guangdong’s policy innovation. It 
seems that Guangdong has the space to do almost everything except what goes 
against the baseline of the central government. Secondly, healthcare policy is 
much more regional, which means that the outcomes of healthcare policy are 
highly related to the specific conditions and situations of a specific place. 
Therefore, the central tends to give more space to the local for healthcare policy 
innovation in order to maintain the relevance of the policies (interview no. 27). 
It is not surprising that Guangdong has so much space for policy innovation. It has a 
very special status which may be regarded as the laboratory of policy innovation 
since the 1980s. However, for Inner Mongolia, which has no tradition of policy 
innovation and relies much on central transfer payment, the feedback on this topic is 
quite interesting. Interviewees from the healthcare sector in Inner Mongolia also 
provided positive feedback when asked about the space for local policy innovation on 
health care. A senior officer who works in the Human Resource and Social Security 
Department in Inner Mongolia mentioned that: 
The central government actually really encourages us [local government and 
departments] to engage in policy innovations … That central document 
mentions that “the central encourages each province to actively study and 
explore the new model and payment approach on this policy”. The central 
ministry also encourages us to report our new practical experiences of this 
policy in a national working conference. It is obvious that the central provides a 
certain space for the local to engage in policy innovation (interview no. 9). 
It seems that Inner Mongolia, which receives significant central transfer payments, 
similarly has plenty of space for policy innovation. The interview transcripts reveal 
that the central government plays a key role in that. The central “gives space to” and 
“encourages” the local to engage in policy innovation. For Inner Mongolia, the 
central government gives policy space but retains the power. For Guangdong, it 
seems that they have more space to pursue their own policies, even when the central 
government somewhat disagrees, because they are more fiscally independent. Thus 
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the central government seems to be the most relevant factor of the space for local 
policy innovation in these two provinces.  
Later on, I interviewed some officials and experts on the top level in order to explore 
why the central provides so much space for the local. When interviewing this 
interviewee, who is a senior specialist of the expert group on the healthcare reform in 
China, she explained why the central provides so much space for local policy 
innovation on health care: 
The central is no doubt giving the local a large space for policy innovation or 
experimenting on healthcare policies, because the healthcare reform has 
entered a critical stage where most of the problems have no ready-made 
solutions. Many issues need new exploration. To be honest, the central is not 
particularly sure which direction the healthcare reform should go. Therefore 
the central government and ministries encourage local governments to actively 
engage in research and innovation, which may help the central to sum up the 
practical experiences and explore the direction of healthcare reform (interview 
no. 23). 
These three examples all indicate that the local has much space for innovation on 
healthcare policies no matter if it is a province that relies much on redistributive 
revenue, such as Inner Mongolia, or a province like Guangdong, who rarely receives 
transfer payments from the central. These examples provide practical experiences of 
those from the top level and bottom (lower) level. Guangdong does have more space 
for policy innovation than Inner Mongolia, however, the fiscal autonomy is not the 
only cause. Here we can notice that the fiscal independence of Guangdong is only 
part of the reason for its large space for policy innovation, beyond the central 
government wanting to see local innovation. Ultimately, Guangdong has more 
autonomy on policy. Therefore, the specific fiscal relation between the central and 
the local has quite limited influence on the space for local policy innovation 
according to the interview data. 
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7.3.2.2 Attitudes towards policy innovation 
Although the local has much space for healthcare policy innovation regardless of the 
extent to which it relies on redistributive revenue or transfer payments from the 
central government, when asked about their attitude towards policy innovation, 
interviewees gave quite different feedback from the previous question “Does the 
local have much space on policy innovation?”. In Inner Mongolia, an official who 
works in a county government told me that: 
Generally speaking, when the central is wanting to implement a healthcare policy, it 
will publish its policy plan to each province. The policy plan usually has two parts. 
One is the compulsory part, which means the policy goals in this part are 
compulsory for the local to achieve. The other is the selective part, which means it’s 
up to the local whether it wants to implement this part or not. The selective part 
probably has very brief policy goals and encourages the local to engage in policy 
innovation in certain policy fields. Since our province has relatively poor fiscal 
capacity and relies much on central transfer payment, we do not have enough 
resources to fulfil the selective part. The central does provide fiscal support for 
some local policy innovation, but the opportunities are quite limited: most of the 
policy innovation in local areas needs fiscal support from the local government 
itself. Therefore, we have always fulfilled the compulsory part and have had low 
desire for policy innovation due to our limited fiscal capacity (interview no. 34). 
According to this interviewee, although the central government has provided many 
transfer payments to Inner Mongolia, it was still not enough for the local government 
to engage in policy innovation in the healthcare sector. Central subsidies are quite 
limited and it is very hard for Inner Mongolia to obtain sufficient funding. If the local 
government wants to engage in policy innovation, it has to fund the innovation itself. 
Thus, its low local fiscal capacity has made Inner Mongolia more unwilling to 
explore policy innovation. 
If Inner Mongolia is inactive on policy innovation due to poor fiscal capacity, will 
provinces that have strong fiscal capacity be more passionate about policy innovation? 
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I put this question to some officials in Beijing and Guangdong, and their feedback 
was quite impressive. Regarding this topic, an official who works in the healthcare 
sector of Beijing told me: 
We usually conduct our pilot innovation with internal resources since we 
seldom receive much support, especially fiscal support, from the central … But 
the process is not smooth. We need to cooperate with so many different 
departments if we want to engage in some policy innovation. We have been 
trying to innovate our policy on separating medical services from pharmacies 
system [Yi Yao Fen Kai] for more than two years, but we still cannot achieve the 
outcome we want. We have tried to push the innovation through the Group for 
Healthcare Reform [the most important organ which is responsible for the 
overall issues on healthcare reform at the centre and the local; here it refers to 
the municipal group of healthcare reform] but the effect is quite limited. The 
requirement for successful policy innovation is support from the [local] major 
leaders. It is only through them can we achieve the overall cooperation of 
different departments. However, healthcare issues are not regarded as a 
priority in the eyes of our major leaders. They devote more attention to political 
stability and the economy. Therefore, there is a big obstacle in our way of 
healthcare policy innovation (interview no. 19). 
An official who works in a municipal finance department in Guangdong provided 
quite a similar experience on healthcare policy innovation: 
When funding a policy, the governments on the municipal and county level 
provide about 60% [of the funds], the provincial government provides about 
thirty per cent and the central government may provide at most ten per cent. 
Local government has to offer the most fiscal support for healthcare policies … 
[and] healthcare policy innovation is more difficult than for other policies 
because too many departments are involved in healthcare issues. The 
department of health care is not strong enough to push the policy innovation 
through. Even the commissioner from the Ministry of Health Care is ineffective 
on these issues. We can only push through the policy innovation smoothly and 
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achieve overall cooperation if the move has been endorsed by the major leaders. 
When Wang Yang [a former major leader of Guangdong who was promoted into 
the central government] was in Guangdong, he held a conference with 
provincial leaders and some leaders from the Ministry of Finance to convince 
the ministry to provide more fiscal resources for the reform of public hospitals. 
After that, the reform of public hospitals went about much more smoothly and 
received 600 million yuan in fiscal support from the central government in 2009. 
However, when a new leader who does not care about healthcare issues too 
much is in power, reform and policy innovation face trouble again (interview no. 
32). 
These examples show that in provinces which rarely receive redistributive revenue 
from the central government, such as Beijing and Guangdong, the local government 
does not have much passion for healthcare policy innovation. This confirms Pierson’s 
point that local government whose income is mostly gained from local taxation tends 
to hold more conservative attitudes on social policy (Pierson, 1995). Even if the 
healthcare department tries to push for policy innovation, the local government as a 
whole still holds a relatively conservative attitude towards healthcare policy 
innovation. The innovation has to overcome plenty of difficulties and it is hard to 
reach the finish line if it cannot attract sufficient attention from the major leaders in 
the local government. 
While conducting interviews in Shenzhen, Guangdong, I discovered an impressive 
example of local leaders supporting innovation. Shenzhen is very famous for its 
policy innovation as well as its economic performance. Many advanced models were 
produced by Shenzhen during the healthcare reform. When asked about the fiscal 
source of healthcare policy innovation, an official who works for the healthcare 
department in Shenzhen said that “we actually rarely have fiscal interaction with the 
central. All the policy innovation is supported by our own fiscal resources. We do not 
even need fiscal support from our province” (interview no. 29). When asked why 
Shenzhen has such strong motivations on healthcare policy innovation, the 
interviewee pointed out: 
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The motivation for policy innovation comes from ourselves [the local 
government]; we do not receive pressure from the higher levels. The most 
important factors which lead to the success of policy innovation are support 
from the upper levels and abundant attention [on the issue] from our local 
government. Support means the central government giving us the freedom to 
engage in policy innovation, so we rarely face obstruction from the [central and 
local] institutions. Abundant attention means that the major leaders of our 
municipal government place a lot of attention on healthcare reform and policy 
innovation. They help different departments cooperate with each other to ensure 
the policy innovation has enough policy and fiscal resources (interview no. 29). 
We may thus observe that the local government, especially the opinions of major 
leaders within it, really plays a crucial role in policy innovation. Although the 
situation and conditions in Guangzhou and Beijing are no doubt more complicated 
than those in Shenzhen, for example, the hospital system is very complicated in 
Beijing and Shenzhen such that military hospitals and university hospitals involved 
in the system and the department of health care are unable to direct it, we can still tell 
the difference between the local governments of Beijing, Guangzhou and Shenzhen 
towards policy innovation. Hence, although Pierson’s argument that more fiscally 
autonomous provinces will have less motivation to expand social policy is confirmed, 
their increased policy space means that they can innovate if local leaders are prepared 
to push for this. 
The paragraphs above have discussed the fiscal relationship between the central and 
local, along with local policy innovation. We may observe that the central 
government provides certain freedom for the local to engage in policy innovation, but 
the attitude of local government towards policy innovation is quite passive. Provinces 
which rely greatly on redistributive revenue such as Inner Mongolia have little 
passion for policy innovation because the local government cannot afford the cost of 
policy innovation. If they receive more resources for innovation, according to Pierson, 
they will do it. But they do not, because central fiscal support for innovation is limited. 
Provinces which are quite independent from central redistributive revenue such as 
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Beijing and Guangdong are passive about policy innovation (with Shenzhen being 
the exception) because their leaders pay less attention to healthcare issues than to 
economic issues. It thus seems that Pierson’s statement on local governments who 
gain their income through local taxation applies similarly to China, where those local 
governments hold relatively conservative attitudes towards healthcare policy 
innovation. 
Political stability and economic growth are much higher priorities for the provincial 
government than health care. It is interesting that Inner Mongolia, which relies on 
central transfer payments, is not passionate about healthcare policy innovation. 
According to Pierson, this kind of local government should be active in policy 
innovation because the central can offer some help and the local government does not 
have to worry too much about affecting local businesses since a big part of its revenue 
comes from the central transfer payment (Pierson, 1995). We can observe that the 
main reason is that Inner Mongolia does not have enough fiscal capacity to support 
policy innovation.  
 
7.3.3 Transfer payment as the main tool of central government 
In interviews about the fiscal relationship between the central and local governments, 
the term “specific transfer payment” (Zhuan Xiang Zhuan Yi Zhi Fu ) appears quite 
frequently. In general, transfer payment includes general transfer payment, which the 
central has not limited its use and the local has autonomy over this money, and 
specific transfer payment, where the local has to use in certain areas following the 
guidance of the central government. When asked about fiscal interaction with the 
central, many interviewees mentioned that special transfer payment is the commonest 
way through which the central could get involved in local affairs. An interviewee 
who works in the department of finance in Inner Mongolia told me that: 
the central government provides much fiscal support to Inner Mongolia on social 
security, health care and environmental protection, which can be up to forty per 
cent of the whole expenditure on these issues. Most of such fiscal support comes 
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as specific transfer payment. For example, the central fund for healthcare 
insurance and building cost of public hospitals all came to us as special transfer 
payment. The central has strict limits on the use of these transfer payments and 
there is a full set of regulations and a supervising system to secure the use of the 
payment. Meanwhile, many of these specific transfer payments come with 
specific policy projects. These policy projects are all advocated by the central 
government and usually include detailed policy goals and policy progress. Only 
by fulfilling what is required of the policy project can the local government 
obtain the relative specific transfer payment. …The basic progress is: firstly, the 
central publishes a policy project to the provincial government to inform the 
government. The publication will clearly describe how much the central 
government will subsidize for this project. Most of the project is open to the 
government on the county level or even lower. Secondly, the provincial 
government informs the government at the lower level about the project and 
those who are willing to attend the project can add their names to the application 
list together with relevant materials such as their detailed policy implementation 
plans. The provincial government reports the application list to the central 
government. Then the central decides on the participants of this policy project 
after several rounds of investigation and discussions. Finally, the central 
distributes the relevant resources to each participant through a dedicated system 
and starts the internal supervision system to ensure that the central transfer 
payment is used in the right ways (interview no. 33). 
From this interviewee’s description, it seems that the central transfer payments come 
to Inner Mongolia mostly by way of specific transfer payments together with specific 
policy projects. But what is the attitude of the local government towards such transfer 
payments? An official of a county government in Inner Mongolia told me that “the 
policy projects really motivate our initiatives. Each district [county] is willing to be 
included in the projects. We always make the effort to be involved in the projects; it is 
a chance for development for us.” When asked what benefits the county government 
can receive, he replied: “If we are included in the project, we can receive a certain 
amount of transfer payment from the central. That’s really attractive to all 
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governments. For example, for the policy project of research on and prevention for 
brucellosis [a kind of disease], our province received about 2 billion yuan from the 
central. That’s quite a lot of money” (interview no. 34). It seems that such transfer 
payments, from the perspective of the central’s policy implementation strategy, are 
quite popular in Inner Mongolia and are pursued by county governments. In fact, 
even in Guangdong, this kind of transfer payment still works well. A senior official 
who works in a county government in Guangzhou told me that:  
when the county government wants to develop a certain sector, for example, 
health care, it will always seek the relevant policy project published by the 
central government and try hard to be included in the policy project. It is because 
we can get specific fiscal support [related special transfer payment] if we are 
involved in the project. We can integrate our specific development goals with 
policy goals of the policy project and achieve both the development and fiscal 
benefit (interview no. 31). 
From examples mentioned above, it is obvious that the combination of specific 
transfer payments with specific policy projects is quite popular in the area of local 
government. The local governments, particularly those on lower levels, are quite 
passionate to take on the project in order to obtain the fiscal benefit (specific transfer 
payment from the central) attached to the policy project. Thus, the central can 
effectively motivate the local to implement specific policies through this way. 
However, it is also obvious that the local government, especially provincial 
government, loses some autonomy on the usage of transfer payments. This is because 
the use of specific transfer payments is quite restricted; they can only be used in the 
fields that the central wants. Most of these specific transfer payments goes directly to 
the county government, which means the provincial government loses out on a big 
part of such a fiscal resource. The more specific transfer payments there are within all 
transfer payments, the less autonomy the local government has in using transfer 
payments. This may be a reasonable explanation for why Inner Mongolia does not 
have enough fiscal capacity to conduct policy innovation. Since a big part of the 
transfer payments that Inner Mongolia have received from the central government are 
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specific transfer payments and these go directly to the county government, if the goal 
of a policy innovation is the same as a specific policy project, the county government 
of Inner Mongolia might have enough fiscal resources to carry out the innovation. 
 
Summary 
This section has discussed central-local fiscal relations and policy innovation. After 
the establishment of a tax-sharing system in 1994, the central held tightly onto the 
power to distribute fiscal resources to the local. Since then, the central has held the 
absolute initiative of transfer payment distribution and come into a strong position in 
the fiscal relationship between the central and local. Such an institutional setting 
causes the central to occupy a larger share of the financial resources and makes the 
local more dependent on the central. The more transfer payments are distributed to 
the local, the more influence the central can achieve over the local. Due to the unclear 
distribution of administrative power between the central and local (see section 1), 
local governments always take too much responsibility for social expenditure, which 
is specified by the central. Together with the strong fiscal control of the central 
government, this ultimately forms a phenomenon of “central treats, local pays” (Qiao 
and Liu, 2014). Meanwhile, since the local government lacks independent fiscal 
space, the local can hardly respond to the variety of its residents’ public service needs. 
The situation is exacerbated by the extensive use of special transfer payments by the 
central authority. The local government possibly loses the freedom to arrange the 
priorities of its expenditure based on the exact needs of its residents. These problems 
can be observed in the case of Inner Mongolia. The local government of Inner 
Mongolia is more dependent on central transfer payments, hence its expenditure 
preference is highly guided by the central government. When the local government 
wishes to spend according to its own will or the exact needs of its residents, such as 
policy innovation in certain areas, the limited fiscal expenditure freedom is the 
biggest problem that has to be overcome.  
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Furthermore, the most impressive thing I discovered during the interviews is that 
specific policy projects combined with relevant special transfer payments play quite a 
crucial role between the central and local governments. These policy projects appear 
everywhere from Inner Mongolia to Guangdong, and have become quite popular 
among local governments, especially governments on the county level. This kind of 
policy-implementing strategy has provided a way for the central to give detailed 
policy guidance directly to the government at the lower levels, and from the fervour 
of the local governments, it seems that the central has found an effective way to 
implement central policies or even obtain control of the local governments. As an 
interviewee mentioned, “when the county government wants to develop a certain 
sector, for example, health care, it will always seek the relevant policy project 
published by the central government and try hard to be included in the policy project” 
(interview no. 31). Nevertheless, provinces which have more fiscal capacity, such as 
Guangdong, do have more policy freedom. On this point, Pierson is right that they 
tend to be more conservative when it comes to the expansion of social policy, unless 
this is funded by the central government through specific policy projects. However, 
how effective such policy projects are and how far the local will act in concert with 
the central should be questioned. Will these policy projects become an effective tool 
for the central to obtain influence on the local or become a cause for tension between 
the central and local? 
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Chapter 8: Discussion  
 
The central-local relationship, as an important form of political-economic institution, 
produces a variety of influence on social policy in different countries. Pierson pointed 
out that there are three institutional characteristics, namely constituent units’ power, 
the interaction model between the central government and state governments, and 
fiscal relations between all constituent units, all which have great impact on social 
power process (Pierson, 1995). From the perspectives of historical institutionalism, 
Zheng had examined how these institutional characteristics of the central-local 
relationship are embedded in political unit regimes and economic-political 
organizations over recent decades, and then developed “de facto federalism” to 
explain the central-local relationship in China. In de facto federalism, reciprocity has 
replaced coercion and bargaining as the most common mechanism within 
interactions between the central and local governments. The central government has 
to seek cooperation with the local, since local governments have become less 
dependent on the central and obtained institutional settings and legitimacy to 
intervene in economic activities in their jurisdiction from intergovernmental 
decentralization (Zheng, 2007). Although the decentralized power has not been 
institutionalized, the central has little possibility to retake those powers because the 
local has become the main force for economic growth. Thus, according to Zheng, de 
facto federalism, which had been conducted in a historical intuitionalist way, may be 
a reasonable descriptor which captures the current features of how the central and the 
local act with each other in political and economic arenas.       
Under the fieldwork of three distinctive dynamics mentioned in Pierson’s research 
the researcher interviewed 35 officials in relevant departments in China to explore 
how the central-local relationship affects social policy in China. After reviewing the 
data from perspectives of power distribution, central-local interaction and fiscal 
relations, a comprehensive understanding of the central-local relationship in practice 
has been obtained. Features that support de facto federalism have been found through 
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interview data, however; I discovered that the central-local relationship in China has 
been in the process of transformation, and there are new features, which are different 
from de facto federalism. Based on this understanding from the interview data, this 
chapter will primarily try to answer the main research questions: what best captures 
the nature of the central-local relationship in China, and what is the impact on 
healthcare policy? There will be two sections; the first will mainly discuss whether de 
facto federalism captures the nature of the central-local relationship in China. The 
second section will discuss what best captures the nature of the central-local 
relationship from a historical perspective. A discussion of how the “dynamism” 
nature of the central-local relationship influences healthcare policy will also be 
included in this section. 
 
Section 8.1: Does de facto federalism capture the nature of the 
central-local relationship? 
De facto federalism has been used to describe the central-local relationship in China 
by Zheng (2005), in which reciprocity acts as the main mechanism in the interaction 
between the central and local. From the interview data, we could observe that local 
governments in China do have more power than they used to have, especially in the 
policy refining process, which makes the local more powerful than the central in 
policy implementation. However, the rise of the project mechanism has brought new 
changes to the central-local relationship and a new channel for central-local 
interaction. This section will discuss whether de facto federalism captures the nature 
of the central-local relationship in light of the new changes in China.    
 
8.1.1 Dilemmas of central-local relations  
As Pierson mentions, how local interest is expressed at the centre is quite influential 
to the extent to which the local may affect the central government (Pierson, 1995). 
How the central government expresses its interest to the local is important, since the 
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stronger and more direct this expression is, the more likely it is that the interests 
(whether central or local) will be respected (ibid.). From the data collected from 
interviews, it is obvious that either the governmental system or the industrial system 
is used to express central and local interests to each other most of the time. 
Meanwhile, such a policymaking process and implementation process have made the 
local quite powerful, because the local has freedom to refine central policies. As 
mentioned by an interviewee, “the local expressed their interest through their refined 
policy. The ministry’s job is checking whether the local detailed policy conforms to 
the central. Only if the local policy goes against the central principle will the local 
policy will be rejected by the central and require modification” (interview No. 21, see 
Section 2 in Chapter 7). According to the formal political structure, China is a 
centralized unitary country where all the power belongs to the central government in 
principle and local government is only the executive body of the central authority; the 
local government should thus fully implement laws, regulations and policies made by 
the central. However, the decentralization which started in the 1980s introduced 
market and societal factors into the political and economic system and achieved a 
re-division of power between the government, enterprises and social organizations. 
Plenty of central power was decentralized downwards to the market and government 
at lower levels. Such decentralization granted the local significant autonomy on 
economic affairs and strongly stimulated the local economy. As such, the economic 
situation completely changed in just 20 years. The local governments played a more 
crucial role in the development of a national economy and local governments 
gradually found their own interests which are different from that of the central 
government. Meanwhile, the decentralization was also a process of shedding central 
power at the local level. After the contraction of central authority, the local has 
actually been growing as a quasi-autonomous body (Zheng and Wang, 2001). It is 
harder and harder for the central to collect in-depth information from local 
government and have its policy implemented in line with its original intention. 
Maybe the political tasks assigned by the central could be resolutely implemented, 
but for the majority of economic and social tasks, the local has significant space to 
refine and implement these policies with a view towards their own interests. Such 
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phenomena lead to duplicity in the central-local relationship; there is the formal 
centralized system and the local should rarely have autonomy. In fact, the assigned 
central authority and tasks are often accommodated by practical local 
implementations, and the local seems to be autonomous and flexible (Zhu, 2009).  
The situation in the healthcare sector is a typical reflection of this phenomenon. The 
local healthcare department belongs to the local government system and only 
receives professional guidance from the central healthcare ministry. The delivery and 
implementation of central policy has to rely on local government and departments, 
since there is no central organ to deliver healthcare policy to the local. When the 
policy implementation comes down from central to local, it gradually loses its 
centrality and becomes more and more locally oriented based on certain local 
interests. Since the local has power to refine central policy, the so-called strong 
central power or authority has been carved up by local government and departments. 
Although the central holds the initiative of interaction and final decision making in 
the central-local interaction on healthcare (see Section 2 of Chapter 7), it is more 
likely to be a last resort rather than an effective solution to misinterpretation or 
improper implementation of central policy by the local. In most cases, local 
government could “make up” refined policy in line with the central requirements to 
get approval. The central has little capacity to do in-depth investigations on dozens of 
locally refined policies in a short time. Thus, the local actually has a great deal of 
power in policy implementation rather than the central government. 
However, local governments hardly feel secure with such decentralized power. Many 
officials have expressed their concern about local policy innovation in their 
interviews (see Section 1 in Chapter 7). Local officials, especially those who are at 
the lowest levels of government, are often initially unwilling to engage in policy 
innovation, since some of the local innovations are choice-made with an idea to 
survival. Most of them were afraid that non-institutionalized local power cannot 
provide protection for their reform and innovation. The local also feels that they may 
need more power to get their innovation and work protected by law. Meanwhile, the 
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central government may also feel “unsecured”, since nomenklatura has played more 
and more limited role on achieving central control upon local governments. 
 
8.1.1.1 Effect of the nomenklatura system 
The nomenklatura system has long been used as an effective tool to insinuate the will 
of the central government into the local area and overcome localism (Zheng and 
Wang, 2001). When the local becomes increasingly powerful in economic and social 
affairs, it seems that only the power of appointment is still held tightly by the central 
government. Such power also maintains the expression of the central at the local level. 
From the interview data, whether the leader of local government is prepared to push 
the reform could make a major difference in the outcome of the reform, especially in 
governmentally complex provinces or cities, such as Guangzhou and Beijing. Thus, it 
is quite important to have local leaders who are in line with the central, especially 
when the central is willing to push reform.   
Based on this principle, many central officials were sent to the local to take certain 
positions every year and the practice has proven advantageous in the past. Firstly, 
those officials were appointed by the central and their power comes from the central, 
so they must take orders from the central government. Secondly, sending central 
officials to the local level is a good way to promote reform in that area since these 
officials could decrease the inconsistency in central reforms at the local level. But the 
limitations of such an approach are obvious. A crucial purpose of the nomenklatura 
system is to locally implement central policies, but the selection of an official may be 
a challenging process since there are different local interests competing against the 
central interest. The choice may often be to either appoint an official who follows 
central interests and will suppress local interests, or appoint an official who will 
follow local interests and distance themselves from central interests. In the former 
case, it is difficult for the sent official to obtain the cooperation of the local officials, 
which results in poor implementation. Some of the local officials who are appointed 
by the central regard their local position as a path leading to higher positions of power, 
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and they are therefore trying to keep the peace during their term rather than striving to 
develop the local economy. This has also limited the outcome of policy 
implementation. In the latter case, obeying local interests means inevitably moving 
away from central interests. Most of these officials rarely get the opportunity to be 
promoted, so pursuing local interests rather than central interests could be an obvious 
choice for them (ibid.). Moreover, according to Zheng, in the matter of selecting local 
officials, the provincial leader has an important say because the central could hardly 
make a personnel change without information on individual leaders provided by the 
provincial leaders (Zheng, 2007). In other words, personnel control by the central 
cannot function well without local cooperation. The province is no longer the one 
who has no impact on central personnel decisions, although it is still formally in the 
subordinate position. Susan Shirk also suggested that there is a so-called “mutual 
accountability” between central leaders and provincial leaders since provincial 
leaders make up the largest part of the Central Committee of the Party, a body that 
elects central leaders (Shirk, 2007). On the one hand, provincial officials hope to be 
promoted and central leaders can threaten dismissal as a negative incentive to 
mobilize local officials to support the reform. On the other hand, provincial officials 
constitute the majority of the Central Committee, and their support is necessary for 
any central leader. They have the strength to persuade the central leader to implement 
policy which is conducive to local interests. This also tells us that reciprocity, the 
most important characteristic of the central-local relationship in de facto federalism, 
becomes the most common and important mechanism in the political and economic 
relation between the central and the local rather than coercion and bargaining (Zheng, 
2007).  
Another feature of the nomenklatura system is selecting local officials for positions in 
central leadership. This approach has historically been commonly used and has had a 
profound impact on China’s political operation. Moving local officials into central 
leadership has strengthened the exchange of information between the central and 
local, which in turn helps to maintain relative stability in the political system. It is 
necessary for the central to have full and accurate information concerning the local in 
order to achieve effective governance at the local level, but China has long lacked a 
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modern system of information collection, such as free media or periodic elections. 
The central collects local information either by sending central officials to investigate 
the local or by asking local officials to collect information for them. But local 
officials often modify and even fabricate information in order to protect local 
interests. So placing local officials into central leadership can, to a certain extent, help 
the central to collect useful local information. However, because the size of central 
leadership is limited, the number of central officials who are chosen from the local is 
definitely small. Therefore, the function of nomenklatura system becomes more and 
more limited along with the growth of local interest. Central power is not as strong as 
it once was and it is harder and harder for the central to maintain control over the 
local. 
Such a situation reminds us of the famous “federal dilemma”, which consists of two 
major issues. Firstly, if the central power is too great, there will be abuses of power, 
which may not only lead to corruption but will also undermine local initiative. 
Secondly, if the central power is too weak, local government will take a position of 
opportunism and have very little willingness to cooperate with the central, which 
could strengthen localism and separatism (Zhang, 2009). The “federal dilemma” on 
one hand could reduce national economic performance and on other hand undermine 
political stability and threaten the national unity. This problem firstly appears in 
countries with a federal system, but has become a major problem for each modern 
country. The United States spent nearly 100 years struggling with the “federal 
dilemma”, and ultimately resolved it through military means, with Lincoln 
establishing the federal government as the highest authority based on federal 
sovereignty (Wang, 2000). 
China has faced this same dilemma. Central power or initiatives are always 
accommodated by the local and the central government feels that there is not enough 
power to keep the local in line with the central; but the central must react very 
carefully to make sure not to undermine the initiative of the local. However, the 
situation in China is yet more complex. Although the local received a great deal of 
power during decentralization, these decentralized powers have not been 
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institutionalized and the local always has to face the possibility that decentralized 
power could be retaken by the central. So the local also feels a level of uncertainty in 
their use of power. Both the central and the local feel they should have more power, 
or as Zheng and Wang put it, “everyone [the central and the local] knows the power is 
draining off, but no one knows where the power goes” (Zheng and Wang, 2001, p.67). 
In such a context, Zheng has pointed out that the central government no longer has 
strong control over local government to keep them in line with the central, while 
reciprocity has replaced political coercion and bargaining as the most common and 
significant mechanism to keep the interaction between the central and local operating 
smoothly (Zheng, 2007). In other words, de facto federalism seems makes an 
appropriate description of the great dilemma of the central-local relationship that 
China faces. The future of the central-local relationship could be institutionalized and 
a formal federalist system might be a possible consequence according to Zheng’s 
prediction (ibid.). 
However, the recent changes and the interview data discussed in the Findings chapter 
seem to indicate that the central-local relationship in China is moving in a different 
direction from Zheng’s prediction. The central has held on to the absolute initiative of 
distributing transfer payments and come into a strong position in the fiscal 
relationship between the central and local through a series of reforms, such as the 
establishment of a tax-sharing system and a national banking system. The central 
government packages specific transfer payments and specific policy projects together 
and sends them to local governments, while local governments (especially county 
governments) are “trying hard to be included into such projects… because we can get 
specific fiscal support [attached transfer payments]” (interview no. 31, see Section 3 
of Chapter 7). Such a policy tool is called a “project mechanism” and gradually plays 
a more important role when the central is dealing with policy implementation at the 
local level. 
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8.1.2 The project mechanism – the central solution to resolving the dilemma 
The importance and popularity of the “(central) project” has been mentioned many 
times during the interviews when talking about fiscal relation interactions between 
the central and local. The “project” discussed here is different from the ambitious 
social construction and development planning projects and is also distinct from 
technical and construction projects. It specifically refers to the arrangement and 
management of transfer payments from the central to the local (Zhe and Chen, 2011). 
Specific policies are the catalysts for such transfer payments and come in two forms. 
The first is assigned to provincial governments by central ministries. Provincial 
governments or departments organize lower governments and their departments to 
accede to the project. All those who agree to participate will compete in the relevant 
central ministry. The second is through open competition projects that enterprises and 
appropriate departments could declare. Local governments or their departments will 
help to write project proposals, and submit these to the central ministries (ibid.). 
Declarers not only have to compete at the top level (the central ministry), but also 
have to compete at the local level (usually on the county level). The approved project 
only passes through the provincial and municipal governments without being subject 
to intermediate approval. Once the project declaration has been approved by the 
central, the transfer payment goes straight to the group that made the proposal 
(usually county governments or enterprises). In the whole process of the project, the 
central government occupies the most important role and is the driving force, 
particularly because it holds the power of project release. Firstly, the central 
government expresses its policy intent and payment goals by setting a specific project. 
The central government also decides the focus of the transfer payment on this project 
and the division of the whole transfer payment. Secondly, the ministry which set up 
the project will issue project guidance which includes goals, project conditions, the 
declaration and release program, funding, payment allocation, responsibilities of 
government on each level, an organization and implementation plan and so on. 
Finally, the central will mobilize local governments at the county level to compete for 
the project.  
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Another important role is that of the county governments, which are the main players 
competing for the project during the process and which have shown enthusiasm for 
central projects. As mentioned by many interviewees who work in county 
government or healthcare departments, chasing central projects is a big part of their 
daily work (see Chapter 7, Section 3). An official from a healthcare department on the 
county level in Inner Mongolia pointed out that “many improvements in the 
healthcare sector are achieved by implementing central projects. The county 
government actually has a strong will in competing for projects” (interview no. 34, 
see section 3 chapter 7). This is because certain payments are attached to the central 
project, which is clearly attractive to the county government. Moreover, county 
governments always deliberately overstate the project budget in order to obtain more 
money from the central (Zhe and Chen, 2011). Sometimes government budget 
management is quite loose; some county governments will propose a small project 
budget to get approved and then claim that the project could not be completed and 
apply for additional funding (ibid.). The government usually agrees to transfer 
additional funds in order to get the policy project implemented and avoid wasting 
money by stopping the project halfway (Qu, 2012). 
In fact, the project mechanism is commonly used and has gradually become a new 
type of governance tool in China (Zhou, 2006). According to the report of People.cn, 
the proportion of specific transfer payments reached 53.3% of the total transfer 
payment in 2012 and increased to 57.1& in 2013 (People.cn, 2015). The project 
mechanism, as the main catalyst for specific transfer payments, undoubtedly plays an 
important role in central-local fiscal relations. Interview data has also demonstrated 
such a phenomenon. Moreover, the project mechanism has a major impact on the 
general central-local relationship in China. The project mechanism could help the 
central to eschew the limitations of massive government structures. The central 
government can centralize its policy goals such as economic growth or welfare 
promotion into specific projects and these projects go directly to the county level and 
provincial government becomes less important than in more traditional modes of 
governance. When the project mechanism starts to operate, the central-local 
relationship gradually changes from the central in relation to dozens of provinces to 
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the central in direct relation to numerous county governments. Originally, big 
provinces were divided into pieces by project mechanisms and the central became 
more powerful since it held the absolute power of project release and rule-making. 
Central policy became more easily implemented by the local since the project is quite 
attractive to county governments, and the provincial governments can hardly obstruct 
the functioning of this mechanism. Meanwhile, the project mechanism also enhances 
the effectiveness of central fiscal management. Since projects are sent to a single 
county and with a set of funding rules, it becomes easier for the central government to 
track and control the use of central transfer payments. In addition, most of the project 
requires the local government to provide a certain amount of supporting funds and the 
central government can also guide and control local fiscal expenditure to some extent. 
Therefore, the project mechanism helps the central government bypass provincial 
government and gets its policies implemented directly by government on the county 
level. Project mechanisms, as a mode of governance, on the one hand, could complete 
the implementation of specific policies in local areas. On the other hand, they could 
help the central government to establish typical examples based on ideological norms, 
which in turn makes it easier to widely spread central policy goals. Since the central 
government sits in the leading position within the project mechanism, it becomes 
easier for the central to keep the local in line with the central on aspects of policy 
implementation and fiscal expenditure within the project mechanism than under de 
facto federalism. The project mechanism seems to be an effective tool to help the 
central government regain its power and authority over local government. 
The local governments, especially on the county level, could benefit from the project 
mechanism. Central projects have become an important source of improvement for 
local economies and social policies. For those counties in west China, for example, 
Inner Mongolia, central projects equals local development (interview no. 31, see 
Section 3 of Chapter 7). Central projects always focus on very specific issues and the 
attached transfer payments and management rules are all exclusive. However, all 
these specific issues are a part of the local government’s work and each of them needs 
to be planned and coordinated with other local issues. For example, the multi-site 
physician practice policy is related to public hospital reform and the reform of 
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staffing levels in the healthcare sector. Thus, for the local government, it is necessary 
to break the boundaries of various central projects and have overall planning and 
coordination capability. This also means the local government tries to pack as many 
economic and social affairs into each project proposal as possible and grasp these 
project opportunities (Qu, 2012). Therefore, the local government prefers to mobilize 
and integrate local resources based on its development plans and aggregate a set of 
local policy targets to take advantage of central projects and turn them into a viable 
force to promote the local economy (ibid.). If such a proposal is approved, the 
attached transfer payment becomes a big part of local income. Stimulating the local 
economy through a central project has thus become a popular choice for local 
governments. Although the design of a central project is specific and may not meet 
the local’s overall interests, it still provides a legal channel for the local to invest in 
specific areas led by a central project. The local can therefore expand its financing 
scale under the title of a central project (Zhe and Chen, 2011). By combining local 
development goals with the requirements of central projects, local governments 
obtain both fiscal resources and political resources (that is, legitimacy provided by 
the central government) and gain the capacity to make concentrated investments and 
rapid constructions based on local development strategies (ibid.). 
Governments on the provincial level play different roles compared to county 
governments. Most central projects are open for government on prefecture-level or 
even lower level. Provincial governments usually act as “organizers” rather than 
“players”, which helps to convey information about project release and gather 
application materials from lower government and report to the central ministries. 
Provincial governments could not “touch” those transfer payment since they are 
directly transferred to those applicants who have been successfully included in 
projects. However, their attitude toward projects could be optimistic because 
provincial governments could benefit from central projects. When counties and 
prefecture cities get developed on economy or social welfare through central projects, 
it could be regarded as the achievement of provincial government. Moreover, the 
economic development brought by projects could be an important resource for leader 
officials on the provincial level to get promoted (Zheng, 1994).    
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Therefore, the project mechanism seems to have become a new type of governance 
and has penetrated all aspects of the economy and social policy in China. Improving 
social affairs and implementing national policies through the project mechanism has 
become a consensus between the central and local. The project mechanism is 
different from the original administrative system, as it is a process that goes from the 
top down to the bottom level. The whole process is full of technical and detailed 
planning, which gives rise to a tendency of technocracy. The central government 
publishes major issues and conveys its economic, political and social intentions and 
responsibilities through the release of projects. The central government tries to 
maintain a stable and rapid economic growth through investment-led projects and 
mobilizing local fiscal expenditure towards specific policy fields by requiring local 
governments to contribute supporting funds for a central project. The distribution and 
management of project-specific transfer payments mean the central government is 
able to attract different local governments to compete for a project and eventually 
achieve control over local protection and even localism (Qu, 2012). 
Meanwhile, a central project provides transfer payments to the local, which is 
important for local development. Local governments can pack multiple projects into 
a comprehensive local development strategy or plan based on local interests. The 
central project thus grants the local government legitimacy to fully mobilize the local 
economic and political resources. The projects which focus on social welfare can also 
help the local government to establish a positive image and enhance its bank credit 
rating by the qualification of a central project. Since central projects offer the chance 
and resources for local development, the local government is quite motivated to 
compete for such projects.  
However, the project mechanism also negatively affects the central-local relationship. 
On the one hand, since the transfer payment is divided into different smaller pieces 
and then attached to specific projects, the usage of certain amounts of money by the 
local is quite limited to specific projects. Thus, the policy capacity of local 
government is weakened and the effect it causes may be more serious especially 
when the local is encouraged to engage in more policy innovation on specific policy 
259 
areas such as healthcare. This may be a reason why Inner Mongolia could not conduct 
much policy innovation (interview no. 34). Both the central and local may not be 
willing to see this happen. On the other hand, since the approval power is held by 
central ministries, the power which was centralized from the local has in fact been 
“decentralized” to the ministries. Ultimately, the authority and policy capacity may 
be weakened by these powerful ministries. 
Therefore, we can observe that the central-local relationship in China has 
experienced some changes caused by this project mechanism. Much of the 
policy-planning and policy-releasing power has been centralized to the central 
government and the policy implementation and organizing power has been 
decentralized to provincial and municipal governments. Moreover, the project 
mechanism deliberately leaves space for local governments to compete for their 
inclusion in the projects. Such competition among local governments in turn becomes 
an auxiliary force to enhance centralization. The power of the central government is 
obviously enhanced with the project mechanism. Although the project-releasing and 
implementation processes seem to be full of reciprocity (both the central and local get 
what they want), it is much easier for the central to keep the local governments 
(especially county governments) in line with its goals and have central policies 
properly implemented at the local level through the project mechanism than it is 
under de facto federalism, because the central has the absolute guiding power in the 
project mechanism. However, such an absolute guiding power seems to be 
“decentralized” to many central ministries, who hold the actual approval power on 
specific policy projects. The authority of the central government could thus be 
weakened if there is a conflict of interest among different central ministries.   
 
Summary 
De facto federalism has made a clear description of the dilemma that China faces, in 
which reciprocity plays a crucial role in central-local interactions and central 
government no longer holds strong control over local government. However, the rise 
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of project mechanism gradually changes the central-local relationship from the 
central in relation to dozens of provinces to the central in direct relation to numerous 
county governments. Central government holds the dominate power on project 
planning and project releasing, which makes it easier to drive local governments 
(especially county governments) to keep in line with goals of central government and 
have central policy “properly” implemented. Thus, the project mechanism, as a new 
kind of governance of central government, offers an important solution for the central 
to resolve the dilemma. In fact, it helps the central to reduce the refining power of 
local government and brings the central back into a powerful position to obtain a 
certain degree of intervention on local policy implementation. In other words, the rise 
of the project mechanism has changed the “relatively balanced” situation between the 
central and local which is described by de facto federalism, and leads the central-local 
relationship in China to another stage. Therefore, de facto federalism probably does 
not capture the nature of central-local relationship in China.  
 
 
Section 8.2: What best captures the nature of the central-local 
relationship in China 
After examining whether de facto federalism captures the nature of the central-local 
relationship in China, the next issue is what does best capture the nature of the 
central-local relationship, or in other words, what is the nature of central-local 
relationship in China? When studying institutions such as the central-local 
relationship, according to Pierson and Skocpol (2002), the context could be examined 
since it influences political settings and policy outcomes. The behaviour and strategic 
choices of political actors are always born within specific socio-economic and 
cultural context in history and shaped by history, therefore, examining the 
central-local relationship in an historical context could help build a better 
understanding of the central-local relationship (Steinmo, 2008).    
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Power possession and policy responsibility, as Pierson mentions, is a crucial element 
that affects the central-local relationship and outcomes of social policy, since it not 
only involves constituent units’ power but also determines the potential restrictions 
on policy intervention put in place by the central government (Pierson, 1995). 
Meanwhile, the institutional development of power distribution is also important, 
rather than the institutional origins themselves, when discussing the central-local 
relationship because it provides insight into how the relationship, actor, and 
institution are shaped in the social process and helps to determine their meaning 
(Pierson, 2004; see Chapter 3). Therefore, placing the discussion of power possession 
and policy responsibility in the particular context of institutional development could 
be a better way to understand the formative process and its internal logic for current 
central-local relations, which in turn could help to more accurately grasp the nature of 
the central-local relationship. This section will mainly discuss the power distribution 
between the central and local from the perspective of institutional development and 
its context. It will focus on how the central-local relationship has been formed 
through the changes in power distribution in China in order to find out what best 
captures the nature of the central-local relationship in China.  
 
8.2.1 The tradition of non-institutionalized power distribution as a key to 
understand the central-local relationship in China 
The power distribution between the central and local, which clarifies the power 
boundary on both sides, is the crucial basis of the central-local relationship. The 
central and local government gain their rights, responsibilities and their distinct 
interests from a particular power distribution. However, as presented in Chapter 7, 
many participants in interviews used the words “unclear” and “indistinct” when 
talking about their ideas of power distribution between the central and local. 
According to these interviewees, in the current system of non-institutionalized power 
distribution, the local government not only has to face the uncertainty caused by 
unclear power distribution but also has to deal with the risks of engaging in local 
policy innovation (see Section 1 of the previous chapter). In fact, we can observe that 
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non-institutionalized power distribution is quite common during the developmental 
process of central-local power distribution in practice. The paragraphs below will 
discuss the formation of such a tradition and its influence on the central-local 
relationship via several rounds of decentralization and recentralization in China.  
Since China has long been a totalitarian state, decentralization has a particularly 
important meaning for central-local relations in China. The decentralization launched 
during the reform and opening, as the biggest decentralization involving sectors and 
powers that have not been involved before in recent decades, is no doubt the most 
crucial issue which helped to form the current central-local relationship. In 1978, the 
central government thought that there was excessive concentration of power in the 
economic system, so there should be a bold decentralization in order to help local 
government and enterprises obtain more management autonomy under the national 
economic guidance (Wu, 2013). Since then, state-owned enterprises started to 
experiment with expanding management autonomy, termed “the decentralization of 
management power of enterprise”. Local governments started to gain management 
power over most state-owned enterprises, and could in many cases actually run the 
enterprises independently. Meanwhile, the property rights of collectively-owned 
enterprises have been held by local governments since after the reform. In 1981, the 
central government set a new institutional arrangement which let all the provinces 
except Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai take full responsibility for their finances. The 
fiscal power of local revenue and expenditure was decentralized to local governments 
and such an arrangement was vividly called “eating in separate kitchens”. Several 
years later, a large number of economic decision-making powers were devolved to 
local governments. Many economic functions such as economic planning, taxation 
and banking were no longer under the control of central ministries and were 
incorporated into the purview of local government. After these rounds of 
decentralization, the local government was granted discretionary power within the 
local economy and was able to control local wealth and economic resources. Local 
government has gradually become a relatively independent authority on local 
economy and its initiative and enthusiasm for economic development has increased 
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rapidly. Therefore, stimulating economic growth and expanding local GDP have 
become inherent demands on and source of power for local government.  
The international economic situation also offered some development opportunities 
for the local government in China. After the second oil crisis in 1980, traditional 
manufacturing moved from the US, Europe and Japan to new up-and-coming 
economies, which was the most important globalization movement since the 1950s. 
China was very sensitive to these developments and seized this economic opportunity 
by actively implementing the policy of opening up in order to achieve greater 
economic development based on its advantages in labor and property costs, as well as 
in taxation and environmental regulations (Wu, 2013). China is undoubtedly one of 
the earliest, the most active and most successful beneficiaries among those new 
economies, others of which include Russia, India and Brazil. Both the internal and 
external conditions provided a good environment for economic growth. Thus, after 
1990, the total number of township enterprises reached more than 15 million. Their 
industrial profit had reached 26.53 billion yuan and accounted for one-third of the 
country’s total industrial output and this was the first time that the private sector 
recorded greater profits than the state-owned sector (24.6 billion yuan in 1990) (ibid.). 
China seems to have become a secular society overnight along with the rapid increase 
of private wealth. Citizens became more and more concerned with the pursuit of 
material wealth. By 1992, at least 100,000 government officials had left the 
government to run businesses (ibid.). 
In the 1980s, the initiative of civil society and local government was fully activated.  
However, the recurring phenomenon of decentralization of authority (local force 
became quite powerful, threatening the central authority; see chapter3) would 
undoubtedly repeat again in China. In 1992, national fiscal revenue reached 350 
billion yuan, of which the central income was about 100 billion yuan, only 
twenty-eight per cent of total revenue, while the annual expenditure of the central 
government was about 200 billion yuan, racking up a 100 billion yuan deficit. Liu 
Zhongli, the Minister of Finance at that time, recalled that some central ministries had 
to borrow money to pay wages (Wu, 2013). 
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After the political crisis in 1989, national ideology tended to be conservative. Deng 
Xiaoping made a significant effort to establish the market economy, however, 
liberalization had frightened many national leaders and they were vigilant against 
anything that could threaten unity and stability. The dissolution of the Soviet Union 
and the socialist nations of Eastern Europe in 1990 made the Chinese Communist 
Party feel that they were facing an unprecedented crisis. Within this context, the 
move towards a strong local government at the expense of the central in the 1980s 
was seriously questioned, and centralization reasserted itself. Since then, China’s 
economic policy objectives have experienced a subtle shift. In the 1980s, the main 
goal was to revive the economy and solve the problem of insufficient production 
capacity. The central government allowed local forces and civil society to do 
whatever they could to bolster productivity and the economy, even if it crossed the 
line set by laws. After 1989, the goal of the reforms had been transferred to 
strengthening the ruling group’s leadership and enhancing control on the local (Wu, 
1999). Therefore, 1989 and 1990 are pivotal points in time for power distribution in 
China, as the central government started to think about retaking the decentralized 
powers from the local and the government competed for profit with the private sector. 
Many people, especially liberal researchers, started to worry that the return of 
totalitarianism was around the corner (ibid.). 
In 1994, the shared-tax system was established by the central government in order to 
reverse their passive position on income distribution. In the view of the central 
government, if the central government reacts slowly in the reform, active local forces 
who strive to expand their own power and wealth could pose a threat to central 
leadership and authority. Under the new tax system, the central government took 
control of taxes which have stable sources, such as VAT and customs duty. The 
central also made several compromises in order to convince the local to accept the 
new tax system. When the new tax system was successfully established, the outcome 
was significant. In 1994, the first year after the implementation, central fiscal revenue 
soared by 200% over the previous year and surged to 56% (as opposed to 22% in 
1993) of total fiscal revenue. But the proportion of expenditure increased by only 2% 
from 1993 to 1994 (Xu and Wang, 2013).  
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The implementation of the new tax system was a turning point in the history of 
central-local relations. The most important consequence that it brought was 
repossession of the initiative in the distribution of economic power and interests by 
the central government. From 1995 to 2004, central fiscal revenue accounted for 52% 
of total fiscal revenue on average, while expenditure only accounted for 30% of the 
country’s total fiscal expenditure on average (Xu and Wang, 2013). The shared-tax 
system is widely regarded in principle as a federal taxation institution which most 
countries with market economies have as their main taxation system. However, such 
an institutional arrangement was varied in China and has become a tool for the central 
government to achieve centralization. The premise of the implementation of the 
shared-tax system in other countries is the clear division of powers and expenditure 
responsibilities between the central and local, but these two issues were deliberately 
left unclear (Wu, 1999). The first problem is the unclear nature of responsibility for 
expenditure, especially by the central government. Most of the expenditure on public 
services was shifted to the government at the prefecture and county level. For 
example, in 2004, the local fiscal revenue accounted for about 45% of the national 
fiscal revenue but expenditure accounted for about 72% of total fiscal expenditure. 
On education spending, the central government spent 1.964 billion yuan, while local 
fiscal expenditure was 3.146 trillion yuan. In social security spending, local fiscal 
expenditure was nearly seven times more than central spending (Wu, 2013). The 
provincial government has also adopted this mode to deal with tax-sharing with 
governments on lower level. As a result, governments on the county level gave away 
about 80% of their powers of taxation to government on a higher level but are 
responsible for 80% of spending for public services and social welfare (ibid.). Such a 
phenomenon is also shown clearly in the responses of some interviewees and is 
probably a reason why they think the power distribution between the central and local 
is not reasonable. Many interviewees who work in both local government and the 
local healthcare system mentioned that they think that local expenditure is not 
commensurate with fiscal capacity. A high burden of expenditure and poor fiscal 
capacity makes it quite difficult for local government to marshal enough resources to 
engage in policy innovation (see section 1 of the previous chapter). 
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The second problem is the inappropriate transfer payment system. The central 
government holds most of the tax in hand but there are no dialogue and consultation 
mechanisms between the central and local government. The central rarely discusses 
the money that should be transferred to the local with the local. Most of these transfer 
payments are made in the form of projects at the local level and investment and 
decision-making power is concentrated in the hands of central ministries, which will 
be discussed in more detail below. Since the local basically has no say in the transfer 
payment, local governments tend to set up lobbying offices in Beijing to express and 
maintain their own interests. When the local tries hard to lobby the central, the central 
inevitably asserts its authority over the local. The two primary problems, plainly 
speaking, are that the local has given up most of its tax revenue to the central but 
needs to spend more and the central takes most of the money but never discusses how 
to spend it with the local.  
It seems that these two institutional defects are still influential in the present day. The 
response of my interviewees also proves a similar point; officials below the 
provincial level always feel that the power distribution is not clear and the central 
takes a great deal, but never spends. The local was granted more powers and space 
than before and took an active role in economic resource distribution and economic 
development in the 1980s, but why was the situation shifted so easily by the central 
and returned to a centralized process from 1994? The key point is the form of the 
decentralization itself. 
In fact, decentralization has long been used as a primary tool to activate the local in 
China. Decentralization in China has been launched as policy-oriented power 
distribution (non-institutionalized power distribution), which is far from standardized 
and legalized power distribution, which requires the power distribution to be 
confirmed by law or a constitution and must go through complicated legal procedures 
to be revised. After the establishment of the PRC, it has been used quite often. In 
Mao’s time, he used decentralization as a tool to activate both the central and the 
local. He required the central to cooperate with local government through conferment 
(Liang Ge Ji Ji Xing, see Chapter 7, Section 1). Deng also used it to encourage the 
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local to develop the economy and implement reform policies. Such power 
decentralization was always implemented in the form of policy in practice and was 
likely to be an agreement or consultation between leaders on different levels. In fact, 
the power distribution between the central and local in China has not been provided 
clearly by the constitution or relevant laws and has long been a consequence of 
negotiation and compromise. It means that both the central power and the local power 
could be easily affected by policy, by the authority and determination of an individual 
leader, and by the political and economic environment. Therefore, it has a strong 
character of the “rule of man” rather than the rule of law (Wei,2011). The local power 
could be unlimitedly expanded in order to protect local interest or could be deeply 
limited by constraints set by the central, because there is no statutory provision on 
local power.  
Following will be an example that shows how such policy-oriented power 
distribution influences on the central-local relationship through different political and 
economic situations. In the 1980s, the central government encouraged the local 
government to develop their economies and provided more space for the local to 
participate in policy innovation. Many government officials established town-owned 
enterprises and could deploy regional public resources, especially land and tax 
incentives. This model was called “local government corporatism” and was quite 
common in Jiangsu and Guangdong (Zhang, 2009). Another typical model is the 
“Wenzhou model” which occurred at the end of the 1970s. The private economy 
development model was, to some extent, implausible because it is defied the laws and 
ideology of the time. But after rounds of investigation and the support of central and 
local leaders, this model has been accepted and retained. These two models were 
phenomena that occurred in particular times and their existence deeply relied on the 
acquiescence of the central government and protection by political strong men such 
as Deng Xiaoping. Due to the lack of legal provision for local power, the local 
government took on economic powers which were meant to be decentralized to 
enterprises and civil society and they often used these powers arbitrarily. Local 
government was “granted” autonomy on a large scale under such circumstances. The 
autonomy could help to create a better environment for the developing local economy, 
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but also put the local government into the role of a special interest group with has 
different interests from the central government. Therefore, the local government 
acted extremely self-interestedly during the pursuit of economic growth and its 
behavior showed corporate characteristics (Xu and Wang, 2013). The local 
government gradually became a kind of “predatory state” and developed an 
inconsistent benefit structure with regard to the central, which resulted in economic 
competition for profit with the private sector and with citizens (Zheng, 2010a, p. 161). 
Such a unique role for local government is not only the major force in improving the 
local economy, but is also one of the fundamental causes of economic and social 
problems that China has faced in the past thirty years (Zhou, 2008). But when the 
local developed away from the political goals of the central government and 
problems resulted, the central started to adjust the power structure between central 
and local government. The central recentralized power in several important areas, 
including quality inspections, audits, environmental protection, land management, 
statistics and production safety. These departments were separated from local 
government and have been put under the vertical management of central government.  
After the financial crisis in 2008, China’s economy entered a new period of structural 
adjustment; the contradictions between the central and local in the economic field had 
intensified. The ability to maintain the benefits of more than a hundred central 
enterprises grew stronger and stronger while local revenue heavily depended on 
land-based financing. Along with the implementation of urbanization strategy and 
the improvement of the social security system came the need to significantly increase 
local expenditure. Therefore, the central started to adjust its fiscal relations with the 
local (Zheng, 2010a). For example, the central started to adjust the structure of tax 
sharing and the amount of general transfer payments in order to suppress the use of 
land-based financing and enhance local fiscal capacity. Meanwhile, the central 
government started to decentralize several administrative approval powers to expand 
the administrative competence of local governments. In other words, a new round of 
decentralization seems to be around the corner.  
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From the processes of decentralization and recentralization shown above, it can be 
argued that under the tradition of non-institutionalized power distribution, 
decentralization is more likely an administrative tool of the central government to 
activate the local to develop the economy. Undoubtedly, the central government will 
hold onto the initiative and stay at its current position under such an institutional 
arrangement, as we have observed in the example presented above. The 1980s were a 
golden era for local governments who were quite powerful and were once a threat to 
the central authority, or even a potential critical juncture to finish the centralized 
system. However, as soon as the central government realized that the power 
distribution mode had to be changed, the central authorities recentralized several 
decentralized powers from the local by establishing new rules and regulations. Most 
of these adjustments were done on the level of policy, which means the adjustments 
could be changed by revising the relevant policy, and the local rarely had veto power. 
From Mao’s “cooperate with local government through conferment” to Deng’s 
“decentralize and transfer the profit” (Fang Quan Rang Li), the recentralization 
which started in 1994 was still a non-institutionalized one, which was implemented 
through governmental or party documents rather than laws and the constitution. The 
strong tradition of non-institutionalized power distribution comes with every big 
moment of economic growth and political development in the PRC and keeps on 
producing influence on central-local relations in China. 
The tradition of non-institutionalized power distribution does not mean that the local 
has no influence on the adjustment of power distribution. The local did actively strive 
for some power from the central government during the decentralization of the 1980s; 
for example, the “Wenzhou model” helped local government gain the permits to 
develop local private economies. However, as the decentralized powers and rights 
were not institutionalized by law, the central government could always find a way to 
adjust the power distribution structure to favour its goals based on its vantage. It 
seems that the central government has actively kept central-local power distribution 
in a non-institutionalized status in order to maintain its capacity to deal with different 
political and economic situations. This tradition is like a central strategy that keeps 
influencing local behavior such as policy innovation till now.  
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Through the development of institutions and the discussion presented above, we can 
observe that the non-institutionalized power distribution tradition is a crucial context 
of central-local relations in China. Only by understanding this tradition can we 
accurately grasp the nature and features of central-local relations in China. 
 
8.2.2 Culture of unity – the boundary of reforms in China  
Zheng (2007) has mentioned that local government, in practice, has great power 
under de facto federalism even though local power is not formally institutionalized. 
He also predicts that such local power or de facto federalism will be institutionalized 
in the future (see Chapter 5). However, under the tradition of non-institutionalized 
power distribution, on one hand, China currently still lacks clearly institutionalized 
power distribution between the central and local, which is the basis for a federalist 
institutional arrangement. On the other hand, local power has not been fully secured 
by the law or constitution, so it is possible for the central to retake the decentralized 
power when faced with a tough situation, like what happened in 1989 and 1990. Now 
that a new round of decentralization has come, the central has given some positive 
signals, for example, Chairman Xi Jinping said that governmental power would be 
caged and the CCP could accept the most incisive criticism (Wu, 2013). Will this 
round of decentralization bring in new elements that can help form the 
institutionalization of power distribution or will it just be a continuation of 
institutional inertia? 
When looking at the long history of China, we find that China wavered between 
centralization and decentralization many times. There was great decentralization at 
the very beginning of the Han dynasty, and then came centralization 60 years later. 
There was great decentralization too from 1916 to 1927, but the country experienced 
recentralization only a few years later. In 1951, local power was highly centralized. In 
1956, central power was decentralized. In 1962, local power was recentralized but 
experienced a great decentralization only four years later. In the 1970s, the economy 
experienced systematic disorder, so recentralization happened again. Another big 
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round of decentralization took place between 1978 and 1989, when excessive 
decentralization had led to a “weak central, strong local” situation. In 1994, the 
central government recentralized power through the establishment of a tax-sharing 
system. It is quite interesting that the local experienced decentralization so many 
times and it has had a handful of chances to fight for institutionalized power 
distribution when the central government was relatively weak. But the local has not 
succeeded even once. Is this a historical coincidence or is there a special force 
controlling the change of power distribution between the central and local? 
We may find the answer in the differences between Eastern and Western history. In 
360 BC, China had its first great centralization, the Shangyang reform, while the 
empire of Alexander the Great appeared in 336 BC. The Han dynasty was testing a 
centralized system around 100 BC; several decades later in Europe, Julius Caesar 
replaced the republic system with a centralized monarchy. From the second century 
BC to the third century AD, there was a unified Han dynasty and a unified Roman 
Empire in the East and the West respectively. In 184 AD, the Han dynasty descended 
into civil strife, nearly 400 years after China had entered a great secession period, 
while the Western Roman Empire crumbled under the pressure of external migration. 
After that, the histories of China and Europe suddenly went their separate ways. 
China went back to being a united country in 589 AD and secession has rarely 
appeared (Wei,2008). Since then after a long period under the feudal system, Europe 
has not been united again till now. Although Europe achieved unity in a monetary 
sense when the Euro appeared in 2000, abolition of the Euro was widely discussed 
after the financial crisis of 2008. Several years earlier, the Greek crisis has 
undoubtedly cast a shadow on the future of the Euro and the EU (European Union). 
Recently after the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom, many candidates for 
president in West European countries such as France and Netherland flaunt the 
banner of “Quitting the EU” on their campaign trail. Therefore, the question is, why 
did China and Europe go idn such different directions after the collapse of the Roman 
Empire and the Han dynasty? This seems to be an outstanding historical question for 
which it is quite difficult to give a standard answer. We can provide explanations 
from the perspectives of geographical conditions, the national psychology, religion 
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and language, but there might be a simple answer that still seems really convincing. 
Wei Feide pointed out that “unity is a culture in China” (Wei, 2008). Secession is the 
most feared, hated and intolerable issue for the Chinese while unity is a fateful feature 
of Chinese culture with ultimate meaning (ibid.). Although unity itself cannot 
guarantee the development of the economy and politics, as Toynbee points out, the 
rise of a united nation successfully ends the troubled times caused by secession; the 
generations who have experienced such a process would naturally be grateful and 
yearn for unity (Toynbee, 1939). 
Due to the natural and ultimate demand for national unity, China has maintained a 
centralized political system for more than 2,000 years despite periods of 
fragmentation. There has been no other political mechanism that can maintain unity 
for such a long time in history. In this sense, China’s tolerance for a centralized or 
authoritarian system is much higher than that of other countries and nations (Wu, 
2013). This kind of state governance logic obviously inherently goes against the 
principles of free trade and the market economy, which formed after the Industrial 
Revolution in the Western world. This is because a market economy and free trade 
require a more decentralized and institutionalized system to ensure the interests of 
each player are protected by formal rules. Liberalized economic reform is bound to 
weaken the power or authority of the central government. The most recent 
decentralization experiments in China (one from 1916 to 1927, the other from 1978 to 
1989) stimulated the private economy to develop very rapidly. However, these two 
decentralizations did not find a good solution to maintaining social stability. If 
decentralization had gone out of control and pro-independence events occurred in 
some of the border provinces, it would have been too heavy a price for any reformer 
to afford (Wu, 2013). Therefore, these two experiments were stopped by the central 
government and the authorities turned to recentralization again. Perhaps we have to 
acknowledge that the culture of unity is the boundary of any liberal reforms in China. 
In this light, it is not difficult to understand why China has a tradition of 
non-institutionalized power distribution under the culture of unity. From the central 
government’s perspective, such an institutional tradition has granted the central 
government the ability to readjust central-local relations when the power distribution 
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had threatened the unity or central authority of China, where central authority is 
highly related to unity. Thus, the formal institutionalization of central-local power 
distribution can hardly be achieved and the signs of the institutionalization are not 
observed now within the context of a culture of unity. 
China has been developing at high speed for 30 years within the context of national 
unity. However, when its GDP per capita reached $3,400 in 2008, social problems 
became acute and China seemed to have stepped into the “middle-income trap” 
(Zheng, 2010a). When faced with these difficulties, which direction would China’s 
future reform go? Will the central be brave enough to jump out of those institutional 
traditions and bring in more liberal or institutionalized elements in order to solve 
social problems? As Zheng points out, “in the West, the rise of the bourgeoisie and 
other social forces finally tamed authoritarian state power, but in developing 
countries it is the government itself that helps to build up a capitalist system to 
promote economic development” (Zheng, 2010a). If the rise of social forces tames 
authoritarian state power, when economic and social developments need to be 
promoted by state power, who can tame that state power (ibid.)? The road of reform 
may be much harder for China than it was with neighbouring countries, since the 
reform experience in these countries can hardly apply to China. Reform in the 
Philippines failed, reform in Singapore is full of controversial debates and reform in 
South Korea is hard to duplicate. Taiwan achieved democracy but its economy has 
fallen into stagnation. As a huge country, China will face difficulties during its 
reforms that will be much more serious than all these countries and regions (Wu, 
2013). Extreme populism in left-wing politics and extreme liberalism in right-wing 
politics add so many uncertainties to the reforms in China. If mistakes from China’s 
reforms lead to turmoil, its impact on the global economic and political situation 
would be absolutely serious. The world is probably not ready for that. Therefore, a 
conservative conclusion would be that in the visible future, economic and political 
reforms in China are likely to be market economy-oriented and within the boundary 
of a culture of unity. The reforms will be in a non-Western style that will try to find a 
balance between the centralized system and democracy. This may be the inherent 
274 
conflict in China which calls for a “gene mutation” solution, and the amount of time 
that this change may take is very likely to exceed the length of our generation. 
In summary, China has taken the centralized unitary system over 2,000 years and 
receives abundant “positive feedback” from such a political system in the historical 
process. The culture of unity has been formed during the long history and gradually 
become the boundary of reforms in China. Under the context of this, it is not difficult 
to understand that why the power distribution between the central and local has not 
been institutionalized over hundreds of years. It indeed reflects a certain degree of 
institutional stickiness on the central-local relationship under the culture of unity.   
    
8.2.3 Dynamism: the nature of the central-local relationship in China 
When we expand our vision to look at the changes to central-local relationships from 
1949 to the present, we can observe that the central government has experienced 
rounds of centralization and decentralization. Under the context of China’s culture of 
unity, de facto federalism is more likely to be a description of a stage of dilemma, 
which has appeared in earlier rounds of decentralization, rather than a description of a 
long-term balanced situation. When placing the central-local relationship in the 
context of time according to Pierson (2004), it is notable that the central government 
is always able to find a way to readjust the central-local relationship when the local 
force seems to be getting too big, which may threaten the central authority and even 
national unity. This time, the project mechanism, as a new mode of governance, has 
been picked as the strategy or institutional tool used by the central government to 
prevent excessive local power. 
From the repeated rounds of centralization and decentralization, it is not difficult to 
find that in fact central-local relations in China have been kept in a dynamic balance, 
in which there is a certain extent of flexibility and space to have central-local 
relations changed according to realistic demands. The culture of unity may be a 
crucial reason for the formation of such feature of central-local relations. On the one 
hand, maintaining national unity has long been a significant task for the central 
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government. In almost every dynasty, the central government has always been quite 
vigilant towards local forces. Sometimes the central government needs to launch 
centralization to protect the country from localism. On the other hand, since China is 
a huge country with broad territories, local government is absolutely significant in 
developing the local economy and social welfare such as health care. The central 
government has to grant a certain extent of local autonomy and try not to hurt the 
local government’s enthusiasm for local development too much. Therefore, the 
tradition of non-institutionalized central-local power distribution is understandable. It 
is precisely such an institutional arrangement which leaves plenty of flexibility and 
space that can allow both the central and local government to reach a relative balance 
when facing different national and international environments. Such an arrangement 
can also possibly reduce the limitations upon the development of the national 
economy and politics that are caused by fixed central-local relations. Therefore, de 
facto federalism here is not so much a feature or nature of central-local government in 
China as it is a state of relative balance. By contrast, dynamism, which results from a 
culture of unity and non-institutionalized central-local power distribution, is more 
likely to be the nature of central-local relations in China. 
Dynamism here means that there is a certain degree of flexibility within the 
central-local relations such that both the powers of the central and local can be more 
easily transferred from one to the other than under institutionalized central-local 
relations. As seen many times throughout history, power transfer always takes the 
form of centralization and decentralization. It is also notable that the central 
government seems to have a relatively powerful position within dynamism because 
the centralization and decentralization are always initiated by the central government. 
The powerful position of the central government is also a requirement of the culture 
of unity, which allows the central government to secure its capacity to adjust the 
central-local relationship if necessary. 
Because of the flexibility granted by the dynamism within central-local relationships, 
China has much more space to adjust the power distribution in response to national 
and international political and industrial changes. Flexibility can help China to 
276 
achieve an efficient adjustment of central-local institutional arrangements when 
facing internal and external difficulties, however, flexibility can also lead to 
inappropriate responses which may result in development difficulties and maybe, 
even economic depression. 
 
8.2.4 How the dynamic central-local relationship affects healthcare policy  
Under the dynamic nature of the central-local relationship, its influence on healthcare 
policy is full of temporary features. Central-local relations are currently in a stage 
where the central government is gradually centralizing some power through the 
project mechanism and other ways such that it has had increasing influence on 
healthcare policies through central guidance. The central government has also set 
clearer boundaries for local healthcare policymaking and policy innovation. Local 
governments have been encouraged to engage in policy innovation on specific policy 
fields as chosen by the central government. In terms of policy implementation, the 
project mechanism has driven the local to become passionate about implementing 
central policies in order to obtain the transfer payments attached to policy projects. 
More and more local resources have also been channeled to specific policy fields 
chosen by the central. 
Under the dynamism nature, the central-local relationship in China significantly 
affects healthcare policy through the three institutional characteristics mentioned by 
Pierson. From the perspective of reserved power for constituent units, as there is no 
institutionalized power distribution between the central and local, there could be 
frequent changes on who should be responsible for a specific healthcare policy. On 
the one hand, the consistency of healthcare policy may be challenged by the change 
in central-local relations. For example, the provincial leadership team on healthcare 
reform has experienced a change from being embedded in the Department of 
Development and Reform to being embedded in the healthcare department, which 
has changed the focus of the healthcare reform (interview no. 27). On the other hand, 
under dynamic central-local relationships, the passion local government has for local 
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policy innovation is relatively little. From the history of centralization and 
decentralization, we can observe that only in the initial stage of the central 
government launching decentralization can local governments get plenty of space 
and freedom to engage in policy innovation. For example, in the early 1980s, when 
the central government started a new round of decentralization of many aspects, there 
was a trend of local innovation. Local government was granted the power to use as 
many local resources as possible for policy innovation and the innovation was easily 
accepted by the central government and spread to other parts of China (see Section 1 
of Chapter 7). When the central government felt the threat from the local government 
and started to centralize power, space for local innovation shrank and local 
innovation became guided by the central government towards specific policy fields 
chosen by the central government. Other local policy innovations were rejected by 
the central government because it was not in line with the central government (for 
example, the multi-site physician practice policy in Guangdong; see Section 2 of 
Chapter 7) or became unsustainable because of a lack of resources from the central 
government (for example, the innovation in Inner Mongolia; see Section 3 of Chapter 
7). Thus, as a result of the dynamic nature of central-local relations, local policy 
innovation can hardly achieve continuous support from the central government. The 
fuzzy central-local power distribution also makes it impossible for local governments 
to secure permanent institutional protection on its innovation capacity and freedom. 
Accordingly, local governments have to be very careful to keep the direction of their 
policy innovation in line with the central government in order to avoid unnecessary 
trouble. Therefore, such dynamism within central-local relations keeps the local 
innovation initiative at a relatively low level because of the lack of permanent 
institutional protection. 
 
From the perspective of interest express and central-local interaction, since 
maintaining unity has been recognized as the fundamental responsibility of central 
government and local governments are always regarded as potential threat to unity, 
the dynamic central-local relation in China has grant central government more 
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powerful position than local government and more capacity to “guide” local interests. 
For example, project mechanism provides a good play field for the central and local 
government to express interest and cooperate. Central government could express 
interest through releasing specific projects which indicate the emphasis and value of 
central government. Local Governments have become much more active in 
combining central projects with their own development goals in order to achieve 
development using central power and resources. However, as the central project had 
been set specific, local government faces relatively clear boundaries in central 
projects, therefore the capacity and space for local government to combine local 
interest with specific central project is limited. In practice, provincial government are 
actually bypassed in project mechanism, central government achieve certain degree 
of direct interaction with government below provincial level. The big refining power 
of provincial government has been weakened as project mechanism become a kind of 
governance and commonly used. Therefore, the healthcare policies are greatly guided 
by the central and reflect more interest of central government rather than interest of 
local government. Meanwhile, too much central guidance can be harmful to 
healthcare policy innovation and implementation at a local level. Since the 
innovation and implementation are highly guided by central projects, they can be 
easily restricted by those central projects. Only when the direction of the policy 
innovation is line with the central can the local receive the innovation space or 
resources provided by the central. It means that the absolute innovation capacity of 
local government has not actually been enhanced. If the central guidance has not 
captured the actual needs of local societies, provinces which rely much on central 
transfer payment such as Inner Mongolia will have little capacity to meet actual local 
social needs (see Section 3 of Chapter 7). Even in provinces which do not rely on 
central transfer payment, central guidance has more and more influence on local 
policy innovation. For example, Guangdong has failed to implement a policy of 
multi-sited physician practices because the central ministry was opposed to it based 
on its consideration of the uniformity of the policy across the country (see Section 2 
of Chapter 7). In fact, more central guidance may mean reduced self-adjustment 
capacity for the local because of the strong guiding effect of the project mechanism. 
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The local may be more likely to be misled by the central if the central project has not 
adequately targeted the actual needs of the local and it will be more difficult for the 
local to adjust relevant projects to their needs.     
From the perspective of fiscal relation between the central and local, as central 
government is at initial position within dynamic central-local relation, the power to 
distribute national fiscal resource is always held in the hands of central government. 
The project mechanism, for example, is a new tool to distribute and mobilize fiscal 
resource. Since a certain amount of transfer payment is attached to specific projects, 
governments on the county level have become more passionate in engaging in 
healthcare policy innovation or implementing specific central policies, which are 
required by specific projects. It helps the central to guide local government and make 
it easier for the local to input fiscal resource on the specific policy field which the 
central wants it to focus on. In light of this, healthcare policy processes and 
innovation present increasingly more features of central guidance. Meanwhile the 
local has also gained more legitimacy for its healthcare innovation through being 
included into central project, which offers protection to the local’s innovation results 
to some extent. Furthermore, the competition among the local government for being 
included in central projects objectively helps to improve the quality of local 
innovation and the implementation of central policies.  
 
Summary  
In summary, dynamism could be the main nature of central-local relations in China. 
Such a nature results from the culture of unity which was formed through thousands 
of years. The non-institutionalized central-local power distribution, as the main 
presentation of such a nature, has granted plenty of flexibility within the central-local 
relationship, therefore, the power distribution can be adjusted when facing different 
situations. Meanwhile, the culture of unity requires the central to be at a vantage point 
where the central government can adjust the central-local relations when the local 
force grows too big. The central government can initiate centralization to restrain the 
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early signs of localism. Such a flexible central-local relationship makes it easier to 
achieve the continuity of development, but also brings challenges to the consistency 
of healthcare policies. Local innovation initiatives may be at a relatively low level 
because of the lack of permanent institutional protection. 
From the perspective of long-term development, such a nature of central-local 
relations makes China less likely to be inhibited by the fixed institutional 
arrangement of central-local relations. This in turn helps to ensure the long-term 
vitality of this kind of dynamic central-local relations. However, such a model of 
central-local relations implies a defect where the continuity of dynamic central-local 
relations requires significant capacity and political wisdom from the central 
government. If one day the central government cannot find an appropriate solution to 
make the dynamic central-local relations sustainable when facing the expansion of 
local forces, there may be the start of a new era, such as of institutionalized 
federalism, or dysfunction of the entire country or even a new period of secession 
which all central government in most of previous dynasties is keen to avoid.      
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Chapter 9: Conclusion  
 
China’s spectacular achievement on economic growth has attracted exhaustive 
academic attention while its intensive changes on social and political sphere over past 
30 years seem to be far less “attractive”. Little attempt has been made to explore the 
central-local relationship during the reform period from a social policy perspective 
(for the exception see Zheng, 2007). There is a significant gap in the study of the 
central-local relationship in China and its impact on social policy. This thesis 
attempts to bridge this gap and offer an understanding of the nature of the 
central-local relationship which has its roots in a long-lived history and political 
culture.  
This chapter aims to provide an overall statement of the contribution of this thesis to 
the existing literature, and to identify the main strengths and weakness of this 
research. An exploration of avenues for further study is also provided. 
 
 
Section 9.1: Theoretical and empirical contribution  
The main aim of this thesis is to attempt to reduce present complex knowledge of the 
central-local relationship in China to manageable proportions and understand the 
nature of the central-local relationship and its impact on healthcare policy. Firstly, it 
draws lesson from historical institutionalism in order to establish an overall 
theoretical foundation and analytical approach to explore the nature of the 
central-local relationship. Secondly, it reviews both Western and Eastern 
perspectives on the central-local relationship, and how it affects social policy; 
Zheng’s de facto federalism and Pierson’s three institutional factors that affect the 
social policy process. The outcome from this step is an understanding of de facto 
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federalism which combines an historical institutionalist analytical approach with 
empirical data on the central-local relationship over 20 years. Thirdly, it applies this 
theoretical framework to present data in China and tries to find out whether it 
captures the nature of the central-local relationship in China.   
Zheng combines structural, procedural and cultural approaches to explore the 
central-local relationship which has changed over the past 20 years since 1978. He 
argues that the central-local relationship in China has stepped into “de facto 
federalism”, in which “a relatively institutionalized pattern which involves an 
explicit or implicit bargain between the center and the provinces, one element in the 
bargain being that the provinces receive certain institutionalized or ad hoc benefits in 
return for guarantees by provincial officials that they will behave in certain ways on 
behalf of the center” (Zheng, 2007, p. 39). Local governments obtained institutional 
settings and legitimacy to intervene in economic activities in their jurisdiction from 
intergovernmental decentralization. According to Zheng, central government could 
no longer eliminate any localistic development in the practical structure of central- 
local relations in China. Central government has to seek the cooperation of local 
governments to have policy implemented. In other words, reciprocity has replaced 
coercion and bargaining and has become the most common mechanism in the 
interaction between central and local government as the decentralization progressed. 
The de facto federalism theory is one of the most sophisticated attempts to reflect the 
change of the central-local relationship in China over the last few decades. It offers a 
systematic understanding of the practical operation of the central-local relationship in 
China. In order to determine the extent to whether the de facto federalism has 
captured the nature of the central-local relationship in China, the power distribution 
between the central and local, the interaction and interest express between the central 
and local, and fiscal relation between the central and local have been examined in this 
research. The mixed evidence shows that some changes in the central-local 
relationship have taken place in recent decades and led to a more powerful and 
autonomous local government. Although those powers reserved during 
decentralization for the local government are not institutionalized by law, as Zheng 
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stated, since there is so-called “mutual accountability” between central leaders and 
provincial leaders, and the nomenklatura system is no longer the most efficient way 
to guarantee the central government’s control upon the local. Thus, the central-local 
relationship in China operates in the way of de facto federalism even without 
institutional guarantee. 
However, the rapid changes in China are not only seen in economic growth; it is also 
visible in institutional transformation. The research of de facto federalism was 
conducted based on the data of 20 years’ “opening up and reform”. After Zheng’s 
research has been finished (2007), new changes which may affect the central-local 
relationship has taken place. There has been a new round of healthcare reforms, and a 
rapid rise of the “project mechanism”; new factors in how central government and 
local government interact with each other particularly in fiscal perspective. Rather 
than presenting a blow-by-blow account of complex and new reforms in China, this 
research aims at providing an insight into the operation of the central-local 
relationship with reforms taken place in the past 30 years and even its developing 
path roots in history.  
The empirical contribution of this research comprises a series of study on relevant 
documents and interview data that has been obtained from those who are highly 
involved in the operation of the central-local relationship and healthcare policy 
process, including officials who work for governments on the county level and 
provincial level, officials who work in healthcare and financial departments in 
sample provinces, and officials who work for central ministries such as the 
Healthcare Ministry and the Financial Ministry. All these interviews provide 
substantial evidence on changes and practices of central-local interaction. However, 
the key question remains as to how these changes impact on the central-local 
relationship and healthcare policy.  
The study on power distribution between central and local government presents that 
there is no formal institutionalized power distribution between the central and local 
especially demonstrating what they should not do, even though China has already 
experienced several rounds of centralization and decentralization. In fact, the 
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principle of “cooperate with local government through conferment” has been used by 
Mao after the PRC was newly established, and it is even influential in present daily 
politics according to the response of interviewees. It may indicate that the 
non-institutionalized power distribution might be a result of path dependency on 
political arrangement and traditions.  
The study of central-local interactions and interest expression suggests that local 
government has developed more and more as an independent unit which has more 
independent political, economic and social reform interests along with the process of 
decentralization. Local government has been granted power and space on policy 
refinement, because central government tends to release principle plans on social 
development and even economic affairs. Thus, the local government has space to 
interpret and implement central policy according to their own interests. This may be 
an indicator that illustrates that the central government no longer has strong control 
over local government to keep them in line with the central, and reciprocity 
mechanism might be increasingly used to keep smooth interaction between the 
central and local.  
The study on fiscal relations between central government and local government 
demonstrate that local government lacks independent fiscal space. The local 
governments who rely on central transfer payment such as Inner Mongolia can hardly 
respond to the variety of its residents’ public service needs, and expenditure 
preferences could be guided by the central to a certain degree. It also suggests that 
central policy projects attached with specific transfer payments play quite a crucial 
role between the central and local governments particularly in social welfare area. 
Local governments at the county level, the most common applicant of such projects, 
are passionate to be included in projects. The attached transfer payment is regarded as 
important source for local developing. Therefore, central government enhances its 
capacity on mobilizing local fiscal resource and policy implementation in local area 
because the central holds the dominant power on project release. The project 
mechanism has become a new type of governance and profoundly influences the 
central-local relationship in China.  
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To sum up, it has been observed that de facto federalism is more likely to be a 
description of the power dilemma that the central government used to face after two 
decades of decentralization. However, the rise of the project mechanism has changed 
the position of central government in central-local interactions. The provincial 
government could be a “bypass” in the operation of the project mechanism and the 
central is put in direct relation to numerous county governments when implementing 
policies in local areas. The central becomes more powerful because of the power of 
project release. Therefore, central government has sought to obtain a certain degree 
of intervention on local policy implementation, and de facto federalism may be 
inappropriate to reflect the nature of the central-local relationship in China.           
When we expand our vision from recent changes in the central-local relationship to 
the repeated rounds of centralization and decentralization that took place after the 
PRC was established, it could be observed that the central-local relation has been kept 
in dynamic balance in which there is certain extent of flexibility and space to have 
central-local power distribution and possession changed according to realistic 
demands. The tradition of non-institutionalized power distribution could be a key 
reflection of this feature. Non-institutionalized power distribution is more likely to be 
an intentional choice to keep flexibility to adjust the settings between the central and 
local in response to internal and external difficulties. Central government is in a 
relatively powerful position which can initiate decentralization and centralization in 
this dynamic relation.      
The basic logic behind this dynamic central-local relationship is the culture of unity. 
Maintaining unity has received profound positive feedback during the long living 
history of China and become a cultural context for daily political operation. Central 
authority is emphasized because it is highly related to unity. Therefore, it is not 
difficult to understand why central government has a relatively powerful position in 
the dynamic central-local relationship and why there has formed a tradition of 
non-institutionalized power distribution between the central and local government. 
The culture of unity could be such a crucial factor in China that it not only set 
boundaries for reforms, but also helped to form the basic interaction model between 
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the central and the local, in which central government has been granted flexibility and 
an advantageous position to initiate changes in power possession between central and 
local in order to looking for a solution when realistic difficulties.  
                 
Section 9.2: Limitations  
The research objective of understanding the nature of central-local relations and its 
role in the healthcare system in China has been achieved through a qualitative 
research method. However, there are still several shortcomings that should be 
identified. Firstly, in order to understand the nature of central-local relations in China 
and their impact on healthcare policy, documentary and interview analysis was 
employed to provide an insight into the daily operation of the central-local 
relationship and how it influences healthcare policy. However, regarding its data 
validity and appropriateness, we can not necessarily generalise from the healthcare 
field to other areas of social policy, which may display different dynamics.  
Secondly, Beijing, Guangdong and Inner Mongolia were chosen as the sample 
provinces to be studied with regard to their differences on healthcare performance 
and “province type”. However, this research only provides a starting point for 
understanding the research questions and a broader study of provinces could 
potentially lead to different conclusions. It would benefit from a broader empirical 
exploration on more provinces in China for the theorization of the research question. 
Thirdly, the qualitative interviews played an important role in collecting data from 
sample provinces. Although I have tried my best to contact and secure a large number 
of the key officials who are highly involved in the healthcare policy process and 
central-local interaction from county level to national level, however, this research 
would have benefitted from a broader range of interviews with more senior officials 
from the central and local government. In addition, as some of the interview 
questions involve cases and processes that have spanned several years, the precision 
of some part of the data could be vulnerable to criticism. Hence, multiple sources of 
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evidence such as documents and archival data were employed as triangulation in 
order to strengthen the reliability and validity of the interview data.  
Lastly, this thesis also suffered from trying to stay on top of political developments. 
As I mentioned, the central-local relations in China are a rather dynamic affair that 
change frequently. When I was collecting data via interviews in China, specific 
transfer payments were widely used and were a part of a new kind of governance. 
However, by the time of writing up the discussion chapter, the central government 
had released a new document to control the scale of specific transfer payment. This 
new development was included in this thesis at a later date and demonstrates the 
dynamic nature of the central-local relationship in China.  
 
Section 9.3: Avenues for further study 
While China has experienced significant changes in central-local relations, scholars 
have been slow to develop their distinctive voices on this issue. It is because the 
tradition of social policy research is quite limited in China and the ability to engage in 
serious evidence-based research is circumscribed by jealously guarded access to 
government organizations – the preserve of a privileged few. Little attempt has been 
made to either combine Chinese scholarship with Western theories or develop 
authentic Chinese theories to study how intergovernmental relations affect healthcare 
policy. Moreover, very few researchers examine central-local relations based on 
current changes such as the rise of the project mechanism. 
This research has been produced to make sense of the nature of central-local relations 
through qualitative comparative research. Zheng’s and Pierson’s research were used 
to explore the research question. However, more comparative study is needed, and 
perhaps a more quantitative research method may be used to explore the nature and 
changes of central-local fiscal relations in an evidence-based way. 
Furthermore, as central-local relations develop in a relatively rapid way, there should 
be more emphasis on the details of the latest changes to central-local relations, such 
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as the rise of the project mechanism in different policy areas and the extent to which it 
does (or does not) constrain de facto federalism in China. Lastly, as China has a very 
long history and has been greatly affected by it, it may be better to explore the topic 
more from the perspective of history. A broader historical horizon will be helpful in 
discovering the true factors or elements that affect central-local relations. 
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List of abbreviations and acronyms 
 
BE  Bureaucratic Enterprise 
CAQDAS  Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software 
CPC      Communist Party of China  
CPPCC    Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
GDP      Gross Domestic Product 
MPF  Market-preserving federalism 
NDRC    National Development Reform Committee 
NPC      National People’s Congress 
PLA      People’s Liberation Army 
PRC       People’s Republic of China 
PSC      Politburo Standing Committee 
ROC      Republic of China 
SAR      Special Administrative Region 
SOE  State-owned enterprises 
TSS      Tax Sharing System 
UK        United Kingdom 
US        United States 
WTO      World Trade Organization 
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Appendix 1: Details of Interviewees  
No Date location Working Department 
1 2014 08 21 Hohhot, 
Inner Mongolia 
General Office Of Provincial 
Government 
2 2014 08 25 Hohhot, 
Inner Mongolia 
Healthcare Department 
3 2014 08 27 Hohhot, 
Inner Mongolia 
Municipal Department Of 
Healthcare Insurance 
4 2014 08 28 Hohhot, 
Inner Mongolia 
Provincial Healthcare 
Department 
5 2014 08 28 Hohhot, 
Inner Mongolia 
Policy Research Office Of 
Provincial Government       
6 2014 08 29 Hohhot, 
Inner Mongolia 
Medical Affair Office Of 
Healthcare Department 
7 2014 08 29 Hohhot, 
Inner Mongolia 
Administration Office Of 
Provincial Government 
8 2014 09 10 Hohhot, 
Inner Mongolia 
Policy And Regulation Office 
Of Healthcare Department 
9 2014 09 15 Hohhot, 
Inner Mongolia 
Healthcare Insurance Office 
Of Provincial Human 
Resource And Social Security 
Department 
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10 2014 09 16 Hohhot, 
Inner Mongolia 
Agriculture Affair Office Of 
Provincial People’S Congress   
Senior Officer 
11 2014 09 18 Hohhot, 
Inner Mongolia 
Investment Office Of 
Provincial Development And 
Reform Department 
12 2014 09 18 Hohhot, 
Inner Mongolia 
Representative Office Of 
Provincial People’S Congress 
13 2014 10 15 Beijing Research Office Of 
International Poverty 
Reduction Centre Of China 
14 2014 10 15 Beijing Institute Of Fiscal Science Of 
China 
15 2014 10 16 Beijing Development Research Centre 
Of The National Healthcare 
Ministry 
16 2014 10 23 Beijing Analysis Centre Of Beijing 
Complaints Bureau 
17 2014 10 29 Beijing Department of Sociology Of 
Peking University 
18 2014 10 30 Beijing Department of Healthcare 
Policy And Management Of 
Peking University 
19 2014 11 02 Beijing Beijing Municipal 
Administration of Hospitals 
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20 2014 11 03 Beijing 
(Telephone 
interview ) 
Sun Yat-Sen Hospital Of 
Fudan University 
21 2014 11 06 Beijing Pharmaceutical Affairs Office 
Of National Healthcare 
Ministries 
22 2014 11 06 Beijing Pharmaceutical Affairs Office 
Of National Healthcare 
Ministries 
23 2014 11 07 Beijing Institute Of National 
Development In Peking 
University 
24 2014 11 13 Guangzhou, 
Guangdong Province 
School Of Government, Sun 
Yat-Sen University 
25 2014 11 20 Guangzhou, 
Guangdong Province 
Reform Office Of Guangzhou 
Healthcare Department 
26 2014 11 24 Guangzhou, 
Guangdong Province 
Policy And Regulation Office 
Of Guangdong Healthcare 
Department 
27 2014 11 25 Guangzhou, 
Guangdong Province 
Policy And Regulation Office 
Of Guangdong Healthcare 
Department 
28 2014 11 25 Guangzhou, 
Guangdong Province 
Administrative Office Of 
Guangdong Healthcare 
Department 
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29 2014 11 26 Shenzhen, 
Guangdong Province 
Reform Office Of Shenzhen 
Healthcare Department 
30 2014 12 03 Guangzhou, 
Guangdong Province 
Budget Office Of Guangdong 
Financial Department 
31 2014 12 03 Guangzhou, 
Guangdong Province 
Government Of Haizhu 
District In Guangzhou 
32 2014 12 09 Guangzhou, 
Guangdong Province 
Budget Office Of Guangzhou 
Financial Department 
33 2014 12 12 Hohhot, 
Inner Mongolia 
Budget Office Of Provincial 
Financial Department 
34 2014 12 16 Hohhot, 
Inner Mongolia 
County Government Of 
Saihan District In Huhhot 
35 2014 12 22 Beijing Reform Department Of 
National Healthcare Ministry 
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Appendix 2: Question list 
 
Warming up: 
When did you enter this working field? 
 
How long have you been working for this department? 
 
To what extent you deal issues with the central/local department in your work? 
 
Power distribution: 
 
Is there any clear division of responsibility between your department and the 
central/local one? If so, please give some detail. If not, how you deal with the 
central/local in practice? 
 
How is the power of policy-making divided between your department and the 
central/local? 
 
How is the power of policy implementation divided between your department and the 
central/local? 
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Have you ever experience working difficulties (for example disagreement or 
bargaining) in your work when dealing with the central/local? What form does it 
take? 
 
How is this resolved in practice? 
 
To what extent does the manner in which disagreements are resolved and policies are 
made and implemented in practice reflect formal rules? 
 
Is relationship you just described a common phenomenon in your working field? 
Does it work in a similar way in other relevant department? Please give some 
examples 
 
Interest expression: 
How do the local/your department express interest to your department/ the central in 
practice? 
 
Have you experience any difficulties in such expression? If so, what is it? 
 
How is the difficulty resolved? 
 
How does such expression affect policy making and implementation? 
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Fiscal relation: 
What is the division of responsibilities concerning money raising and expenditure 
powers between your department and the central ministry/ local department? 
 
Have you experienced any difficulties on this fiscal relation with the central/local? If 
so please give some examples. 
 
How is the difficulty resolved?  
 
How do these affect policy making and implementation? 
 
Personnel power 
How are relationships between central and local officials in your work field formed 
and sustained over time? 
 
What is the promotion mechanism between your department and the central/local? 
 
To what extent does this promotion mechanism affect decision-making and policy 
implementation? 
 
Province diversity 
For interviewee on the local level: What are the specific factors related to this 
province that affect the central-local relation? Please give some detail. 
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For interviewee on the central level: What are the specific factors related to particular 
provinces that affect the central-local relation? Please give some detail 
 
For interviewee on the local level: How do the factors impact on healthcare outcomes 
in your province? 
For interviewee on the central level: How do the factors impact on healthcare 
outcomes variation between provinces and localities? 
 
End up: 
 
Are there any other things about the central-local relationship and policy making or 
implementation that you want to share? 
 
Who do you recommend to be interviewed next about this topic? 
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Appendix 3: Information sheet 
 
Date: 
 
Dear X: 
 
Title:   “Understanding the role of central-local relation in healthcare system in 
China” 
 
Name of Researcher:  Xiaoyu Zhai  
 
Invitation to Participate:  
I am writing to invite you to participate in an in-depth interview that I am conducting 
to help me understand better the ways in which the central-local relation in China 
affects healthcare policy.  The research has several objectives: (a) to generate new 
approaches for understanding the nature of current central-local relation in China. It is 
in types of federalism, unitary or neither (b) to explore how this relation affects the 
healthcare policies. How the central-local relation affect the process of policy making 
and policy implementation (c) to contribute this knowledge to the field of social 
policy as a way to further understand the relation between institutional arrangement 
and social policy .  
 
I have included two copies of the consent form in this mailing. If you decide to 
participate in the proposed research, please sign both copies and return one signed 
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copy to me. Please keep the Information sheet and the other consent form for your 
records.  
 
Participation is voluntary; Right to Withdraw without Negative Consequences 
Prospective research participants are under no obligation to participate in this 
research project; there are no negative consequences to deciding not to participate.  
 
If you do agree to participate, you are not obliged to answer specific questions or to 
provide information you do not wish to give. You have the right to not answer 
specific questions but continue as a participant. If you choose to participate and have 
agreed to have the interviews audio recorded, you may at any time ask that the audio 
recorder be turned off. Indeed you can withdraw from the interview by stating that 
you have decided to withdraw.  
 
In addition, you can withdraw from the project up until the point when the interviews 
have been transcribed. There will be no negative consequences to withdrawing from 
the research project. You can state your intention to withdraw from the project by 
contacting me, the researcher, Xiaoyu Zhai (contact information is provided on both 
of the enclosed forms). If you choose to withdraw from the project please indicate 
whether you want the previously collected data destroyed or returned to you.  
 
 
Purpose and Description of the Research: 
The interview that I am inviting you to participate in will be a discussion of your 
experience of being an official or expert in healthcare system or in a relevant aspect of 
the policy process. I would like to ask you questions about your experience of the 
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policy process and what kind of the influence that the central-local relation have in 
your working field 
 
 
What will be required of participant, including time commitment? 
The interview will be private and will take place in a mutually agreed upon location. I 
would like to make audio-recordings of the interviews and have them transcribed later.  
Also, if you would like to have a summary report of the research finding please 
indicates that on the consent form. 
 
 
Confidentiality and Anonymity  
Your participation in these interviews will be kept in confidence. Pseudonyms will be 
used for all participants. Confidentiality of your data is assured. All data will be 
transcribed by me and/or a professional transcriber and we will both be bound by 
confidentiality. We will keep all data tapes and transcripts in a secure and locked 
place until the project is complete. No identifying information will be included in any 
document resulting from this study.  
 
 
 
Storage of the data  
Tapes and transcripts and any other data will be kept for 1 year after the completion 
of the project and then destroyed.  
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Contact information   
Xiaoyu Zhai 
Department of Social policy and Social work 
The University of York 
Heslington 
York, YO10 5DD 
UK  
Email:  xyz500@york.ac.uk 
Mobile: (0044) 7517268440 
 
Thank you for considering this request.  
 
 
Signature of Researcher: __________________________ 
Date: _________________________ 
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Appendix 4: Consent form  
If you agree to participate in this research, please read these following statements and tick 
YES or NO next to each based on your will. It should then be signed and returned to 
Xiaoyu Zhai 
 
I have read the information sheet and had the opportunity to ask 
questions  Yes/No 
I understand that I can withdraw voluntarily from the research  Yes/No 
I understand that data will be used in the research project  entitled “Understanding 
the role of central-local relation in healthcare system in China” 
I give permission for the interview to tape recorded  Yes/No 
 
Data anonymity  
I would like my full name appears in the quotations of the research report  Yes/No 
I would like my job title appears in the quotations of the research report  Yes/No 
I would like my working place appears in the quotations of the research report  Yes/No 
 
Accessibility to the research data and result  
 
I would like a copy of the transcripts of my interview   Yes/No 
 
I would like a copy of the summary report from the research data   Yes/No 
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________________________ 
Signature 
 
________________________ 
Date 
Return to:   
Xiaoyu Zhai 
Department of Social policy and Social work 
The University of York 
Heslington 
York, YO10 5DD 
UK  
Email:  xyz500@york.ac.uk 
Mobile: (0044) 7517268440 
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